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Abstract
This thesis recognises two axioms of materialism. Firstly, that the human or 
other agent is within and is comprised of the same stuff as, a universe made up 
of material things, each of which is, in principle, explicable in materialist terms. 
Secondly, that the theorist is himself an agent, explicable within the theory of 
agency that he propounds. The author contends that any attempt to explain 
complex conscious human agency ‘from the top down’ faces either a potential 
regress of explaining the aetiology of human agency in terms of some agency of 
design or the view, canvassed by Colin McGinn, (1989), that the human mind is 
‘cognitively closed’ to the concepts that would explain how human 
consciousness can arise from the material substance of the brain.
The author has avoided this dilemma by postulating an austere characterisation 
of agency, from which the rich and manifold nature of human agency and 
intentionality has developed by the accidents of evolution. He holds that this 
austere agency may be explained by natural accidents of chemical combination 
that have led, by the accidents of evolution, to the phenomena of reproductive 
life, functionally characterised in this explanation by agency and autopoiesis. 
This austere characterisation of agency is an example of a functional system. 
Agency is a capacity of an entity within the physical system of an agent in the 
world. This capacity is enabled by functions that the author has named; 
‘perception’, ‘representation’, 'cognitive process' and ‘action’. Through the 
processes of perception, physical states of the world physically cause changes 
in representational states of agency; within cognitive processes, representational 
states combine to cause actions of agency that change states of the world, that 
includes the agent, in ways that maintain or tend towards those goal states of 
the agent in the world, that are postulated in a theory of agency.
It is argued that this concept of agency is functionally isomorphic with the 
technological concept of regulation. Two theorems from regulation are 
particularly relevant. Firstly, Ashby’s theorem that for successful regulation the 
variety of possible states in the regulator must at least match the variety of 
states regulated against. Secondly, the very idea of regulation stems from the 
epistemic contingency for the agent, of events regulated against. Life, as we 
know it on earth, is reproduced by reproductive behaviour that follows and 
reproduces the programmes encoded in DNA. The autopoietic maintenance of 
the structure of the living organism against the contingencies of an 
unpredictable world is enabled by the mechanisms of agency.
The structure of the thesis and the ontological commitments of the author are 
set out in a first introductory chapter. In the second chapter the author 
summarises the history and currant range of application of the system concept 
and describes the philosophical implications of his notion of a physical system. 
The notions of physical cause, accident, function, supervenience, representation 
and alternative realisation that are assumed within the thesis are also described 
in this chapter. The third chapter is devoted to the development of the concept 
of agency as a capacity, characterized by goals and intentionality and enabled 
by the functions listed above. Examples of agency in the world are described in 
the fourth chapter. These range from the simple reflex agency of a governor, 
unicellular organism or part of a plant to the complex integrated agency of 
production control systems, advanced vertebrates, including us, and social 
groupings such as a colony of social insects or some aspects of a human 
corporation. Also, within this chapter, the author considers the impact of 
language on human social agency, the implications of social agency for the 
attribution of personhood and through semantic ascent, the social practices of 
attribution of meaning, truth and mind, and the propositional attitudes. He 
concludes that, since agency necessarily involves an agent in its world and 
human language is about the world as it is for the human agent; language, 
agency and the world are explanatorily inseparable.
In the fifth and sixth chapters the author applies his theory of human agency to 
the computational theory of mind and the apparent tension between 
determinism, free will and personal responsibility. The author concludes: 
Firstly, that the brain as an organ of representation, is not a computer since 
computation is an act of agency, although parts of the brain may have a 
combinatorial function within such acts. Secondly, if freedom is defined as an 
absence of physical constraint then a free agent is physically responsible for its 
acts. Within the social practice of attribution of personhood to the continuous 
ongoing agent within the community, each person is held responsible for his 
actions, including those that change the future agency of himself and others, for 
better or for worse, according to the valuation of the community. In a final 
chapter the author summarises some of the philosophical implications of his 
thesis. The notions of variety in regulation and of autopoiesis as a necessary 
criterion of life are used in the thesis and are explained in each of two 
appendices.
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1INTRODUCTION
1.1 Summary of Thesis
In this thesis I shall develop an account of agency that is based on a system 
description of the behaviour of an entity in an environment as action for the 
goals of the entity consequent on perception of the environment. This differs 
from standard accounts of agency principally in two respects.
Firstly, previous accounts have explained actions in the world by reference to 
desires and knowledge that are states of the agent and some capacity in the 
agent to gain beliefs from perception and choose action appropriate to beliefs 
and desires. I claim that these accounts leave desire as an explanatory dangler. 
By explaining agency as functionally isomorphic to regulation, action is 
explained as a functional component in a causal regulatory process between an 
entity and its environment. Regulation depends on goals and I explain the goals 
postulated in a theory of natural agency as the result of the accidents of 
evolution by which each organism is so structured that it is apt for system 
description in terms of agency. If regulation and agency are functionally 
isomorphic then our artefacts of regulation are also apt for system description in 
terms of agency.
Secondly, my concept of agency extends to simple organisms and artefacts of 
regulation. An austere definition of agency in system terms leads to a functional 
specification that is realised in a vast range of entities familiar in our world.
This is an explanation of mind and language from the bottom up. The argument 
is aetiological and can be summarised in eight steps.
2(i) There is a material universe of stuff constrained by physical laws
(ii) The aetiology of natural agency is accidental and evolutionary.
(iii) Acts of agency are concerned with what is contingent for the agent
(iv) Agency is realised in the material stuff of this universe
(v) By its acts each agent divides the material stuff into a world of things 
for it.
(vi) Evolution of the cooperative social agency of human kind has led to 
languages that denote things and the practices of reference to things that 
are for  humans.
(vii) Semantic ascent within language has enabled human practices of 
attribution of propositional attitudes and an articulated theory of mind.
(viii) Human theorising has led to a reification of mind and the invention of 
the mind-body problem.
1.2 Outline of Thesis
This thesis is in three parts. Firstly, a methodology of explanation based on the 
notion of system is developed. Secondly, this methodology is applied to an 
analysis of agency, as the capacity for intentional action in the world. Thirdly, 
the value of this analysis is demonstrated by its application to two problem 
areas; the computational model of cognition and the tension between the 
notions of determinism and responsibility. Chapter 2 deals with the system 
methodology of explanation. The application of this methodology to agency 
and intentionality is considered in Chapters 3 and 4. The two problem areas are 
considered in Chapter 5 and 6. The system concepts of autopoiesis and requisite 
variety are used in the thesis and are explained in two appendices.
31.3 Not a Physicalist Thesis
A principal aim of the thesis is to establish a methodology which will enable 
self-consistent explanation of ourselves as organisms, individuals and members 
of our various social and linguistic communities without postulating any stuff 
separate from the varieties of physical stuff studied by our physical sciences or 
any causal agency which is not within the purview of the physical sciences. 
This makes me a monist and some kind of a naturalist, but not a physicalist. 
Wilkes, (1978, 1), explicates the 'physical' as " picking out all and only the 
items, processes, concepts, laws, hypotheses, theories or theoretical postulates 
used essentially by physical scientists". Like Wilkes, I take as axiomatic that 
"... the physical sciences which study the brain and human activity can have or 
devise a vocabulary adequate for the identification of any physical event, state 
or process." However, in my own way and for my own reasons which will 
emerge in the course of this thesis, I recognise functional theories based on the 
notion of a system and these theories are not reducible to physical theories, 
hence I reject physicalism. In a narrative description singular physical events 
have singular causal explanations but the teleological implications of a 
functional explanation within a system description may preclude reduction, in 
the Nagel, (1961), usage, of function-theoretical terms to the theoretical terms 
of physical science. However, this system description is consistent with a 
background assumption that none of the entities or events that realise a system 
contradict the laws of physical science. As will emerge, I am a realist about the 
representational states of agency and an instrumentalist about the goals of 
agency. Propositional attitudes such as belief are to be interpreted 
instrumentally, although states of attribution of each of the attitudes are real 
states of the linguistic community within which they are attributed.
1.4 Cause and Accident
My notion of 'cause' is physical and explanatory. I assume a Humean account of 
causality. Certain phenomena show a constant conjunction and if two events are
4causally linked in this way then; if one event had not been the second never had 
existed. Natural events, those lacking agent cause, are generally linked by 
various phenomena and causal explanation is easier in principle than in 
practice. However, over the billions of years between the big bang and the 
advent of life on this planet, events led to events and were susceptible to 
physical causal explanation had we been around to do it. I take no view as to 
whether the world, as described by the ‘true physics’ is deterministic or not. 
The actions of agency are responses to events that are epistemically contingent 
for the agent. Although many events that we note in our world today bear the 
mark of agent cause, the very fact of agency is the result of accidental events, 
constrained by physical law.
1.5 The Place of Biology
My concept of natural agency is within the explanatory scheme of biology. 
Many writers have contended that the concepts of biology are not reducible, 
although no entities discussed by biologists are inconsistent with the laws of 
physics and this is the stance that I will assume. Since my notion of agency 
includes both biological agents and artefacts of regulation, it is unsurprising 
that that it extends continuously throughout the phylogenetic tree to primitive 
and complex organisms and also, within a complex agent, whether natural or 
artefact, to its regulatory supporting structures.
1.6 System Description
System descriptions are essentially counterfactual. A system description picks 
out a set of possible worlds. Its use is to explain how the range of outcomes is 
constrained by the theories, components and boundaries which define the entity 
described. The notion of system is an important tool in this thesis and a chapter 
is devoted to the history, metaphysics and application of this notion.
5Systems may be described in terms of abstract functions, which, if realisable, 
may be capable of alternative realisations. Alternatively, a system description 
may be of a specific structure of actual physical components. Such a structure 
may be apt for characterisation in functional terms and if so, these functions 
may be realisable in alternative physical structures.
In Chapter 2 ,1 describe the history of the system concept and how this has led 
to the application of system thinking to explanation and intervention within 
complex human organisations and artefacts. Within this chapter, I explain my 
own specific usage of 'system' as a mode of description of an entity which is 
characterised by the counterfactuality of event and outcome. This usage 
requires precise definitions of the notions of cause and function and these are 
given. In a causal explanation, effect follows cause within a flow of events 
constrained by physical laws. In a functional explanation, certain phenomena 
are seen as apt for explanation in terms of the capacities of entities. Such an 
entity may be described as comprised of components, which have functions that 
enable the capacities of the entity. Although the capacities of any given entity 
may be explained uniquely in terms of specific functions that are realised in 
specific structures; for any given function, alternative physical realisations may 
exist.
1.7 Intentionality
Brentano, (1874), described the objects of mental phenomena, the components 
of our desires and fears as 'intentional objects'. His contention was that: since 
these objects relate to propositions that are immaterial entities, mental 
properties must be irreducible and materialism must be false. By this thesis, 
intentionally is the hallmark of the mental as manifest in articulate thought and 
much of current philosophy of mind and language is concerned with the 
implications of this assumption. I will argue that this assumption draws a false 
distinction between man and other living creatures. Man recognises and
6describes objects that are intentional for him and distinguishes between living 
things and artefacts of regulation. Animals with nervous systems recognise 
objects that are intentional for them. All organisms and regulatory artefacts 
behave in ways which man can describe as regulatory, goal seeking and 
intentional: by their behaviour such entities classify objects that are intentional 
for them.
1.8 Agency
In Chapter 3, I discuss the interrelated concepts of agency, intentionality, 
perception, representation, goal and action. Although my usage of these 
concepts is close to that current in the philosophy of mind and cognition, some 
of this usage is technical. In particular, I refine the concept of human agency to 
an austere agency that is a capacity of an entity to react to the events of an 
unpredictable environment so as to further its goals.
I follow Davidson in defining agency as characterised by action that is 
intentional under a description and from this I derive a functional 
characterisation of agency in terms of perception, representation, goal and 
action. By this austere definition, any artefact that displays regulatory 
behaviour can be described as having agency. In the terms of Dennett, (1987, 
15), it is an intentional system.1
Within a theory of agency; perception, representation, cognitive process and 
action are functions of the entity that enable its agency. By perception, states of 
the world change the representational states of the agent; through cognitive
1 What Dennett actually writes is: "What it is to be a true believer is to be an intentional system, 
a system whose behaviour is reliably and voluminously predictable via the intentional strategy." 
Dennett is however, an instrumentalist regarding the attitudes. Whether Dennett is a realist 
about systems is unclear. The distinctions between Dennett's position and my own will emerge.
7processes, representational states combine to cause learning and action. Action 
is change in the agent that changes the world for the goals of the agent. 
Perception is the process by which representational states are maintained as 
representations of the world for the agent. Representational states are about the 
world for the agent; as the world is presented to the agent so these states re­
present the world for the agent. Goals are postulates within a theory of agency 
that explain how the actions of agency are for  the agent; they are possible 
worlds picked out by the system that describes the agency of this agent.
This austere concept of agency can be compared with an equally austere 
concept of regulation by which entities that may be organisms or artefacts act 
towards their goals in an unpredictable environment. Cybernetics is the 
discipline concerned with the theory of regulating mechanisms. If agency is 
equivalent to regulation then the explanatory tools of cybernetics are 
explanatory for agency. If regulation is counter entropic then agency is counter 
entropic. Each act of agency is determined since it follows from the state of the 
world and the representational and states and goals of the agent but each state of 
the world is unpredictable for the agent; if it were otherwise it would be 
programmed. Thus, each act of agency is a spontaneous response to an event 
that is epistemically contingent for that agent. Successful regulation requires 
requisite variety. If an organism has evolved to survive in virtue of its agency 
then its representational variety will match the variety of states in the world that 
are relevant to its survival.
My naturalisation of agency and intentionality is based on the thesis that the 
very notion of intentionality is implicit in the regulatory behaviour of living 
things and artefacts of regulation. Several authors have contributed to the thesis 
that the maintenance and behaviour of living things is essentially cybernetic2. A
2 Cannon, (1932), Ashby (1956), Sommerhoff, (1950), Wiener, (1961), and Nagel, (1979), to 
name but a few.
separate application of systems to biology has been the work of Maturana on 
cognitive systems leading to his collaboration with Varela in describing the 
autopoietic account of life as self-maintenance. Cybernetics is the science of 
control and in organisms or artefacts, control can be homeostatic or heterotelic, 
Sayre, (1976, 52-54). Homeostatic control is concerned with internal 
maintenance of states of an entity by variation within the entity. Heterotelic 
control is concerned with the control of states of an entity by action in an 
environment.
By our current physical theories, our universe is characterised by entropy. 
Although the closed organisation by which living things maintain their identity 
is apt for description in terms of autopoiesis, the open organisation by which 
living things sustain their autopoiesis by maintaining essential relations with 
their environment must be described in cybernetic terms and this maintenance 
is counter entropic.
1.9 Representation
The concept of representation is central to the theory of agency, which iis the 
central topic of chapter 3. The concept of representation is introduced in 
Chapter 2, where the intrinsic and non-conventional representations of agency 
are distinguished from the extrinsic conventional representations of language 
and symbol. The content of an intrinsic representation is attributed within a 
theory of agency. Such theories will be within some domain of description 
chosen by the theorist and a description of the content of a representation within 
agency will be comprised of concepts, within this domain and possessed by the 
theorist, that are of whatever is represented. If such a domain is realistic, in that 
the description is of a world real for the theorist, then bridging laws available to 
the theorist will link alternative physical descriptions, also available to the 
theorist. Alternatively, functional domains will include functional objects, real
9for the theorist. Either of these domains of description may be used to describe 
and explain the same instance of agency.
Different theories will invoke different representations that may be differently 
realised but if an entity is apt for description in these different theories of 
agency then cognitive variety of representation will be available to realise each 
of the representations invoked. However, the content of all such representation 
is described in concepts of the theorist, and these are not, in general, concepts 
of the agent.
Concepts of the theorist are abstracta realised in the practices of language and 
in language the terms that denote concepts are representations .by convention 
The distinction between representations and misrepresentations within agency 
is explored in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 contains examples of natural and artefactual 
agency that illustrate misrepresentation within agency. Representation by 
convention and associated misrepresentation is considered in Chapter 5. The 
distinction between conventional representations and representations within 
agency is pertinent to the computational theory of cognition which is 
considered and opposed in Chapter 5.
1.10 Levels of Agency
Using Ashby's, (1956), notion of requisite variety, I suggest that the 
development of complexity in life can be seen as an evolutionary response to 
the possibilities of complexity inherent in the natural world. This can then be 
described as an increased complexity of those objects that may be defined, 
within our system description of agency, as intentional for the creature. These 
objects comprise the world of the creature that recognises them. By 'world' I do 
not mean planet Earth, although for all of us our world is within it. We are 
complex creatures and our concepts of the intentional objects, whether chairs, 
elephants, computers, quarks or galaxies, which comprise our world reflect our 
complexity. Although my hypothesis is that all of these worlds are emergent
10
descriptions of the same physical stuff and the project of physics is to describe 
this stuff, I cannot demonstrate this. Neither can I demonstrate the reality of the 
objects of our world.
The rich variety and complexity of human agency and our artefacts of 
regulation is a long way from the austere concepts of regulation, representation 
and goal. In Chapter 4 I give some examples of landmarks on the spectrum 
between the basic regulation of a simple control mechanism or prokaryotic cell, 
and the complex integrated agency manifest in our diverse responses to events 
in our world.
1.11 Teleology and Goals
The thesis is frankly teleological in that I explain agency by the attribution of 
goals and agency as a capacity within the essence of an organism or artefact of 
regulation. I follow Aristotle in attributing a telos to such entities, and this telos 
will include the processes of operation, maturation and change prescribed by 
the genome of an organism and the design of an artefact. I also follow Aristotle 
in holding that, once the organism is bom or the artefact is switched on, it is of 
the essence of the entity that, ceteris paribus, it will behave thus and so. If we 
define a local necessity as following the telos and a local accidentality as 
causation by factors not within the telos, (instantiations of other things not 
being equal) then Aristotle's terminology applies. This necessity is law like but 
these are not the physical laws of our universe, such laws have evolved or for 
an artefact, have been designed, and they could have been otherwise. Accidents 
of evolution or the design of artefacts have occurred within the constraints of 
physical laws. Whether these physical laws could have been otherwise is 
beyond the scope of this thesis
Teleological explanation can be characterised by the invocation of ends and 
goals and each of these is at risk of reification. In my analysis I shall define
11
function in explanatory terms following Cummins, (1975). Although I use 
Millikan's, (1984), notion of Normal3 function as a natural biological function 
that explains current functionality because of its reproductive history, I do not 
follow Millikan in her reification of such functions, Millikan, (1993, 19). The 
behaviour of organisms can be explained in terms of functions and each such 
explanation is of some capacity of an organism. It is in these terms that the 
functional system of autopoiesis explains the survival and autonomy of an 
organism, the functional system of circulation explains the oxygen metabolism 
of the mammalian body and the functional system of agency explains the 
interaction between an organism and its environment. I define the goals of 
agency as possible worlds picked out by the cognitive processes of agency, 
within the system of an agent in the world. Survival and reproduction are 
theoretical terms within a theory of the agency of organisms. In these terms, 
current realisations of natural agency have evolved through the survival and 
reproduction of previous generations against the accidents of previous 
environments. The complex goals described within a theory of natural agency 
are enabled by the prime goals of the natural agent; which are to survive and 
reproduce. Each agent organism within each generation can be described as 
pursuing its goals against epistemically contingent events within the world that 
includes itself and other agents.
In so far as realisation of perception, representation and action are appropriate 
to the satisfaction of its goals against the accidents of its environment, an agent 
whether natural or artefact, will be successful in its environment. In so far as 
this realisation is appropriate to its goals of survival and reproduction against 
the accidents of its environment the organism, which is a natural agent, will 
survive and reproduce. In so far as its realisation is appropriate to the goals 
prescribed by its designer the agency of the artefact of regulation will be 
successful. The goals of agency are instrumental within a theory of agency.
3 I shall follow Millikan in capitalising ‘normal’ when it is used in this technical sense.
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They do not represent realities in the world. In Chapter 6 I use these 
conclusions to resolve the apparent tension between determinism and personal 
responsibility.
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2
HISTORY & METAPHYSICS OF SYSTEM
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will outline the history of the concept of system and describe 
how the application of this concept has become an analytical methodology with 
application to most of the physical and social sciences. Application of this 
concept to my own project of refining and extending the concept of agency 
requires a clear definition of system as a mode of description and the 
ontological consequences of this definition are considered.
Within language and aided by science, we each maintain an internal physical 
model of our world with which we derive meaning from current and 
remembered perception. One aspect of this modelling is our separation of the 
world into component structures of phenomena: things that we can recognise, 
describe and comprehend.
Some of these component structures we accept as other organic creatures, more 
or less like ourselves. Some are naturally occurring things like hills, rocks, 
planets, stars or rivers. Others are artefacts of humankind like cars, houses, 
computers and chairs, or repositories of information like books, computers, and 
other people whom we may question.
Many of these component structures can be integrated into other structures 
which we can name and recognise, or can be analysed into further component 
structures which we can name and recognise. Analysis and synthesis are not 
unique. We analyse a structure into its component structures with reference to 
some context of interest and there will generally be several alternative contexts.
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A car can be analysed in terms of engine, body, wheels and transmission. 
Alternatively it can be seen as comprising; steel, rubber and plastic or as an 
assembly of components from various suppliers. Each analysis is in a different 
context. Each of these describes the same real thing which is the car. A term in 
general use for a whole which, in a given context we recognise as an integration 
of other wholes which relate or are combined together in a comprehensible way 
is 'system'.
The use of 'system' to denote a whole which is the sum of it's parts has a long 
tradition in Western language. In ancient Greek, systema (from sys-hystemi, "to 
[make to] stand together") originally meant something joined together - a 
connected and composite whole. The first recorded occurrences of the word 
appear to be in the texts of Aristotle and Plato. In "The Generation of Animals" 
Aristotle uses 'system' for the animal or organism as an entity comprising body 
and soul. In the Epinomis, Plato referred to "every diagram and 'system' of 
number". This distinction between physical and formal system is fundamental 
to the usage of the term and has endured through the millennia.
An associated notion is that of 'holism'. Holism was defined by Smuts, (1926), 
as "the tendency in nature to produce wholes from the ordered groupings of 
units". Another alternative is 'holon'. Koestler, (1967, 48), defined 'holons' as " 
those nodes on the hierarchic tree which behave partly as wholes or wholly as 
parts, according to the way you look at them."
2.2 Physical Systems
Modem system thinking has developed through several strands. Mayr has 
described the development of feedback control as existing since the Greeks but 
was more recently exemplified in the centrifugal steam governor developed by 
Watts in 1788 and mathematically explained by Maxwell in the late nineteenth
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century. The dynamic equations of feedback control now underpin the 
engineering disciplines of linear, non-linear and stochastic control systems.
During the middle of this century Rosenblueth and Wiener, (1950) and Wiener, 
(1961) extended the mathematics of feedback control to include the theories of 
prediction, information and communication required for aiming at a moving 
target and the new discipline formed by the combination became known as 
cybernetics. Wiener, (1961), defined cybernetics as the entire field of control 
and communication theory whether in the machine or in the animal.
Ashby, (1961) extended the notion of cybernetics into a general theory of 
control in mechanism and system. He defined a system by a listing of variables 
and relations in a context of interest with a state space that is structurally closed 
and single valued. For Ashby a system is described by a phase space of 
variables or operands1 and the property of closure is a relation between a 
transformation and a particular set of operands in which the translation does not 
produce a new element in the set of operands.
Another strand in the development of the usage of system has been the 
application of the theory of open systems, initially in biology. Koehler, (1938), 
distinguished between open and closed systems in terms of material or energy 
transport. Closure here is a different concept from that described by Ashby, 
(1961, 11). A physical structure may be described as an open physical system 
and at the same time its formal description may be structurally closed., Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy, in a series of writings between 1940 and 1970, has extended 
the theory of physically open systems and advanced the notion of General 
Systems Theory as a new scientific doctrine concerned with those principles 
which apply to systems in general and their application to a range of problems
1 Ashby, (39) drew attention to the ubiquity o f system description: "Every material object 
contains no less than an infinity o f  variables and therefore of possible systems."
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in human affairs2. Sommerhoff, (1950), considered the mathematics of control 
in living systems and formulated the concept of directive correlation .
In 1972 Maturana first published his essay on the "Biology of Cognition". This 
was included in 1973 with his joint essay with Varela on "Autopoiesis, the 
organisation of the living"4. In the first of these essays Maturana stressed the 
need for recognition, of the role of the observer in the explanation of living 
systems. He wrote: "Anything said is said by an observer. In his discourse the 
observer speaks to another observer who could be himself; whatever applies to 
one applies to the other as well. The observer is a human being, that is, a living 
system and whatever applies to living systems applies also to him." He defined 
cognition and organisational self maintenance as central concepts of living 
systems and wrote. "Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a 
process is a process of cognition". Maturana's usage of 'cognition' is not just 
that of knowledge by perception. For him; "Living systems are cognitive 
systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition"5 In the second essay 
of this volume, Maturana and Varela defined an autopoietic machine as a 
homeostatic or relation-static system which has its own organisation as the 
fundamental variable which it maintains. The concept of autopoiesis as a 
conjunct to agency is vital to this thesis and is described in Appendix A, below. 
The thesis that autopoietic is identical with living has led to a school of system 
thinkers concerned to apply the concept to inorganic and extra-organic systems 
such as synthetic chemical structures and human organisations. The work of 
this school is summarised and assessed in Mingers, (1995).
Processes of measurement, decision and control can be observed in 
organisations such as firms engaged in the production of goods and the
2 See Bertalanffy, (1968), for an overview.
3 The implications o f this work for my application of'agency' are considered in 3.8, below.
4 These two essays were published in English together in Maturana and Varela, (1980).
5 In Chapter 3, below, I modify this usage and place cognition as a central process o f agency.
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provision of services. Such processes are describable by systems of linear or 
quasi-linear systems of differential equations similar to those which describe 
artefacts using feedback control. The System Dynamics movement, initiated by 
Forrester, (1961), has been based on an attempt to model organisations in these 
terms and hence derive improved procedures for the management of items such 
as stock and the timing of management decisions. Current practice in system 
dynamics has been described by Wolstenholme, (1993), as providing a map or 
systemic view of the main variables in a problem area and to develop a 
multitude of analyses of how problems develop and the effects of intervention.
The practice of system dynamics has led in its turn to the development of 
various methodologies for describing entities such as cultures or organisations 
in system terms. These are methodologies for the system analyst and can be 
distinguished from Soft System Methodologies.These are procedures by which 
members of an organisation in a problem situation, can work together to create 
system descriptions of their situation and through the process of shared 
description, learn to recognise the dynamics of the situation or process within 
which they act and the problems which require solution. These two approaches 
are explained in Checkland, (1981), and Eden, (1989).
As previously noted, system thinking in philosophy goes back to Aristotle and 
Plato. Indeed, we may find it astonishing that the term has survived with its 
usage intact over nearly three millennia. More recently, Broad, (1925), 
introduced the concept of the emergent characteristics of wholes. While, 
Aristotle used the term system to refer to the whole which is an organism and 
saw essence in the component, Broad saw essence as a property of the whole. 
Smuts, (1926), spoke of 'holism' the consideration of things with organised 
complexity. Whitehead, (1969), in his "philosophy of organism" came near to 
system thinking but went beyond the modesty of a descriptive account. Laszlo, 
(1972b), has applied cybernetic principles to describe the world through its 
evolution, organisms, their subsystems and their cultures. He defines terms like;
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system cybernetics, microphysical cybernetics, bio-cybemetics and socio- 
cybernetics. Laszlo concludes; "But the systems philosophical framework can 
remain; it can be held that (i) the understanding of the human being and the 
world about him is possible in reference to a hierarchy of dynamic systems, 
defined in terms of their invariances of state and function, and that (ii) the 
concept of such a systems hierarchy is the optimum framework for the 
interpretation and integration of analyses of empirical matters of fact". 
Unsurprisingly, his definition of system is in cybernetic terms: "A natural 
system is the joint function of four independent properties (a) a coactive 
relation of parts resulting in ordered wholeness (b) maintenance of a steady 
state against environmental disturbances (c) Maintenance of organisation 
against environmental disturbances (d) structural adaptation with respect to 
subsystems as components and suprasystems of which it is a component".
Laszlo produced his "Introduction to Systems Philosophy in the same year as 
Maturana and Varela wrote "The Organisation of the Living" and two years 
after Maturana published his essay on "The Biology of Cognition". The two 
essays by Maturana and Varela were not published in translation until eight 
years later so it is understandable that there is no mutual reference between the 
two works. However, It is surprising that subsequent literature in systems 
thinking does not draw attention to the similarities and differences between 
these two theses. In an otherwise admirable account of the development of 
systems practice Checkland refers to Laszlo but makes no reference to 
Maturana or Varela. Jantsch, (1980), writing a systems account of evolution in 
man, culture and the world, uses the paradigm of self-organisation. He 
acknowledges a debt to Maturana and Varela. For Jantsch, "Mental concepts, 
ideas and visions become autopoietic levels in their own right".
Recently; several authors, writing of system practice, have sought for and 
acknowledged, a philosophical basis for their work. Mingers, (1993), writing of 
information systems, quotes Habermas on critical theory and a communication
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theory of social action and the later Wittgenstein. At a recent systems 
conference6: Fuenmayor contrasted the writings of Kant, Heidegger and 
MacIntyre in interpreting the modem discourse of global system thinking. 
Jackson quoted Heidegger on the 'bringing forth' or 'revealing' of a 
technological achievement and compared this with the emergence of a social 
system. At the same conference, Spaul noted that the 'Critical Systems 
Thinking' commitment to critical and social awareness hangs naturally with 
Rorty's post modem view of knowledge and contrasted this with Habermas' 
‘interest-constitution’ theory.
Philosophers writing in the field of mind and language make extensive use of 
the term 'system' but generally without explication of their usage. Dretske, 
(1981), in his work on "Knowledge and the Flow of Information" asks "What 
makes some systems capable of occupying belief states but not others?" and 
claims to "use the concept of belief to distinguish genuine cognitive systems 
from mere processors of information." He speaks also of information- 
processing systems. He does explain his usage of 'information' but he does not 
explain what a system is. Dennett, (1983), in applying his concept of 
intentionality to cognition in organisms describes a vervet monkey as "an 
intentional system, a thing whose behaviour is predictable by attributing beliefs 
and desires (and, of course, rationality) to it". He goes on to describe first, 
second and third order intentional systems in terms of their interactive 
complexities. He tells us a lot about intentionality but does not explain why or 
with what limitations, we may describe a monkey as a system. Putnam, (1988), 
demonstrates that: "... in one sense, any physical system can be modelled as a 
computer". It is evident that for Putnam, the system is the actual, physical entity 
and the computer (or automaton) is the model. Kim wrote, in the context of 
supervenience, of the “world ... as constituting a system, something that shows 
structure, and whose constituents are connected with one another in significant
6 The 1993 conference of the UK Systems Society, reported in Stowell, et al (1993).
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ways.” Kim, (1993, 53) His concentration was on the notion of dependence and 
he did not pursue the conceptual interconnections between system and 
supervenience. These are considered in 2.8, below.
2.3 Formal Systems
Philosophers have been more precise in their usage in the description of and the 
development of, the theory of formal systems. Since Plato this usage of 'system' 
has remained distinct from physical, functional description and the 
development of geometries and systems of formal logic can be described as the 
development of formal systems.
In recent years considerable attention has been devoted to information systems. 
Such systems have been observed at least since the Pharaohs kept records of 
their stocks of grain and may indeed predate the formal systems of written 
language. The development and ubiquitous application of the digital computer 
has led to an explosion of interest in the theory and application of formal 
systems for the representation, maintenance and storage of information.
The term 'information' is used in two ways; a disjunctive usage is concerned 
with the probabilities of alternative states of affairs and a conjunctive usage 
concerned with the combination of propositions known to obtain a holism of 
inference. The disjunctive usage finds its application in the technology of 
communication as developed by Shannon and Weaver, (1949), and discussed in 
Ashby, (1956), Dretske, (1981), and Bar-Hillel, (1964). The conjunctive usage 
is nearer to our every day usage in information systems and would refer to 
information in the Magna Carta or the structuring of information in a data base, 
resident in a digital computer. A description of this usage is given in Kent 
(1978). As in other formal systems of rules, an information system is realised in 
physical marks and processes, and a complete description of an information 
system will be a physical system description of the organisation of the marks 
and the processes for their maintenance and interpretation.
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2.4 System as a Mode of Description
In science or in philosophy, we are concerned to explain. Before we can 
explain; we and the audience, which may be ourselves need to recognise what it 
is that is being explained. Prior to the act of explanation is the act of 
description. The system mode of description is one in which some particular 
thing in our world is described, not just in terms of its function and form but 
also in terms of its counterfactuality. That is, how its function and form 
determine the manifold events that can occur in this aspect of the world. It is in
n
these terms that I wish to explicate my notion of'system'.
We must distinguish between the act of description and the diagrams and well
Q
formed sentences in the language that represent the information conveyed by 
the act. It is this abstract entity, which is realised in text, within language, that I 
will refer to by the term 'description'. By locating the description in the text I 
am not taking a stance in the post-modern, post-structural dispute regarding the 
determinacy or relativity of the 'meaning' in text, though this could be discussed 
in system terms. This dispute has been addressed by many writers including 
Fish, (1980), and Midgley, (1994). My aim is simply to distinguish the text of 
the description from what it is, whether actual, fictional or hypothetical, which 
is being described. The concepts referred to by the terms of the text may differ 
between author and interpreter. It is this risk of cultural ambiguity that the 
exponents of techniques of systemic cooperative description such as Cognitive 
Mapping, Eden (1989), seek to avoid.
In a system description the domain of the entities described will range over 
possible worlds picked out by the counterfactual conditionals within the text of 
the description. A system description will be a description of something. The 
thing described may be actually existent in this world and a subject of current
7 The author presented this concept of system to the UK Systems Society in 1995.
8 'Conventionally represent' in the terminology to be developed.
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explanatory interest. The counterfactuals will then derive from a physical 
theory of this thing. Alternatively, the system description may be a detailed or 
functional specification for an entity not actually existent or existent but 
imperfectly described. The thing described may be conceivable but not 
physically realisable within current technology or physical possibility.
This characterisation of 'system' is different from that of workers in the system 
movement such as Checkland, (1981). In p 110 of his book Checkland writes 
"Let us start with the physical systems that apparently make up the universe". 
Although he writes of physical systems as if they are substances and 
distinguishes the system from its model, in the glossary he defines a System as 
"A model of a whole entity ... An observer may choose to relate this model to 
real world activity." Klir, (1969), has written, about systems; "In experimental 
science; an abstraction to be used when nature is examined from a viewpoint. In 
engineering science; an abstraction when relations are prescribed and we wish 
to implement them." It is at Klir's level of generality and abstraction that I will 
use the system mode of description. The narrative mode of description may 
describe an actual event or an actual structure, it may describe a fictional or 
hypothetical event or structure. The system mode of description describes how 
the properties of the entities and the relations between them, prescribe the sorts 
of structures or events that may occur and 'may' is a modal idiom. I shall 
routinely speak of an entity as 'apt for description in system terms' to 
distinguish the entity from its actual or putative system description. The 
convention of speaking of such an entity as a system is common and to totally 
abstain would lead to tedious translation but essentially my usage of 'system' is 
as a mode of description of entities apt for description in those terms.
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2.5 The Counterfactuality of System Description
The notion of counterfactual dependence in our physical world is enmeshed 
with the notions of causation, theory and law. Everyday statements like "If you 
had got home in time we would have got to the party" rely for their 
interpretation on theories of cause and effect. Lewis, (1973), has given a 
general analysis of counterfactual conditionals. Lewis, (1986), contends that 
our modal idioms are quantifiers over possible worlds. For Lewis, possible 
worlds are real entities and 'actual' is an indexical like 'I' or 'here' or 'now'. If in 
the idioms of counterfactual hypothesis, I say, "Had you got home in time we 
would then have got to the party" then, in Lewis' terms, I am describing a 
relation between possible worlds. I could have said, "Had you got home in time 
we would then have got to the party but actually you were late and we did not". 
It is in this spirit that Lewis, 92-3, claims that 'actual' is indexical. "... 'Actual' 
is analogous to 'present', an indexical term whose reference varies depending on 
a different feature of context...". He does not claim that other possible worlds 
actually exist. He does claim that, in any text containing counterfactuals, the 
same logic with the same criteria for the preservation of truth will apply for 
each alternative text within the combinations of the counterfactuals. It is in this 
sense that a system may be described as picking out a set of possible worlds in 
which set membership is prescribed by the properties of the entities and their 
relations, described in the system.
Lewis, (1986, 1.3), also defines the notion of 'similarity' between sets of 
possible worlds. If a system description contains or implies counterfactual 
statements then any state of the entity described is a possible world. Worlds are 
'similar' in that the components of the state space vectors that locate them are 
similar.9
9 Similarity is a vague notion. Perhaps, close to Wittgenstein's notion of'family resemblance'.
24
Stalnaker, (1968), describes the formal properties of the conditional function 
and considers how we should evaluate a conditional statement. His suggestion 
is:
First add the antecedent (hypothetically to your stock of beliefs; 
second, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain 
consistency (without modifying the hypothetical belief in the 
antecedent); finally; consider whether or not the consequent is then 
true.
Stalnaker then moves from belief conditions to truth condition by reference to 
possible worlds. He proposes that truth conditions for a conditional should be 
formulated in the terms:
Consider a possible world in which A is true and which otherwise 
differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A then B' is true (false) 
just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.
Following a semantical system for modal logics due to Kripke, (1963), 
Stalnaker defines a model structure and a selection function. If M is an ordered 
triple (K,R,X) where K is the set of all possible worlds, R is the relation of 
relative possibility which defines the structure and k  is to be understood as the 
absurd world to allow for an interpretation of 'if A then B' where A is 
impossible. If a  and 13 are members of K then aR13 reads; 13 is possible with 
respect to a.
The selection function / takes a proposition and a possible world as arguments 
and a possible world as its value, it selects for each antecedent, 'A' a particular 
possible world in which A is true. The assertion which the conditional makes, 
then, is that the consequent is true in the most similar world selected.
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For a given conditional: If P then Q (1)
a) (1) is true iff there is a relevant set ‘S’ of propositions true of 
the actual world a  and
b) If there is a set of accessible possible worlds of which S and P 
are both true which may or may not include a  then
c) Q is true in the more similar members of S.
A system description will comprise propositions about a  and a set of open 
conditionals understood in the manner of (1) above. Any system description 
that we can produce will be a finite axiomatisation involving conditionals of 
this form.
For an example of this, consider a description of a university. A student writing 
home might describe the buildings, the lecturers, and the syllabus and leisure 
facilities. Each of these is a particular description of actual states of affairs in 
her actual world. She will assume that, when she wakes next morning or returns 
next year, this will be the same university, although we and she know that there 
will have been changes. Students and staff will come and go, buildings will be 
extended or change their use. Within the practices of language, the university is 
defined, by a holism of function and capacity and by that set of possible worlds 
in which this university has these functions and capacities and this name or 
some translation of it.
I do not wish to enter the debate on the reality of these possible worlds. The 
actual university at any time is comprised of real people, real books, real 
buildings and an abstract constitution of customs and rules, realised in the 
marks of memories and text. It is this constitution that is described by the 
counterfactual statements within a description of an ongoing university. That
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this ongoing university is real is intuitively appealing. Whether, because of this, 
we should assign reality to all of the possible outcomes, is outside the scope of 
this thesis. Possible worlds, whether or not they are reified, that are picked out 
by a physical system which is realised in the world are possible futures of the 
actual world described by that system.
If a structure described within a system includes the function of representation10 
then that system will generally include descriptions of the representation and 
what is represented and what is represented may or may not be a possible world 
picked out by the system. For example, planning systems will include 
combinatorial mechanisms for the production of representations of possible 
worlds contingent on possible actions.
A system description does not pick out an entire possible world. It might not 
pick out a possible part of a possible world. The conditional terms of a system 
are components of a theory and this theory may be false. It may be a functional 
specification for an artefact that is not technologically feasible or is logically 
inconsistent. Even if the description is of actual states of affairs at some instant 
and of conditionals that are held true over an appropriate range of contingent 
events, the description is finite and ideal. A lot of the actual world will be left 
out and all of the theory is ceteris paribus.
2.6 Cause
In this thesis I rely on two distinct notions of cause. These are 'agent cause' and 
'physical cause'. The causal power of agency stems from the capacity of an 
agent for action that physically changes the world. This notion is a principle 
subject for this thesis and will be discussed extensively in subsequent chapters. 
Since my ontological commitment is to the primacy of a physical world; for
10 Representation is considered in more detail in 2.11, below.
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me, agent cause depends on physical cause and this section is devoted to the 
elucidation of my usage of this term.
My notion of physical cause is Humean in that; physical causal explanation is 
based on the constant conjunction of contiguous events constitutively described 
as instances of physical properties that are covered by physical laws referring to 
these property types and these terms imply counterfactuals relating instances of 
these properties. I distinguish between events that can be explained in terms of 
physical cause, spontaneous events and accidents. Although we are physical 
entities within a real physical world, any state of affairs can be alternatively 
described and alternative descriptions require alternative explanations.
Physical system descriptions are of physical entities and real physical entities 
are composed of real physical components. The capacities of such entities are 
enabled by the structure and capacities of components and this enabling is 
explained within a functional characterisation of components and these 
functions are realised by physical events that are explicable in physical causal 
terms.
Russell, (1919), suggested that the role of causation in explanation has grown 
smaller with the advance of science and is being replaced with notions of 
functional relationship: probabilistic correlation relations between events or 
states of affairs11. However, my concern in what follows is with physical 
explanation by physical cause. One aspect of current usage is to describe the 
relation between successive contiguous physical phenomena that are
11 Halliday, (1994), writing on "The construction o f  knowledge and value in the grammar of  
scientific discourse" suggests that causal forms o f verbal representation have evolved as part of 
modem science and have penetrated into almost every domain o f our semiotic practice. 
Halliday's treatment o f cause is metaphysically neutral: new semiotic identities are created by 
advances in science and the nominal expression in the grammar construes iconically an 
objectified entity in the real world. New verbal representations that link these entities are 
themselves also iconic.
28
constrained by physical laws that represent the observed regularities of our 
universe as causal and this is the usage that I will follow. There is one notion of 
cause as relating to a causal force, as if the way things turn out is the way 
Nature intends them to go. This notion I wish to eschew. The universe was 
going on for a long time before there was agency. During that time things 
happened12 and if our science has got it at all right, all of these events were 
constrained by the physical laws that we observe today. It is this counter notion 
that I am canvassing when I contend that physical causal relations explain 
events that are constrained by physical laws.
In physical causal explanation the explanandum phenomenon P is described as 
resulting from the conjunction of:
(i) One or more specified incident phenomena Cj.
(ii) An environment of unspecified incident phenomena E.
(iii) Physical laws; Lj that apply to the incident Cj and constrain 
the outcome to P.
(iv) That, during the phenomenon, E remains stable within a range 
such that Lj apply. This is assumption ECp.
Bringing these together, the axiom of physical causal explanation is that:
(Cj & Lj & ECp) —> P
12 Their classification into things will be in the terms o f our agency but what happened then is 
not changed by our classification now.
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where the arrow denotes the causing of P according to this explanation.
The cited laws Lj quantify over instances of Cj within environments that meet
the ceteris paribus criteria. In a token causal explanation any of the three terms 
may be cited as causally explanatory. If in an experiment to demonstrate Ohm's 
law a student asks 'Why did the current vary in this way?' she may be answered; 
'because of variation in the resistance or the potential difference' or 'because it 
is constrained by Ohm's law' or in comparison with another students error, 
'because he did not keep the temperature constant'. Another description of the 
same state of affairs may include the propagation of an electromagnetic wave 
along a wire and different laws would be invoked in a different explanation.
The notion of physical cause depends on the notion of succession. Our 
communal model of our world is of physical substance in a physical space 
within which phenomena produce phenomena in an ongoing temporal matrix. I 
will not attempt to justify this model or the notion of physical cause described 
above. In so far as we understand the phenomena of our physical world it is in 
terms of our ability to formulate a system of physical laws that are explanatory, 
coherent and economical. In any description of a stream of phenomena the 
temporal matrix may be continuous or discrete. If it is continuous then we 
speak of a causal process. If it is discrete then we speak of a causal sequence of 
events. However, any closed volume of space-time may be alternatively 
described and different descriptions in different domains of description will 
define different events, with different phenomena explained by different laws. 
Description, explanation, domain, laws and ceteris paribus clauses are 
interdefined.
In a universe without agency, phenomena are constrained only by physical 
laws. Although in any description each process or stream of events can be
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causally explained,13 any state of affairs taken as cause could have been 
otherwise. Although; apart from spontaneous nuclear events and ill conditioned 
equations, Laplace's demon could have predicted all phenomena; for the 
purpose of causal explanation, all phenomena are essentially contingent. It may 
be that there are ratchets14 in our universe and by such ratchets, our universe, 
our world and life within it have evolved, but they could have been otherwise.
A physical event may be explained by a description of a temporal chain of 
physical events that are linked by physical laws. Each such explanation will be 
in a domain of description using terms and concepts appropriate to this level of 
physical explanation. These terms and concepts may or may not reduce to some 
more fundamental level. If they do, then bridging statements will be available 
by which the explanation can be translated to another domain of description, 
though for some pragmatic reasons, we have chosen this level. It may be that, 
due to complexity or the frontiers of science, such bridging statements are not 
available and the laws invoked in this explanation are as fundamental as we can 
get. Whatever the reason for our choice of domain, we use the notion of 
physical cause to invoke the law or laws, appropriate to this level.
The description that I have postulated is of a universe without agency. If we 
assume that the universe began with a 'big bang' then I assume that that event 
and all subsequent contiguous events were constrained by physical laws and 
the succession of any two successive contiguous or ancestrally contiguous, 
events is apt for description as causally linked if they satisfy Kim's, (1970), 
condition for direct contiguous causation:
13 If the event is explained as occurring with some probability characteristic of an unstable 
element then this is a prime cause within a physical explanation.
14 By a 'ratchet' I mean two successive states of affairs physically causally linked and such that 
the causal propensity o f the latter is, from some point o f view, different from the former. Thus, 
ratchets lead to development, although their occurrence is accidental. An example is the 
suggested role o f autocatalysis in the creation o f life. Stewart and Cohen, (1997, 21). Ashby,
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e is a contiguous cause of e' if and only if e * e' and e bears to e' the 
ancestral of the relation of direct contiguous causation - that is to 
say, (S)(e’ e S & (f)(g)(f s S & g is a direct contiguous cause of 
f  id g e S) =5 e s S).
Not all physical events are contiguously caused15. An atom of an unstable 
element will emit particles and change in its atomic structure at intervals that 
are random and fall within a Poisson distribution. As far as we know, none of 
these events is caused by another event within the space time continuum of our 
domain of description. Although the average rate of emission is law like and the 
creation of this atom may be explained as caused by a prior atomic event, no 
causal event can, so far, be found for any specific event of this kind. My criteria 
for physical causal explanation are conceptual coherence and consistency and I 
am prepared to take physical laws as describing reality if they preserve truth 
within their domain of description.16
The notion of a causal chain is as vague as the notion of contiguity. Many 
causal chains may alternatively explain any given event. For any specific causal 
chain within an explanation, each law invoked will contain ceteris paribus 
clauses that construe some properties as environment rather than causally 
constitutive. In another explanation within the same domain of events,
(1956, 196), calls a property autcatalytic; "whose occurrence at one point increases the 
probability that it will occur again at another point."
5 The notion o f contiguity is necessarily vague. Some laws involving the weak forces of  
gravitation and electromagnetism explain phenomena across cosmological distances. Other 
laws such as those involving heat flow and chemical reactions explain only locally. The strong 
forces that bind the atom are extremely local but their rupture causally explains the release of 
particles that causally explain phenomena over cosmological distances.
16 Schrodinger, (1944, 10), points out that physical laws rest on atomic statistics and are only 
approximate. However, we humans take them as true for the medium sized dry goods that we 
classify by our agency and recognise their vagueness at the atomic level
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environmental properties may be taken as causally constitutive. Each such 
explanation may be true, the choice depends on the context to the explanation.
In a pair of successive events chosen arbitrarily for causal explanation there 
may not exist a chain of contiguously causal relata such that the successor event 
can be explained as caused by the predecessor. The successor event is then 
causally independent of the predecessor. If for some given event no causal 
predecessor can be found then the incidence of such an event is effectively 
random; with respect to any given model of events. It is an accident.
Alternatively, a causal ancestor of an event may be but one of so many 
influences that the notion of direct cause is not explanatory. If the number of 
causal chains is small then we may speak of contributory cause. If the number 
of causal chains is so large that aggregate contributory cause is not explanatory 
but a few causally contiguous events can be identified then statistical analysis 
over a class of such events may show correlation. In applying such correlation 
to a theory of such situations we would speak of 'contribution to the reduction 
of variance’. If the number of causal chains is so great that no causal theory can 
be found that explains the event then such events are also effectively random.
/  n
Any token incidence of such an event is apt for explanation as an accident .
Paul Humphreys is a realist about chance. He describes such situations as 
instances o f ’probabilistic contributing cause’. "... the characteristic feature of a 
probabilistic contributing cause is that it raises the chance of the effect, i.e., it 
produces an increase in the value o f  the chance o f the effect. So, assuming the 
existence o f physical chances, the direct effect of a contributing cause is an
17 I am an instrumentalist about chance. Gallie, (1957), writes: "Under the influence of  
rationalising philosophers we have all been tempted to ignore the inescapable reality o f what is 
contingent or irreducibly uncertain in human affairs." We may fmd aspects of the phenomena 
that are explained by physical laws, operating within their range, and these are spoken of as 
'contributing to the reduction o f the variance'. This does not reduce the inherent contingency of 
the phenomena though it contributes to their explanation.
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1Rincrease in the chance of some property." , Humphreys, (1989, 104). Many of 
the phenomena recognised in our world are so complex in their aetiology that 
we recognise the practical impossibility of fully explaining any token event in 
terms of physical causation. For any class of such phenomena, such as 
respiratory disease or rainfall, we may establish by statistical analysis positive 
and negative correlations with other phenomena and further analyse the data to 
ensure that the variables in our model are causally independent. We also seek 
for evidence of actual physical processes that lead, by the accidents of actual 
events in the world, to the phenomena of interest. In these analyses we estimate 
probabilities and these are measures derived from actual incidence of the 
phenomena. They are not measures of actual physical chances. Within our 
current understanding of quantum phenomena we may estimate the chance of a 
physical nuclear event but this is distinct from the relative probabilities that we 
use instrumentally to allow for the observed incidence of aggregate 
contributory physical cause.
If two coincident events have no common causal ancestor then they may be 
described as causally independent. An event may be explained as caused by the 
conjunction of two coincident events in that their conjunction gives necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the explanandum event. If these two events are 
causally independent then the explanandum event cannot be explained 
independently by either of the incident events. I shall follow a common usage 
in defining the relation between such co-incident causally constitutive 
properties as 'orthogonal'.19
For a simple example of physical causal explanation: A boulder rolls down a 
hillside. Examination of the terrain may convince us that it was pushed and this 
would require explanation. Alternatively, without agent cause, supporting soil
18 Authors italics.
19 An example o f this usage is Nagel, (1979,207).
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may have naturally eroded, eventually permitting the boulder to roll and we 
would speak of physical cause. Once rolling, physical laws of gravity and 
inertia will constrain the path of the boulder. It may come to rest in a stream 
and dam the stream and without some safe guard, this may lead to a flood 
which may destroy a village. We may use laws of soil mechanics and 
hydrodynamics to explain the relations between events. Our explanation will go 
back as far as we think relevant, it may or may not include the geological 
accidents that have led to the structure of this hillside.
This account of cause takes no account of mind or agency. Our explanation of 
the loss of the village may include the lack of a safeguard and this may be cited 
as agent cause if its lack was intentional. The boulder may have been pushed 
and this may be cited as agent cause. Each action or inaction, of agency, cited 
as agent cause, is a responsible act of agency and each such act is a determinate 
response by that agent, as constituted at that time to events contingent for that 
agent. As will be argued throughout this thesis, agent cause is parasitic on 
physical cause since agency is realised in physical phenomena within physical 
substance. Current realisations of the functions of agency have evolved through 
the contingent events of evolution. One of the consequences of evolution has 
been that it promotes more complex systems and this may be because they have 
greater adaptive capacity, Bechtel and Abrahamson, (1986). The agency of such 
systems may have complex causal powers but their existence is causally 
grounded in the contingent events of environment and evolution, constrained 
only by natural law.
I assume notions of cause and accident, the accidents of cosmic evolution, the 
accident of life and the accidents of organic evolution. Through physical 
causation, these accidents have led to the simple and complex agency of 
organisms on our planet and to the complex social agency of man in linguistic 
communities. Each act of agency changes the world and this change is 
physically caused by that act. Some of these changes are within the intention of
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the act of agency and some are accidental in that they are physically caused but 
not intended. I will define agent cause as the causal relation between those 
changes that are within the intention of an agent and that act of that agent. As 
will be seen, agent effect is the resultant of causally independent events 
although, from the point of view of explanation by agency, each of these events 
is determined by prior events in the world.
2.7 Function
Entities may be described as having 'capacities', the things that they can do. 
Cummins, (1975), considers the role of function ascribing statements in 
explanation and concludes: "To ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a 
capacity to it which is singled out by its role in an analysis of some containing 
system. When a capacity of a containing system is appropriately explained by
90analysing it into a number of other capacities whose programmed exercise 
yields a manifestation of analysed capacity, the analysing capacities emerge as 
functions." Cummins' usage of system is near to mine. Where we differ is that 
a system description of an entity in the world will include statements and 
conditionals regarding all items in the world, including the entity, that are 
relevant to some explanation. If just the entity has some capacity of interest 
then that entity would be a 'containing system' in Cummins' terms and would be 
apt for description as a 'system' in my terms.
Earlier in his essay, Cummins defines function recursively.
"x functions as a <|> in s (or: the function of x in s is to relative to 
an analytical account A of s's capacity to \\i just in case x is capable
20 It is assumed that, in this usage, Cummins would roughly equate 'programmed exercise' with 
Millikan's 'Normal conditions' and does not imply actual programming by an agent.
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of <|)-ing in s and A appropriately and adequately accounts for s 's
capacity to \\j by, in part, appealing to the capacity of x to § in s."
To say that the capacity for one function is accounted for by the capacity for 
another is equivalent to the statement that any function is both of something and 
for something. All of the systems of interest in this thesis either are or contain, a 
containing system in the sense that Cummins uses. The system description of 
the living organism in the world will contain an entity that is apt for description 
as its own containing system since its function is to maintain itself although it 
will contain components and component structures that have function for it. 
Any entity with function within a containing system has that function o f that 
entity and for the entity described as the containing system. Any function is a 
two-place relation. In the terms of Cummins' explication:
91If x functions as a <|> in s then <|)(x,s) is interpreted as <|> is of x for s.
That a system is a functional containing system does not imply that the system 
is topologically contained. The mammalian circulatory system is distributed 
through the body. The system has function for the organism within the 
containing system of the organism but the heart and blood vessels have function 
for circulation within the circulatory containing system. Living organisms can 
have function for living organisms. Hearts and livers are comprised of living 
cells. Each cell is comprised of components that have function for it and each 
cell has the function for itself of maintaining itself. Just as each cell has 
function within a heart so the circulatory system, which includes the heart and 
other component organs, has function for the organism, which we describe 
within the containing system. Although a living organism can be described as 
its own containing system, as in its autopoiesis, it may also occur as a an entity
21 The function o f autopoiesis is the interpretation of <))(x,x).
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with function in a wider containing system. Examples are; an organism within 
an ecology or a wolf in a pack. A human organisation, such as a university can 
be described as a containing system. Each personal role described within the 
containing system of the university can be described as having a function for 
the university and may also have function within the containing system of a 
department which has function for the university. The university has function 
within the containing system of a community although the community, like the 
living organism, may be defined in terms of its self maintenance.
Non living entities may have natural function: as dung has function for a beetle 
and a dead fly has function for a spider within the containing system of an 
ecology. Alternatively, they may be artefacts, things intentionally made or 
modified in order to provide a function for the intentional agent who made 
them. An artefact may be described within a containing system and its 
components may have function for the artefact, described as a containing 
system. In a wider containing system, these components can be described as 
having function for the intentional agent who uses them.
2.8 System and Supervenience
An entity described as a functional system may be attributed properties relating 
to its capacities. For example, a particular realisation of a university may, by 
certain criteria, be deemed good at physical research and bad at teaching in the 
humanities. In modal system terms; in the actual world described by the 
statements of the system and the antecedents of its conditionals, application of 
these criteria will lead to these conclusions, e.g. ‘This university, as it is now is 
good at physical research’. The question then arises as to whether the 
dependence relations between these properties of these capacities meet the 
criteria for supervenience; if so on what are they supervenient and what is the 
character of the supervenience? Another issue that should be addressed is; 
whether within the possible worlds picked out by the system description, these
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properties meet the criteria for supervenience and if so what can we say about 
the supervenience of these properties?
The notion of supervenience rests on an assumption of an asymmetric 
dependency between entities and properties of a space-time region that are 
defined in one domain of description and other entities and properties that are 
defined in another domain of description. Supervenience is a modal notion. 
“Supervenience means that there could be no difference of one sort without 
differences of the other sort”, Lewis, (1986, 15).
There have been many definitions and classifications of supervenience. Kim, 
(1993), and Horgan, (1993), give an extensive account of the field. For 
simplicity in this brief analysis, I will focus on two definitions listed by Horgan, 
(ibid, 567).
Weak supervenience pertains only to things that occupy the same 
possible world; it says that within any world, all things that are B- 
indiscemible are also A-indiscemible.
Strong supervenience pertains across possible worlds; it says that 
for any worlds w and w’ and any things x and y (in w and w’ 
respectively), if x in w is B-indiscemible from y in w ’ then x in w is 
A-indiscemible from y in w’.
In a system description that includes features of an actual physical world; the 
conditionals within the description pick out possible worlds, accessible from 
that actual world in virtue of the fact that the system is a true description of the 
actual world. Causal relations cited between these features constitute a theory 
and this theory is true if the system is a tme description of the actual world.
39
System theories may be at the level of mechanisms22 or they may be at the 
level of system capacities and functional components that enable those 
capacities. For example, one capacity of a university is education and this is 
enabled by functions such as teaching, the maintenance of reference material, 
housing and admission administration. Another capacity could be research and 
this would be enabled by functions such as; selection of research staff, 
motivation, the maintenance of reference material and administration of 
research facilities. Any functional theory may in general be realisable in 
alternative physical form and such alternative structures would be functionally 
isomorphic but any actual realisation will have specific properties, attributed 
against specific criteria, solely in virtue of the physical causal powers of that 
realisation.
If we consider an actual university in an actual world then it is the properties of 
this university in this actual world that are assessed by these criteria. Although 
the system description of this university picks out possible future worlds 
through its conditionals, the quality attributed lies in the present and may not 
be maintained in all of these worlds. Considering the concept of discemibility 
against the concept of a university; within any actual world of universities and 
quality criteria, those that are indiscernible at the physical level will be 
indiscernible at the quality level and the criterion for weak supervenience is 
met.
Strong supervenience requires that indiscemibility be established across 
possible worlds. For a physical system S any actual occurrence of S is in an 
actual world and in this actual world the existence of S picks out possible future
22 Defining 'mechanism' as a nexus o f physical cause, seen as a holism in an explanatory 
context, which may or may not be seen as a component with explanatory function. Malcolm, 
(1968), questioned whether a neurophysiological explanation o f human behaviour is compatible 
with a purposive explanation. For Malcolm a 'mechanism' is a causal nexus but he does not 
consider the aetiology of purpose or that 'purpose' may be descriptive o f mechanisms that react 
to events by action that is for their purpose.
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worlds. In each of these worlds there may be defined a property Ax. In two such 
worlds, Wj and Wj, Ax may take the values; Aik and Aji and these will each be 
associated with physical properties, Bjm and Bjn. If two worlds Wj and Wj are B 
indiscernible then Bjm = Bj„ and strong supervenience is the claim that this 
entails Aik = Aji.
If we are describing a university from the point of view of a quality assessor 
then the quality criteria are taken as given and quality is absolute. Possible 
worlds picked out by his system description of a university will manifest 
different values of these qualities and these will be strongly supervenient on the 
physical properties described if indiscemibility of quality is associated with 
indiscemibility of physical detail across this set of possible worlds. This system 
description will contain only those statements and conditionals that are relevant 
to the capacities and functions of this university. Such a system defines a 
particular spatio-temporal region. Horgan defines Regional Physical 
Supervenience, (ibid, 571).
"There are no two P-regions that are exactly alike in all qualitative 
intrinsic physical features but different in some other qualitative 
intrinsic feature."
This notion of regional physical supervenience characterises the relation 
between the higher level qualities and their physical instantiation but the 
physical basis of these qualities remains unexplained since the criteria by which 
these qualities are assessed are themselves candidates for explanation in a wider 
physical system. To pursue our example of the university: If the system 
description includes statements and conditionals concerning assessors and their 
criteria then qualitative intrinsic features such as a state o f  attribution o f being 
good at research would be regionally physically supervenient on the physical 
embodiment if there are no two P- regions exactly alike in all intrinsic physical 
features but differing in other qualitative intrinsic features. The essential
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characterisation of physical regional supervenience is unchanged between these 
two examples but in the second example, the supervenience of the first is 
explained. We now speak not of quality but of a state o f attribution o f quality.
From the stand point of explanation, the first system description, from the point 
of view of the assessor, is incomplete. Similar arguments apply to Hare’s, 
(Hare, 1952), examples. If we say “St. Francis was a good man.” this statement 
is made within a community whose members recognise certain criteria of 
goodness. These criteria may be absolute for that community but the physical 
basis for that attribution will be within the physical realisation of the mores of 
that community. If the attribution is of the rightness of an action and ‘rightness’ 
has a moral connotation then a similar argument will apply. This is not an 
argument against moral realism, although this 'attributionism' is consistent with 
an agnosticism about the reality of moral properties. States of attribution of 
goodness of a person or goodness of research at a university are real states. If 
they are physically explicable then they will be strongly supervenient on the 
physical detail of the system within which such states of attribution occur. This 
system will include: those agents whose actions comprise the attribution, the 
objects about which the attribution is made and the mores of practices within 
which such attributions are made and have conventional meaning for the 
community. Each of these is realised in physical mechanism.
I conclude that system properties are strongly 
supervenient on the physical properties of their 
realisation only if the system includes those 
mechanisms by which such properties are attributed.
This distinction between the physical supervenience of attributed states and the 
physical supervenience of states of attribution is relevant to the to the physical 
supervenience of mental properties and this will be considered in 4.12, below.
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If the attribution is of the rightness of an action for an agent then it will be 
deemed as right in that it is caused by Normal representations within Normal 
cognitive processes. The action is deemed as right within a theory of agency. A 
theory of agency will be described in the terms of a domain of description that 
classifies the world for the theorist. Since the theorist and the agent share a 
common world, domains of description for which this theory is true will be 
linked by bridging laws and the truth of the theory will be independent of the 
agency of the theorist, although without the theorist it could not be said. This is 
an argument for realism regarding representational states of agency, such states 
are realised in physical states that track physical states of the world.
2.9 Alternative Realisation
Within the hierarchical, functional structure of a containing system, 
components can be defined with function at distinct levels within the hierarchy. 
In these terms, the heart can be described as having the function of pumping 
blood for the organism and component structures of the heart, such as muscles 
and valves, can be described as having function for the heart. If, at any 
particular level, a component can be fully described in system terms as having a 
specific function for an entity or another component then any alternative 
physical realisation of this function may replace that component in this system 
without changing the system description down to that level in the hierarchy. 
This is close to Putnam's, (1973b) , notion of functional isomorphism. For our 
purposes:
Any two components are functionally isomorphic if
either can replace the other within a containing system
23 What Putnam wrote was "Two systems are functionally isomorphic if  there is a 
correspondence between the states o f  one and the states o f  the other that preserves functional 
relations" However, Putnam then identified functional states with computationally 
characterised states and this, he now admits, Putnam, (1992), was wrong.
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without change in the capacities enabled by the function 
of the replaced component.
We have said that the function of the heart is to pump blood. If this is the only 
function of the heart then any organism with an artificial heart that pumps blood 
will be functionally isomorphic with one with a natural heart. This is not to say 
that functional states are identified by their causal role in the world. It is, rather, 
to say that functional capacities within an entity described as a containing 
system are identified by their causal role in that containing system. The notions 
of function and cause are interdefined within a system. If an artefact has a 
function for an agent then this function will be described in terms of its causal 
role for that agent in a system description that includes agent and artefact.
Functions are abstract entities described in the text of a functional explanation. 
Following Cummins, we may explain the actual capacities of an actual physical 
entity in functional terms and the functional components will be real physical 
entities with capacities that may be explained in functional terms. However, for 
any functional component, the capacity that enables the capacity of the 
containing system may conceivably be realised in an alternative physical form. 
Indeed, any entity with some physical capacity that could have function in some 
containing system could, conceivably, have that capacity in virtue of some 
alternative physical structure. A physical system description could be couched 
almost entirely in functional terms. For example, some physical capacities say 
the storage and retrieval of data may be specified. Functional components to 
enable these capacities may be specified within a functional hierarchy without 
reference to specific physical realisation which may be in marks on paper, 
storage in cabinets and agents reading and writing or, the equipment and 
procedures of a computer based information system.
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2.10 Millikan Functions
Millikan, (1984), and (1993), insists that 'proper functions' are those that are 
necessary for some capacity because of the historical context in which that 
capacity has been enabled by that function. That is:
[for] an item A to have a function F as a 'proper function' it is 
necessary (and close to sufficient) that either; (1) A originated as a 
"reproduction" ... of some prior item or items that, due in part to 
possession of the properties reproduced have actually performed F 
in the past and A exists because (causally historically because) of 
this or these performances. (2) A originated as the product of some 
prior device that given its circumstances had performance of F as a 
proper function and that, under those circumstances, normally 
causes F to be performed by means of producing an item like A. 
(1993, p 13)
In the explanation of natural functions, and this is her concern, I think Millikan 
is right. However, this leaves us without a term for the functions of alternative 
realisations. Millikan claims that an accidental double of a mammal has no 
proper functions because its history is not right, its heart does not have pumping 
blood as a proper function. I am content to reserve proper function for items 
with the right history. The gyroscope in a guided missile has the proper 
function of orientation because it has the right design history and my heart has 
the proper function of pumping blood because I have the right history. But if I 
realise the orienting function of the gyroscope with some alternative technology 
or if my failing heart is replaced with some alternative pump then these devices 
have their function in their context, though these are not proper functions in 
Millikan’s sense.
Millikan also insists on the use of ’Normal' for those conditions under which a
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proper function has historically fulfilled its function. Again, this is right for 
those proper functions whose functionality is vested in their reproductive 
history but it is also right for those functions whose functionality is vested in 
their realisation of a function within a containing system. My replacement heart 
will have a 'Normal' context of operation. It may require batteries and fail to 
operate near strong magnetic fields. Any explanation of my circulation must 
now include reference to revised Normal conditions of operation for my heart.24
2.11 The Function of Representation
In every day usage, one item is said to represent another when, in some context 
or by some convention, that item stands in for the other. Linguistic and pictorial 
representations are the most ubiquitous in our everyday usage although the 
range of representational structures that we use is very large. An extensive 
literature exists on the topic of representation; ranging from Peirce's work on 
the theory of signs, to the semantic realism of Fodor, (1985), the psychological 
usage described by Pemer, (1991), and the natural or biological approach 
exemplified by Dretske, (1988) and Millikan, (1984 and 1993).
My concern in this and subsequent chapters, will be to distinguish between the 
representational function of states intrinsic to an entity and the conventional 
representations of symbol, icon and sign. Most writers speak of representational 
systems. It is difficult to avoid this usage of system as an assembly of 
components seen as a whole. But in the terminology of this thesis, 
representation (the verb) is a function of a state that enables some capacity of 
an entity within a containing system that describes and explains the role of this 
entity in the world. The system may be physical in that it is realised in actual
24 This issue is controversial. Walsh and Ariew, (1996), distinguish the principal positions. My 
usage o f function is within my usage of system. For me, a function is an abstract entity: a 
component within an explanatory description. Real physical structures that are apt for 
explanation in functional terms may have evolved or have been designed.
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physical mechanisms, it may be ideal in that it is not actually realised or it may 
describe actual arrangements in functional terms. In the latter case, it may be 
that the representational and other functions could have been realised otherwise.
Examples of representational function include:
(i) the function of terms and sentences within the system describing human 
language in the world;
(ii) the use of natural and artefactual signs such as weather indicators and 
meter readings within a system describing humans predicting or 
measuring aspects of their world;
(iii) the function of states within an organism or artefact of regulation, that 
track those states of the world that are relevant for the regulatory 
capacity of that entity within a system describing the entity in the world.
In each of these examples we can pick out a capacity that is enabled by the 
function of representation. The representational function of terms and sentences 
enable communication through language and perception. Application of natural 
and artefactual signs enable other representations of the state of the world for 
the perceiver and, through perception and action, the internal representations of
25an organism or artefact enable the capacities of agency or regulation .
Dretske, (1988, 52), stipulatively defines a representational system, (RS), as:
"... any system whose function it is to indicate how things stand 
with respect to some other object, condition or magnitude. If RS's 
function is to indicate whether O is in condition A or B, for 
instance, and the way RS performs this function (when it performs
25 In the next chapter I will argue that agency and regulation are functionally equivalent, and 
that representation is a vital component in the functional enablement o f these capacities.
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it) is by occupying one of two possible states a (indicating that O is 
A) and b (indicating that O is B) then a and b are the expressive 
elements of RS and what they represent (about O) is that it is A 
(the case of a) and that it is B (in the case of b)."
Dretske divides realisations of representation into three classes that broadly 
match my three examples above.
Type I systems have no intrinsic powers of representation. Their 
representational function derives entirely from conventions of use. Dretske 
follows Peirce in calling the representational elements 'symbols'. In his terms 
they are "doubly conventional; we give them a job to do and then we do it for 
them".
Type II systems are those of inherent natural or artificial meaning. Their 
representational function for us, the observers, depends both on an actual 
correlation between one state of affairs and another, which may be natural, as in 
tree rings or artificial as in the case of a voltmeter and a convention of 
interpretation by us. Correlation alone does not constitute representation: I am 
aware of many correlations that I do not interpret as representations. The 
position of the steering wheel on my car correlates with the angle of the wheels 
but I do not normally perceive my direction of travel by looking at the steering 
wheel. Since such systems require only one act of interpretation, they are singly 
conventional
Type III systems are those in which the representational function is independent 
of any conventional procedures extrinsic to the use of the representation for the 
behaviour of some entity of which the representational structure is a part. The 
representational function is realised within some entity, a capacity of which is 
enabled by that function and no conventions or procedures outside that entity 
play any role in the realisation of representation for that entity. Dretske
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0  ( \describes these as natural systems of representation. "Natural systems of 
representation ... are ones which have their own intrinsic indicator functions 
that derive from the way the indicators are developed and used by the system o f  
which they are a part."
Where Dretske distinguishes the extrinsic nature of type I or Type II 
representation from the intrinsic nature of Type III representations, Dennett, 
(1982/3), contrasts the explicit representation of interpreted structures with tacit 
representations that represent within the processes of an entity. He characterised 
explicit representation in the terms:
"Let us say that information is represented explicitly in a system if 
and only if there actually exists in the functionally relevant place in 
the system a physically structured object, a formula or string or 
tokening of some members of a system (or 'language') of elements 
for which there is a semantics or interpretation and a provision (a
27mechanism of some sort) for reading or parsing the formula."
Dennett is not using 'system' in my strict sense of a description. There are, 
apparently, two 'systems', in my sense of the term, to which reference is made 
in this passage. The first is a physical system, which includes representations, 
what is represented, the users of the representation, and interpretative 
mechanisms by which the users relate the representation to the represented. The 
second is a system of conventions within which the physical representations are 
interpreted by those who are party to the conventions. This, latter, system 
would be realised in the "provision (a mechanism of some sort) for reading or 
parsing the formula." which would be, at least partially, within the cognitive
26 Since Dretske is not concerned with artefacts o f agency, for him, all such representations are 
natural. Thus in this context natural can include the artefactual.
27 In Dennett, (1987,216, author's Italics.
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processes of those party to the conventions. Within the theory that I shall 
develop, representation within a physical system of usage of this kind should be 
seen as 'explicit' since, following the conventions of representation and 
interpretation are intentional acts of the agents who use the representations 
within the first system, mentioned above.
An example would be a system of cars, drivers, roads and traffic lights. The 
function of the system is transportation and the function of the representational 
states of the traffic lights is to represent the rights of way at road junctions. The 
semantics is the usual relation between colour and right of way, and the 
mechanism is the perception of colour by drivers and their agency in following 
the conventions. Since the system includes the represented, the representation 
and the users of the representation, a complete explanation of the system will 
include the semantics of the system and the mechanisms by which the 
semantics are implemented. In such a system the function of the representation 
is explicit within the conventions of users who maintain it because the users of 
the representation are aware of its conventional nature. Other examples of 
explicit representation are in language and computation. In a flat language, 
without semantic ascent, the conventions are not themselves explicit but are 
manifest in the intentional acts and interpretations within the practices of the 
language. A computation is an intentional act and interpretation of the 
representations of computation is conventional within the context of the 
computation.
Sometimes implicit representations will depend on explicit representation. In 
our traffic light example a photograph of a driver disobeying a signal will 
implicitly represent the rights of way at the time through the inferences of 
location and timing of the photograph. If this photograph is used by the police, 
then the photograph will explicitly represent the crime through the 
interpretations of another physical system including police and a public 
prosecutor.
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Dennett contrasts explicit and implicit (or derived) representation with 'tacit' 
representation. Explicit representation represents under an interpretation while 
tacit representation represents within a function He invokes Gilbert Ryle's, 
(1949, 58), distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. Knowing that 
is essentially propositional, explicitly representational in that use requires 
semantic interpretation. The representations of knowing how are essentially 
procedural, tacit in that use is independent of semantic interpretation. In 
Dennett's words; "For the whole point of tacit representation is that it is tacit! 
States of such a system get their semantic properties directly and only from 
their functionally defined roles." (ibid. 223)
The extrinsic-intrinsic distinction is one of physical domain. The 
representational character of colour in traffic lights is vested in the conventions 
of the community that see and activate the signs. The lights are perceived by 
members of the community but are not a part of any member of the community. 
Similarly, propositions are produced, parsed and interpreted by members of the 
community but are not a part of any member of the community. Intrinsic 
representations, on the other hand, are used by the entity of which they are a 
part. They are intrinsic to that entity.
The explicit-tacit distinction is one of logical domain. The conventions that 
govern the interpretation of traffic light or sentences are available for 
articulation and inspection by those using them. The physical processes through 
which an entity represents its environment for it are a part of what it is to be 
that entity and are not available to the entity. As I shall argue, interpretation is 
an act of agency but representation within agency is a part of what it is to be an 
agent.
These distinctions are vital. All of our descriptions and explanations are 
couched in the explicitly meaningful symbols of language and it is in these
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representations that we interpret the intrinsic and tacit but meaningful, 
representations within all agency, including our own. The intrinsic 
representations of autonomous agency will be considered in 3.5. In 4 .12,1 will 
argue that propositional attitudes are explicit representations of attributed 
relations between actual or putative representations within the integrated 
agency of humans and other higher vertebrates and the actual or putative states 
of the world that they represent.
Computation depends on extrinsic representation. In Chapter 5, I will argue 
that, although some of the cognitive processes of agency may be procedurally 
isomorphic to some computational processes, cognition is not computation. 
Computation is an act of agency and the intrinsic representations within agency 
are not available for interpretation by the agent.
2.12 Malfunction and Misrepresentation
Within a system explanation of a capacity, the function of an entity is explained 
as the way that Normal functioning of that entity contributes to the exercise of 
that capacity. An actual realisation of that function in the physical domain will 
be subject to the accidents of a contingent world. A heart may not pump blood 
because a clot has lodged in a valve. A term in language may be misunderstood 
because of noise or because parties to the exchange did not share the same 
concepts. The damaged heart may pump but badly, a misunderstanding within 
language may cause minimal embarrassment.
The notion of function proposed by Millikan is normative while that proposed 
by Cummins is explanatory. These have been seen as opposed by some writers, 
including Millikan but need not be. If a system description that is set out to 
explain a capacity of a particular entity or of a natural kind, includes that some 
function enables this capacity, then if the explanation is of a Normal capacity, it 
will explain this in terms of Normal function and this may be a 'proper function'
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in Millikan terms. If hypothesised possible events lead within theories to 
hypothesised loss of function in some entities that Normally have that function 
then a system can be described in which counterfactuals concerning the 
occurrence of such events and their consequences are included. We may be led 
to formulate such systems because narrative descriptions of such occurrences 
exist or because within our current theories, such events are possible. Within 
such system descriptions, possible events antecedent in counterfactuals, have 
consequences that are apt for interpretation as malfunction. If one Normal 
consequence is that some state is representational then it is at least possible that 
the consequent state will misrepresent.
The relation between 'misrepresenting and malfunctioning' is discussed in detail 
by Karen Neander, (1995, 125), in an essay with this title. She illustrates the 
analysis with a by-relation diagram of functional causal influence in a frog 
striking at things flying past.
contributed to gene replication
4
by
helping to feed the frog 
by
4.
helping the frog to catch flies (prey? food?)
4-
by
detecting small, dark, moving things
Neander suggests (p. 129), that "the frog doesn't misrepresent as long as its 
representation R is caused by something appropriately small dark and moving." 
Her justification for this is that, (p. 130), "it is by detecting small dark moving
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things that the frog detects frog-food and flies." This would seem to imply that, 
for her, the frog does not misrepresent if any misrepresentation is not the result 
of malfunction in the frog and this is reasonable. However, since the cognitive 
processes and representations of the frog contributed to species survival by 
helping to feed the frog then, under another description28, small dark moving 
things are intentional for the frog since they may be represented as food. If, 
under this description, a small dark moving thing is not food then those 
intentional states or representations of the frog that represent this as food, 
misrepresent. In general, the Normal function of representation will be 
consequent upon the Normal functioning of other explanatory components. 
However, if a state misrepresents, this may be the consequence of 
malfunctioning of other components or of ambiguity in the world for the frog. 
This distinction is relevant to the consideration of misrepresentation within 
agency, which will be considered in 3.7, below, and to misrepresentation within 
computation, which will be considered in 5.4, below.
Representation in the frog is of type III and for the frog, issues of truth and 
falsity do not arise. If we see a thunder cloud and conclude that it will rain but it 
does not, then the proposition in which we state our conclusion is proven false. 
However, in type II terms, the signification of the thundercloud for rain was a 
malfunction, for the forecaster, of representation and our conclusion of rain to 
come was a misrepresentation. Though, had we said that it looks like rain, we 
would have spoken truly. Propositions, representations of type I, may be held to 
be true or false in so far as they relate to states of the world and if they are false 
then they misrepresent. However, a statement is an act of agency and its 
representational function is for that agent. If he intentionally lies then the 
misrepresentation of the lie is functional for him, although its falsity may be 
dysfunctional for a listener. Alternatively, a state may falsely represent because
28 This is Anscombe's (1957) notion of intentionality 'under a description' and will be met again 
in 3.2, below.
54
of an error of perception or ambiguity in the world for the perceiver and 
misrepresentation, falsity and malfunction will go together. A true statement 
may be misheard and the resulting type I misrepresentation will be a 
malfunction of communication.
2.13 Conclusions
Although there is an extensive and respectable tradition of systems thinking 
within Western history some of the usage within this tradition is, in my opinion, 
incompatible with my development of systems methodology for the explanation 
of, in particular human, agency. For this reason I take system to be a mode of 
explanation of the behaviour of physical entities that is characterised by the use 
of counterfactual terms. Systems pick out possible worlds. A system may or 
may not be truly realised in physical form. If it is, then it will pick out worlds 
that are actually possible; that is, accessible from the actual world in which it is 
realised..
The behaviour of such entities is explained by theories that are based on 
physical laws so that all resultant phenomena may be taken as physically 
caused. It is an axiom of my thesis that all cause is, at root physical cause: 
phenomena constrained by physical laws and initiated by events that may be 
contingent. Agents cause events by their actions that result from the physically 
realised and functionally explained capacity of agency.
Within such descriptions we explain capacities of physical entities in terms of 
the capacities of their components. Components within entities are described as 
having function for the entity in virtue of their enabling capacities of the entity. 
Functions are abstracta, which may be realised in physical entities or other 
components with function, which in turn, may be realised in components or 
physical entities and the hierarchy will rest on a basis of physical causal 
explanation.
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A component entity or structure may have function in terms of what it does. A 
state of some entity or structure may have function in terms of what it 
represents. Components may malfunction and states may misrepresent. 
Malfunctioning and misrepresenting are both described within the abstraction 
of a system description in which the counterfactual terms within a description 
of Normal functioning are augmented by counterfactual terms that pick out the 
abnormal consequences of abnormal incidents.
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3
SYSTEM, INTENTIONALITY & AGENCY
3.1 Intentionality
The intentionality of mental states and events derives from their property of 
being directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Discussion of 
intentionality goes back certainly to the medievals and some notion of 
intentionality could be derived from Aristotle's discussions of the practical 
syllogism. For Aristotle, man is a rational animal and our concern is to 
understand and perfect this rationality1. Also, for the medievals, intention is the 
distinction between the natural existence of the insensate or merely brute, and the 
mental existence which distinguishes man.
For Aquinas, intentionality is that our thoughts are about things and the form of 
the thing in a thought is a concept. A form of something present in someone's 
mind as a concept is, for Aquinas, obviously present in a very different way from 
its presence in an external thing. Aquinas called this mental mode of presence 
'intentional being'.
For Brentano, the fundamental property of consciousness is intentionality. All 
and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality Every subjective experience is 
understood as an act of consciousness referred to some object. Brentano was 
concerned with the ontological status of intentional objects. If objects can be 
described as intentional then they cannot be intentional in themselves, de re, as
1 A contention that will be argued for in this thesis is that Aristotle was wrong in this regard. 
The behaviour o f man as agent is as rational, though far more complex than the other higher 
vertebrates. What distinguishes man is his capacity to rationalise. As a member o f a linguistic 
community, his behaviour as agent may be capable o f more complex rationality due to this 
rationalising.
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this would either lead to the vicious regress of intentional perception of 
intentionality or to a dual aspect theory of things. The alternative is that 
intentional objects are objects of thought and this was Brentano's choice. If 
objects of thought are real then we need a duality of stuff. If they are ideal then 
we have the Platonic duality of form and stuff. If they are nominal then they are 
within the description and this is close to the position that I will develop.
For Husserl, every act of consciousness is intentionally directed towards some 
object. He wrote: "Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the 
word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental 
property of consciousness to be conscious of something."2
For Sartre, intentionality is constitutive of consciousness, its directedness on to 
outer objects that are prior to consciousness. He wrote: "To say that 
consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself 
as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as 
already existing when consciousness reveals it."3
Anscombe, (1957), distinguished intentional actions as those that are answers to 
the question: "why is he doing that?". Of particular relevance to this thesis is her 
notion of a hierarchy of descriptions of an action. Her conclusion that an act can 
be seen as intentional under an aspect of a description was extended by 
Davidson, (1971) in his definition of agency.
Recent approaches to intentionality range from the instrumental account of 
Dennett, (1987), to the realistic representations of Fodor4 and the biological 
functionalism of Millikan, (1984). Lyons, (1995, 1) defined intentionality as
2 Cartesian meditations, (p 33).
3 Being and Nothingness, 1943 ed’n., Routledge, 1991 p.xxxviii.
4 See the introduction to "Meaning in Mind", ed. Loewer & Rey, (1991), and Fodor, (1987).
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"covering those characteristics of mental activities on account of which those 
activities are said both to have a content that contains information about 
something beyond the content and the activity, and to involve a particular sort of 
attitude towards that content. Moreover, it is a peculiarity of mental content that 
it is necessarily 'perspectival'."
Lyons, (op cit.), presents a cogent argument for a bottom up explanation of 
human intentionality. Since he is concerned to explain human intentionality, his 
account is concerned with the physical basis for the aboutness of the world for 
humans. He starts with the aboutness of brain function and distinguishes this 
from the aboutness of the behaviour of the pre-linguistic child and distinguishes 
this from the aboutness of the propositions with which we attribute aspects of 
aboutness to one another and ourselves. As will emerge in this chapter and the 
next, my conclusions are close to those of Lyons. Where Lyons is concerned to 
explain human intentionality, defined in his terms, I am concerned to generalise 
the very idea of intentionality and to demonstrate that the resultant generalised 
notion is a systems notion, the attribution of which need not be restricted to 
humans, vertebrates or even organisms.
For each these writers, intentionality is a property of consciousness and 
consciousness is a phenomenon to be accepted or explained. If we take 
intentionality as a property of consciousness then we will need to consider what 
sort of thing is consciousness5. If intentionality is a property independent of 
consciousness, we must enquire of what it is a property and what sort of property 
it is. I will argue that intentionality is a property of an action or state of an entity 
and is essential to the agency of that entity. This is not to suggest that 
consciousness is not intentional but it is to suggest that the combined notions of 
intentionality and agency are more fundamental.
5 The explanation o f consciousness is not a subject for this thesis. Where, as in chapter 6 ,1 need 
to consider consciousness I will rely on Dennett, (1991).
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Whether it is a property of consciousness, of thought or of sentences, 
intentionality is aboutness.6 We may speak of the objects of thought or the 
objects of consciousness. Thought is about something and we are conscious of 
something. Sentences are about things, whether actual, historical or fictional. 
Sentences are sequences of marks within a syntax, through which they are given 
meaning for us by our practices of use. It is in our practices of use that sentences 
are about something and so sentences are about something for us. The thoughts 
we think are our thoughts and we are aware of them in our consciousness. As we 
recognise that our thoughts are ours we also recognise that other's thoughts are 
theirs. ‘Consciousness’ is the term we use for our awareness of our own thoughts, 
memories and sensations: the awareness, which we can share with others. In this 
sense, our consciousness is essentially ours, the objects of our thoughts or the 
objects of our consciousness are objects for us. Our intentionality is about-ness 
and it is for-ness and it is about things for us. If we wish to characterise 
intentionality as a system property it is obvious that one entity which can be 
described within a system as having this property is a human. This does not pick 
out a system kind, unless we assume that humans are the only kind with 
intentionality. The question to be asked is: whether the fact of possessing 
intentionality can be used of itself to pick out an entity that is apt for description 
as a system kind? The answer is that we do already use a term for just such an 
entity and this term is ' intentional agent'
3.2 Agency
Agency is to do with action. In philosophy we are concerned to distinguish 
human agency in terms of action that is by an agent and for an agent. Davidson, 
(1971, 46), summarised this in the terms:
6 Definition in: "The Oxford Companion to the Mind", ed. R.L. Gregory, Oxford, 1987.
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a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under 
an aspect that makes it intentional.
This usage of 'agency' must be distinguished from the other common usage of 
an 'agent' as a substance that acts. In chemistry an agent is the active component 
of a reaction in distinction from a catalyst that enables a reaction or an inert 
substance that has no relevant causal power. In human affairs, a man is the 
agent of another if he acts on that person's behalf. In biology we may say that 
'wind is the agent of pollination'. These notions of agency focus on a particular 
change within a causal chain and define agency as the property of that which 
has causal power for this change. My usage of physical cause as explanatory 
within a system does not relate events in this way and this usage of agency is 
not relevant to my thesis. Throughout this thesis 'agency' is to be understood as 
'intentional agency' and 'agent cause' is change caused by an intentional act.
For Davidson, (1963), agents act from reasons and reasons cause actions. 
Reasons, for him, are mental states such as beliefs and other attitudes. It is that 
agents have these states that cause an agent to act. Thus Davidson, (1970), 
suggests that; although physical cause requires physical laws and reasons cause 
actions, there are no psychophysical laws. Davidson is concerned with human 
agency, human action and human rationality. If we assume, as he does, that 
mental events are events of a human agent then we have reason to consider the 
apparent paradox of how such events can cause action without a physical causal 
connection. For most of the rest of this chapter I intend to bracket this question. 
My reason for this is that I will argue that mental talk is not best interpreted as 
talk about mental states or mental events of or within a human or other, agent. 
To establish this argument, I must first generalise the definition of agency. I 
will develop the argument that our rich conception of human agency can be 
seen as an elaboration of an austere conception of agency which stems from its 
definition in terms of action and intentionality.
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My amendment to Davidson's criterion is slight, I propose that agency, 
intentionality and action be co-defined in the terms:
An entity is the agent of an act if what it does can be described
under an aspect that makes it intentional for that entity.
By an entity I mean any substance that we may distinguish and describe. The 
distinguishing and describing are our actions. They are actions of theorists who 
are agents, also in the world and of the world. An entity has agency under our 
description if; within this description, its actions have an effect on its world and 
this effect is by the entity because it is for the entity. Actions of agency are 
physical events, physical changes of the agent that cause physical changes in 
the world that includes the entity. States of an entity are intentional if they 
relate to states of affairs that are for the entity. Thus the concepts of agency, 
action and intentionality are logically bound. Necessarily, an agent has 
intentionality if its actions are for it. An entity with intentionality but without 
agency would be in the world and of the world but would not affect the world in 
a way which reflects that its world is for it. Although such an entity may exist, 
unless it is our artefact and we have access to its states, we cannot be aware of 
its intentionality. A digital computer may have states that are about states of 
affairs in the world, though they are not of its world, but it does not act. The 
states of any measuring device are representations, for the user, of states of the 
world, but the instrument does not act. Such artefacts are not intentional in 
themselves since their intentionality is vested in our interpretation which is 
manifest in our behaviour in our world. States of the brain are about states of 
affairs in the world, within our theory of our agency but the brain does not act.
I will take it as an axiom that there is some way that the world is, which is 
independent of agency although its description by us must be dependent on our 
agency. The project of science is to describe the world, using the terms that 
reflect the way the world is for us and theoretical terms, grounded in these
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terms. However, every agent in the world, the world that we describe in the 
terms of our science and which we believe to be independent of agency, is also, 
in its world, the world that is for it in virtue of its intentionality. Any agent is in 
the world and it is of the world. Also, it is in its world, that cross section of the 
world that is, intentionally, for it.
The world of the agent is causally related to the real world. The set of the 
objects that are for it may overlap the set of objects of the world of a theorist, 
within some domain of objecthood in the theory of agency of that theorist. 
Since the theorist is an agent her objects are a cross section of the real world. 
Her ontology of that world is created by her classifications of the world through 
her agency. Each agent classifies the real world of actual physical stuff for it. 
Agents who describes other agencies in their theories will couch those theories 
in the terms of their own ontology which derives from the classifications of 
their own agency.7
3.3 Functions of Agency
An entity has agency if  its actions can be described under an aspect that make 
them intentional. The actions of an entity are intentional if they change things in 
the world and this change is for the entity. Agency is a system capacity that is 
enabled by the intentional functions of perception, representation and action. If 
we can establish criteria for realisation of these functions then we can use these 
criteria to derive a minimal functional description of an intentional agent. This 
will then enable us to pick out examples of entities in this world to which we can 
attribute agency and intentionality.
Any token realisation of agency will be a physical entity in the world and we 
must distinguish between the entity that is the agent and the entities that
7 This ontological dependence is illustrated in the example of 4.3 below.
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comprise the world of the agent. As a physical entity it will have causal 
relations with its world. Changes in the agent will cause changes in the world of 
the agent and changes in the world will cause changes in the agent. This theory 
of agency may be summarised in five functional definitions.
(i) Actions of agency are those agent changes that cause changes in 
the world that are intentional for this agent
(ii) Perceptions of agency are those agent changes that are caused 
by the world and are intentional for the agent.
(iii) Representations within agency are those agent states that are 
changed or maintained by perception so that they are intentional for 
the agent.
(iv) Cognitive processes are those causal processes by which 
perception changes representation, representations change 
representations and representations cause action so as to further the 
goals of the agent.
(v) Goals of agency are those possible worlds that are picked out by 
the cognitive processes of agency.
The defining characteristic of agency is intentional action. Action causes 
change in the world that is for the agent. Action is caused by change in states of 
the agent and these states are themselves changed by events in the world. Those 
states of the agent that cause action by the agent that is for the agent are caused 
by events in the world that are relevant for the agent. These states I will define 
as representational states of agency. They are representational since they re­
present the world for the agent.
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The agency of an entity is manifest in a process. This process can be described 
as; events in the world causing changes in the agent which cause changes to the 
world that are for the goals of the agent. The component process within which 
events in the world cause change to the agent I call 'perception' and the 
component process within which changes in the agent cause change in the 
world I call 'action'. Those states of the agent that, through perception, are 
changed by events in the world and that, through action, change the world I call 
representations. Those processes, generally within the agent, by which 
perceptions change representations, representations change representations and 
cause action that is for the goals of the agent I call 'cognitive'.
3.4 Goals of Agency
E. Nagel, (1979), distinguishes three explications of goal directed processes. 
Firstly, the goals of intentional action in which an organism can be described as
o
goal-directed only if it is legitimate to ascribe intentions, desires and beliefs to 
the organism. Secondly, the program view of goal directed processes in which 
the process is constrained by some code to continue to some end. Thirdly, the 
system property view according to which an entity is so structured that it will 
adapt itself towards some goal state against variations in its environment.
To take the first of these explications is to seek a functional account of 'goal' 
that will lead to realisation in actual states of an entity that represent 
propositional attitudes that are about actual states of the world and are 
concerned with goals that have actual import for the entity. Later in this thesis 
we will be concerned to explicate the folk psychological practices of a 
community of linguistic agents in terms of physical states of the community but 
this is not relevant here.
8 McFarland, (1989, p.43), distinguishes goal seeking systems from goal directed systems, 
where the latter refer to explicit goal representations. In this usage Nagel makes no reference to 
goal representation but the distinction is relevant and I shall speak o f goal seeking processes.
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To consider the second of Nagel’s explications: A program may have a goal 
and if the coding of the program is an act of agency then this will be the goal of 
an agent. Alternatively, the program may have evolved, as the coding of DNA 
programs the growth of an organism. It would be reasonable to think of such 
growth as the goal of that program but this growth is not within the goals of the 
agent organism. Also, it is my contention that the evolution of DNA is not the 
outcome of an act of agency.
The system-property view of goal-directed processes as described by Nagel is 
the one that will be argued for in this thesis. Nagel's exposition is based on the 
work of Sommerhoff, (1950). Sommerhoff identifies goal directed behaviour by 
its plasticity; that the goal may be reached by different paths and from different 
initial conditions and persistence; that the continued maintenance of the entity 
in its goal-directed behaviour is enabled, by changes within the entity, against 
disturbances within the entity or its environment. In particular, the controlling 
variables that maintain action towards the goal must be orthogonal. By 
'orthogonal' we do not mean that their values will not be correlated as they 
obviously are. What is meant is that neither is causally dependent on the other 
or jointly causally determined except through their co-operation in control9. 
Nagel's examples are of homeostasis within the circulatory system and of steam 
engine speed control through a centrifugal governor. In each example, 
controlling variables; blood water content and kidney activity in the first and 
engine speed and valve opening in the second are orthogonal as defined. For 
kidney homeostasis, the blood water content can be seen as the environment to 
the kidneys and for the governor, engine speed can be seen as the environment 
to the governor. The goals of agency of an organism are within the environment 
of the organism. The Sommerhoff criterion is that the events in the environment 
against which the organism is pursuing its goals are essentially orthogonal to
9 This usage o f 'orthogonal' was defined in 2.6, above.
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the structure, in virtue of which, the organism can be described as pursuing its 
goals. Actions of the organism will correlate with events in the environment 
and Sommerhoff coined the phrase 'directive correlation' for this linkage. This 
causal independence or orthogonality between goal and perception in the 
analysis of intentional action is critical:
Apart from actions of an entity that are programmed towards a goal, 
goal-seeking behaviour is characterised by input events in the 
world, which are essentially unpredictable for the entity.
It has been argued that: if ‘goal’ is to be associated with ‘final cause’ then, since 
goals are in the future, effect can precede cause, (Taylor, 1966). This is not my 
usage of goal in this account of agency. In the description of a theorist, an 
intentional act divides the world. For the theorist, the world of the theorist is 
classified for  each agent by the intentionality of that agent. This classification is 
in the concepts of the theorist and in this sense the classification is for  the 
theorist but any token classification is an aspect of the theory of agency of a 
token agent. It is the acts of that agent that establish its world fo r  it and this 
world is manifest for  the theorist in the classifications of the theorist. 
Perception, representation, cognitive process, goals and action define agency in 
a theory of an theorist, who is also an agent in and of the world that contains the 
agent, whose acts are the subject of the analysis and explanation of the theorist.
The goals of agency are described within the theory of a theorist. In one such 
theory of a short-term goal described by a possible state of affairs, the goal may 
be described as if it were in the future. But this is a possible future within the 
counterfactual theory held by the theorist and picked out by the system of 
agency in the world. Fundamental goals of any organism are to survive and to 
reproduce, since organisms that exist are those, whose ancestors have survived 
and reproduced. Again, for any token organism, its survival and reproduction 
are possible futures described within the theory of agency. Falk, (1981), gives a
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regulatory account of agency that is very similar to the above, although his 
terminology is very different. He describes regulatory systems as ‘natural 
feedback systems’ and generalises the notion of ‘subtraction’ to accommodate 
all complexities of goal directed processes and writes “so the negative feedback 
system, complex as it is, is the minimum system with states that can have a 
representational function for the system."
It is not of the nature of a goal of agency that it be represented. Although, in the 
complex integrated agency of the higher vertebrates or a target seeking missile, 
actual or possible states of affairs may be represented in states of the agent. 
However, goal states such as survival or the achievement of reproduction may 
not be represented within the system. Analysis of the system comprising the 
organism in its environment will reveal that the cognitive processes of agency 
Normally pick out possible worlds that, within the theory of agency, are apt for 
description as survival or reproduction. Nourishment is not represented in the 
representations of the agency of a bacterium that bias the aggregate motion of 
its cilia or the neural states of a frog striking at a passing speck. In those cases 
where goals are represented the representation may be explicit, as in a student 
deciding to work for a degree or co-ordinates in a target seeking missile.
Taylor, (op cit), argues that purposeful behaviour is uniquely characteristic of 
agents but he claims that it cannot be understood or even described using only 
the concepts of physical science. In Chapter 7 he argues that there can be no 
possibility of a causal analysis of intentional action unless, "all events including 
those that are the acts of men are causally determined by other events". For him 
the I  in 7 move my hand' is transcendental to any causal analysis. Purpose has a 
fundamental place in his ontology and he sees cause as irrelevant to purposeful 
explanation, (221).
McFarland, (1989, 54), opposes the notion of goal representation. He contends 
that: "... the behaviour of individual animals (and people) is guided, not by any
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goal-representation, but by myopic hill-climbing behaviour". My use of goal is 
more modest than the usage that McFarland is concerned to oppose. A theory of 
agency that includes the perception of a potential gradient, whether 
gravitational or chemical, may include as goal; climbing up that gradient. This 
is how E. Coli proceeds towards its nourishment and sometimes it will fail. 
However, the complex agency of an advanced vertebrate may include learned 
responses and more complex goals may be appropriate within a theory of 
agency that explains the behaviour of an entity in its environment. Goals are not 
represented, the structure that realises the cognitive processes of agency is such 
that actions of agency pick out possible worlds that are described as goal states 
within a theory of agency.
Natural agents that are observed are those that exist and their existence is 
consequent on their survival and the survival of their ancestors against the 
events of their environment and that of their ancestors. These events may be 
presumed to include accidents from the point of view of the agent, events 
orthogonal to the current states of agency, since we do not presume any higher 
agency. Since these natural agents exist we presume that the cognitive 
processes by which their natural representations lead to intentional action are, at 
least, not inimical to their survival. If these processes have developed over the 
life of the agent then this process of development is, at least, not inimical to its 
survival. If these cognitive processes or their process of development is 
inherited then we presume that these processes were, at least, not inimical to the 
survival of its ancestors.
As theorists of the agency of ourselves and other natural agents we deduce from 
our current observations and fossil evidence that the cognitive processes of 
natural agents and their ontogenetic development have evolved so as to lead to 
action that is, at least, not inimical to their survival. Since each agent and its 
ancestors have survived in an environment of limited resources, we infer that 
cognitive processes and the processes of their ontogeny have evolved that are,
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ceteris paribus10, beneficial with respect to the survival of the agent. Species 
evolve in environments, and behaviour that is appropriate for the survival and 
reproduction of the individual against the contingencies of its environment will 
be selected for. Such behaviour can be interpreted, in a theory of agency of the 
individual, as for  the goals of agency. In a given theory the goals attributed may 
be to avoid danger, to obtain food or to reproduce.
If teleology is the doctrine that structure and behaviour are determined by the 
purposes they fulfil then this definition of goal is not rooted in teleology. 
Structure and behaviour have been determined by the filtering of selective 
processes against events of the past. Any perception, representation or act of 
agency can, in principle, be described by an theorist, in the terms of some 
domain, as about aspects of the environment: this is what it is to be intentional. 
In these terms the theorist can describe the specific goals of an act within the 
goals of survival or reproduction as the pursuit of prey, avoidance of a predator 
or partnership for reproduction. The theorist possesses the concepts of these 
goals. The acts of agency are physically caused by physical states of the agent 
that have been caused by the environment of the agent. It is within the theorist's 
theory of agency that we separate this process into perception, representation 
and cognitive process. Agents act in this way because the selective processes of 
evolution have filtered out those entities that do not act in this way. The 
behaviour of agency can be explained in terms of perception, representation, 
process, goals and action but this process has not been designed to meet these 
goals.11 Our use of the notion of 'purpose' is a component practice in our 
communal theory of mind and the evolution of these practices is considered in
4.11, below. Looking ahead to this analysis, the aetiology of 'purpose' is. 
Firstly, primitive agency has evolved that classifies the world for it by its
10 Cashing in the 'ceteris paribus' clause would take us into contentious areas o f evolutionary 
theory that are not relevant to this argument.
11 This point is also made by Falk, (1981, op cit.).
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actions. Secondly, complex integrated agency has evolved that recognises 
objects and action that are relevant in its world. Thirdly, linguistic communities 
of such agents have evolved that use signs to refer to these objects and describe 
behaviour as purposive with respect to the objects that have been classified by 
that behaviour.
Goals may conflict. The behaviour of an organism or artefact may be apt for 
explanation in terms of multiple goals and action will be the result of 
processing of representations that involves a payoff between opposing goals. 
Normal cognitive processing will have evolved or been designed, to result in 
action that is generally appropriate for this type of organism or artefact, whether 
solitary or within a group. However, token actions may not be best for goals 
such as survival of the token entity if such a goal were to conflict with inherited 
or learned conventions of a group.
3.5 Representation Within Agency.
Agency, in the stipulative usage of this thesis, depends on representation.
Whether human cognition depends on representation is a matter of current
debate. Van Gelder, (1995) suggests that cognition may be explained in terms
of dynamic coupling He considers the example of a centrifugal steam governor
and contends that: since the operation of this mechanism is dynamically
determined, its power of control is not apt for explanation in terms of
representation. However, van Gelder sees the representational approach to
cognition as "... a matter of rule governed manipulation of symbolic
representations." He argues that cognition is not just computation. I share this
10view: chapter 5 of this thesis is devoted to it. However, the type III
12 More recently Ramsey, (1997), contends that: "... for a significant class o f models there is 
no compelling reason for thinking that connectionism's own terms should include a notion of 
internal representation." I agree; cognitive science need have no truck with representations. But 
a theory o f agency must involve the agent in the world and describe the world as it is for the 
agent. If a neural process is called recognition within a theory then its output state represents 
what is recognised within that theory.
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representations within agency are not symbolic; they are states of an agent that 
depend on states of the world that are relevant for the agent. They are intrinsic 
to the agent in the sense defined by Dretske and their interpretation by a theorist 
is tacit in the sense defined by Dennett. These concepts were distinguished in
2.11, above.
Recall our five definitions in 3.3, above. Action, perception, cognitive process 
and representation are functions for the capacity of agency and agency is a 
capacity of an entity described within the containing system of an agent in the 
world. Actions are agent changes that are caused by states of the agent and 
these changes cause change in the world that is intended by the agent. 
Perceptions are processes of agent change that are caused by changes in states 
of the world that are intentional for the agent and the processes of perception 
cause changes in states of the agent. Thus, agency implies that there exist states 
of the agent that are causally linked to states of the world that are relevant for 
the agent and that the causal powers of these states of the agent are necessary 
for agency. Not sufficient, since although agency implies the existence of these 
states, it has other implications, such as a world apt for classification, processes 
apt for description in terms of action and perception, and autonomy.
Such states are intentional since they are about states of the world. If the 
processes by which such states are for the agent in that they lead to acts that are 
for the agent in the context of perceptions of the world, then these states must, 
in some sense track the states of the world. We theorists, in our functional 
theory of the agency of this entity, can call these 'representational states' since, 
within our theory, these states re-present the world for the agent. I conclude:
To effect its agency each agent must represent its world, for it, in a 
state of itself. Such representation is an intentional relation between 
a state of the agent and a state of affairs in the world.
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This purpose for us of this theory of agency is to explain how an entity 
described in terms of agency functions Normally in the world. The states of the 
agent postulated in such a theory represent the states of the world for the agent 
in so far as they mediate, for the agent, between how the world affects the agent 
in perception and how the agent affects the world in action. That the state 
represents is independent of any interpretation by the theorist, though what it 
represents may be described within a theory. The capacity of an organism to 
achieve its goals of survival or reproduction or ambition in an unpredictable 
world does not depend on the interpretation of its representations within agency 
by a theorist. The function of such representations for the theorist is to explain 
the behaviour of the agent. Their function for the agent is to cause appropriate 
action in the world.
This theory of agency postulates the functions of perception, representation and 
action within a causal functional nexus in which perceptions cause 
representations and representations cause representations to cause action in the 
world that is for the goals of the agent in the light of its perception of the world. 
This causal functional nexus will vary from agent to agent but each agent type 
and each token realisation of a type of agent, can be described in terms of some 
causal structure of cognitive process that maintains the intentionality of agency 
for this type or token of agency. This is a thin, austere conception of agency but 
it is the conceptual core of the agency that is common to living things and 
artefacts of regulation. Representation is the bridge between perception and 
action. Actual representational states are about the world, as it actually seems 
from the point of view of the agent
3.6 The Content of Representations Within Agency
If perception presents the world for the agent and action changes the world for 
the agent then representation re-presents the world for the agent. The way that 
our world is for us can be represented in language within the representations of
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propositions: these are type I representations in Dretske's classification, 
outlined in 2.11, above. The terms of these propositions represent the content 
for us of states of our world. It is in sentences made up of these propositions 
that, within our theory, we describe the states of the world represented within 
an agent. Any representational state postulated by us in our theory of the 
cognitive processes of a token agent in the world will be postulated as having 
content for the agent and that content is what that state represents for that agent. 
If we can explain the behaviour of an agent by a theory then this theory will be 
apt for description within sentences of our language. If the theory is true then 
these sentences will be true. The content of these sentences will be made up of 
concepts, concepts possessed by the theorist who states this theory.
An agent, qua agency, need not possess concepts and the content of its 
representations is generally nonconceptual13. However, the actions of agency 
may include linguistic transactions within membership of a linguistic 
community and people14 who are agents within that community will generally 
satisfy the possession conditions for the concepts of their shared language.
The function of representations within agency consists in their causal role in 
leading, Normally, to appropriate acts of agency within the cognitive processes 
that define this type or this token of agency. In any true theory of the cognitive 
processes of a given realisation of agency there will be some instantaneously 
isomorphic relation between a representational state and the world state or 
possible world state represented. The dynamic on-going agency, of the 
realisation of the theory, may not be apt for explanation in terms of static, 
causal isomorphic relations between the representation and the represented. The 
content of such representations is generally nonconceptual for the agent, though
13 The relevance o f nonconceptual content is demonstrated by an example in 5.3, below. The 
nonconceptual nature of the content o f perceptual experience and sub-personal computational 
states is defended by Bermudez, (1995).
14 The distinction between person and agent is explored in more detail in 6.7 below.
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not for the theorist. However, the cognitive processes of articulate rational 
agency may include explicit representations of beliefs attributed. For example, 
“I stopped because the light turned red.”
We may observe a cat, a dog and a tree and theorise that; the cat perceives a 
dog and a tree. In our theory the neural states of the cat will represent the state 
of the world that we call 'a dog there' in some neural processes that represent 
that state of the world for the cat; and similarly for the tree. Acts of the cat will 
be appropriate to a dog and a tree within the limits of this situation (functions 
are not always fulfilled). Each of its representational states will be caused by 
and functionally related to15 some of its perceptions. Each of its actions will be 
caused by and functionally related to some of its representational states.
An actual entity will have the capacity of agency in the world only if it has 
states that causally track states of the world so as to enable intervention in the 
world that furthers the goals of its agency. In simple realisations, such as 
artefacts and unicellular organisms, the representational content of such states 
can be interpreted within our theory of the cognitive processes of the agent. Of 
a simple vertebrate we can say; this state of affairs caused this pressure that 
excited this neuron that excited that neuron that activated that muscle. The 
austere agency of bacteria, parts of plants and simple creatures such as the 
Californian Sea Hare and the cockroach16 can be at least partially explained in 
these terms. That the agency of more complex creatures is capable of 
explanation in these terms is a matter for ongoing research. Actual cognitive 
processes may turn out to be a blend of serial and parallel combinatorial 
processes. The hypothesis of the this thesis is that whatever structural form 
these processes take they will be apt for interpretation as realisations of 
combinations of representations of the world as it is for the agent.
15 'Caused by' as the realisation o f 'functionally related to'.
16 Ritzmann, (1993), cited in Clark, (1997).
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Akins, (1993) has given a detailed neural and cybernetic explanation of the 
agency of the Mustached bat as manifest in its hunting. She writes, (p. 151):
" ... what science suggests is that the sonar system of the bat is 
probably not concerned with the representation of three dimensional 
objective particulars.... There being, that is, no particulars for it, we 
should not ascribe to the bat perceptions of those particulars ... 
Because there are no objects that the bat perceives, there are no 
objects for the bat to perceive in a certain bat-like way."
Akins, in this passage, appears to be arguing against a symbolic usage of 
representation. In a theory of the agency of the bat, the bat's neural states 
represent and what they represent is a state of the world. This state may be 
described in our theory as a moth or a landing place or a cave layout or as 
combinations of Doppler shift, azimuth and amplitude. Earlier, (p. 150), she 
writes:
"The bat's auditory system seems to be designed for sequenced non­
integrated information processing."
Alternatively stated, the behaviour of these complex creatures can be explained 
in the functional terms of agency but this agency is realised in quasi- 
autonomous cognitive processes. Although these processes combine to facilitate 
survival of the bat, their agency is not co-ordinated to this end and there is 
nothing that it is like to be a bat. The goals of the bat that are functional for its 
autopoiesis are served by the totality of its cognitive processes but these are not 
integrated cybemetically. Each example of agency that is realised in a bat can 
be functionally described in terms of perception, representation, cognition and 
action. We may describe the perception as 'of a moth', and the act as 'following, 
sending and catching' but the content of the representations is most robustly
76
defined as of physical properties like Doppler shift, amplitude and angle of 
azimuth. In this domain, perception is of these properties and each action is a 
physical 'hill climbing'17 response to a perception
The world of the bat is very different from that of the cat. The neurological 
mechanisms of the cat will provide for large scale integration of visual, audible 
and olfactory data and it is tempting to conclude from this that the 
representations of the cat are of real objects out there, though we may have no 
justification for this18. A Normal token cat will respond to stimuli that are 
relevant for it and in these responses it will track objects in its world. The 
perceptual mechanisms of a cat are transducers just as are ours and the bats, and 
representations of the cat will track such states of the world as size, speed, 
shape, smell and sound. Combinations of such representations may be 
'recognised' and specific behaviour may have adapted to previous experience. In 
this case the agency of this cat will be manifest in its actions about these 
perceptions of recognition. We, in our observations of the cat, may interpret 
these perceptions as classification by the cat of its world. We may name the 
classes 'picked out' in terms that denote aspects of the world for us and we may 
translate these terms into others that denote aspects of the world that appear to 
us to be for the cat in our theory of the agency of the cat. From this analysis we 
may explain the behaviour of the cat in terms of concepts like prey or food 
source or comfort. These concepts are possessed by us but not by the cat. The 
conceptual theory established may be sound in that it explains and predicts the 
behaviour of the cat but the intrinsic representations of agency that are realised 
within that cat are not representations of these concepts for the cat. It may be 
that neural states of the cat correlate with realisations of these concepts: indeed,
17 Using the terminology o f McFarland, (1989).
18 Dennett, (1991,43) denies animals consciousness since he insists that consciousness is only 
having a "centre o f narrative gravity". However, "Human beings are not the only creatures 
smart enough to suffer." (449), If 'being conscious' is not the right term for 'being sufficiently 
cybemetically integrated to manifest a multi-sensory world view', then we need a term and the 
Dretske, (1993, 272), notion of 'thing consciousness' may apply.
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this is likely for a mature cat in a stable environment. However, although these 
two functional theories trade in the same coin they are not dealing with the 
same goods. If, within our theory of the agency of the cat, we speak of 
perception of prey, representation of prey and action of pouncing on prey, then 
we gain in interpretation but we lose in realisation. We, not the cat, have 
decided that 'that is prey'. I contend that our attribution of conceptual content to 
type III representational states should be seen as a theory of attribution and not 
as a functional explanation of phenomena realised in the world within the 
cognitive processes of the agent.
Further, I will argue in 4.11 below, that our attributions of beliefs and desires as 
representations with conceptual content should also be seen as within a theory 
of attribution that we call folk psychology. Also, I will argue that the functional 
representations of folk psychology are not realised within the cognitive 
processes of the human agent. The content of intrinsic representations of agency 
within a human agent is generally nonconceptual. A representation may involve 
the recognition of phoneme structures within their parsing, it may involve the 
recognition of scripts evoked by such parsing. However, for the agent that is 
animal and human, these are combinations of intrinsic representations caused 
by perceptual events, past and present.19
Extrinsic and conventional representation within language must be 
distinguished from intrinsic and tacit representation within agency. The content 
of those representations in language that deal with representations within 
agency is wide in so far as it is concerned with internal states and their 
representations of an external world. The content of statements of propositional
19 Models o f the neural processing involved in such parsing may deploy the symbolic 
representations o f  serial processing or the sub symbolic processing o f  neural networks. The 
partial stages o f convergence within a neural network are not apt for interpretation as 
representations o f agency, although the recognitions to which they converge and some stages in 
the serial processing may be. However, the symbolic representations are representational for the 
cognitive scientist. These distinctions are considered in Chapter 5, below.
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attitudes is also wide. Such statements are attributions by which we may 
explain the behaviour of agents who are sufficiently like ourselves to make the 
attributions of our own folk psychology plausible. We might want to say that 
the frog believed there was a fly but be inhibited by our knowledge of the 
simplicity of the mechanisms of the frog's cognitive processes. However, the 
fact that our own cognitive processes include learning, are far more complex 
and can only be mapped on to the world, in a theory of agency, by the positing 
of many goals does not change the fact that they are mechanisms. We share a 
continuity of realisation of intrinsic representations in states of neural circuitry 
with other vertebrates. Our intentional activities can be functionally explained 
in examples of the same theory of agency that we may use to explain the 
actions of any living thing.
Conceptual content is within language. Peacocke, (1992, 23) wrote: "Possessing 
a concept is knowing what it is for something to be its semantic value." 
Possession of a concept by a human agent implies that the agent has intrinsic 
representations within agency with content of something (the semantic value) 
and intrinsic representations within agency with content of the well formed 
strings in language that denote that something. Concepts are abstracta, realised 
in the practices of language. Representations with conceptual content are 
realised only within sentences of language spoken by people to people about 
things, concrete or abstract, in their world.
Ethologists have a different concept of 'concept'. Allen and Hauser, (1991), 
define 'concepts' as
"[CJapable of explaining complex abilities to generalise over 
variable stimuli, to rapidly produce appropriate responses to the 
common features underlying these stimuli and to modify behaviour 
when it is discovered that perceptual stimuli are unreliable guides to 
underlying features."
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Such concepts are those with which an observer may construct a theory of the 
agency of a complex organism in the world. In such a theory of agency, 
representations will be comprised of such concepts but in the Peacocke sense, 
these are concepts possessed by the theorist.
3.7 Misrepresentation Within Agency
The function of a representational state of agency is relative to the explanation 
of agency that includes that state and this explanation is within a theory of 
agency that explains this type or token of realisation of agency. If this theory is 
true then it will explain the Normal functioning of agency in terms of 
representing states and states of the world that are represented; this usage of 
'Normal' is that of Millikan, (1984). However, the Normal functioning of the 
processes of agency is contingent on events in the world, within or outside the 
physical boundary of the agent. It may be that, due to some neural flaw, a 
representational state fails to track events in the world and this state may now 
be that appropriate to some other state of the world. Alternatively, it may be 
that no conceptual interpretation exists for this state. In so far as this state can 
be said to represent then it misrepresents.20 It may be that the organs of 
perception, the transducers that realise the function of perception for this agent, 
are faulty or that some physical extension of agency, such as a clear view of a 
state of affairs, is impeded. If so, then any representational state that 
functionally relies on this perception will misrepresent. Intrinsic representations 
within agency may or may not be realised by binary processes that cause 
unequivocal representations. The tracking of representations may be vague but 
this need not invalidate a theory of agency by which agents act in a world in 
ways that are for their goals by perceptions of that world that cause
20 Misrepresentation is considered again in Chapter 6 in the context o f the computational theory 
of cognition.
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representations of that world. Such representations have content for the agent. 
Their representation will be tacit if their interpretation is in action rather than 
language. Their content will be nonconceptual for the agent if they are not 
explicitly interpreted by the agent. If the content of a representational state is 
not that which is Normal for the cognitive processes of that realisation (or 
embodiment) of agency then that state misrepresents. The state may not cause 
inappropriate action but the cognitive processes leading to that action will not 
be Normal.
Intrinsic representations within agency will perform their function Normally i f :
(i) the perceptual processes that maintain them are functioning Normally
(ii) the cognitive processes that maintain them are functioning Normally
(iii) the processes by which representations cause action are functioning 
Normally.
In animals that have evolved and in artefacts with complex agency, Normal 
cognitive processes can be expected to be truth preserving. Each causal process 
by which representations combine to lead Normally to another representation 
can be compared with the introduction and elimination rules for the logical 
operators. For example, in combinatorial terms a cognitive process may be 
equivalent to an AND gate. Its occurrence will be equivalent to & introduction 
and behaviour based on both conjuncts will be equivalent to & elimination. 
Another may be an isomorphic translation between representations in different 
physical media. Its occurrence will be equivalent to id  introduction and 
behaviour based on the inference will be equivalent to z> elimination. It is by 
evolution or design that the cognitive processes are for  the goals of the agent. If 
this fo r-ness is robust to a variety of relevant events in the environment then we 
may expect that successful cognitive processing will be processing that 
Normally leads to survival or the achievement of design goals and will
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comprise representational processing that preserves truth. Abnormal processing, 
due perhaps, to neural or component failure, will not be systematically truth 
preserving and may lead to misrepresentation21. The processing itself will be 
topic neutral. It is because of the relative stability of environments, that through 
the accidents of evolution, cognitive processing will be, generally, apt for 
interpretation in terms of truth preservation.
This is not to say that the interpretation of Normal representations by a theorist 
in a theory of agency will Normally yield content that is true. Deceptive 
strategies by a guided missile may involve representations of the false. An 
animal may have evolved to behave in ways that consistently overestimate the 
threat of an antagonist. But the need for adaptive response to a contingent world 
implies that truth preservation in Normal cognitive processing will be 
advantageous for design or evolution. Since such processing is designed or has 
evolved to cope with a range of contingent events we would expect its logical 
interpretation to be topic neutral.
3.8 Agency, Regulation and Cybernetics
In technology we say that an entity is regulatory if some state of the entity 
within its world is maintained at or near some goal state against variation in that 
world. Regulation may be within an entity in that the proximal cause of 
variation of this state is within the entity. Alternatively, it may be within the 
world in that the entity physically changes its relation to the world, which is the 
environment of the entity, in order to achieve or maintain some relation to the 
world against change in the world. It is the latter form of regulation that I wish 
to compare and contrast with agency. This is the regulation which Sayre, (1976, 
54), dubbed 'heterotelic'. It is the process by which an entity maintains some
21 It may be that, by chance, the content o f the resultant representation is Normal but I will rely 
on a notion o f 'justification' in Normal representation and avoid such complications.
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state of the entity in its world by active causal intervention in that world. The 
entity is in the world and it is of the world. Vital states of the entity may include 
energy levels, which are depleted by operation of the entity. The 
counter-entropic maintenance of order within the entity requires importation of 
energy from the environment and this importation requires principled
29
intervention in the world, which is the environment of the entity.
Regulation is about the world and it is about the world as it is for the entity. 
Successful regulation requires perception of the world and representation of the 
world as perceived. It also requires a structure by which the state of a 
representation leads to the act required to change the world in a way appropriate 
to its goals. Some of our artefacts include in their functional specification the 
capacity to act on the world to maintain certain properties against changes in the 
world. We call such artefacts regulators and the theory of such artefacts is the 
discipline of cybernetics.
Since the requirements of regulation are functionally isomorphic to 
the requirements of agency I claim that agency is functionally 
equivalent to regulation and that the theorems of cybernetics apply 
to all realisations of agency.
The term 'cybernetics' was first introduced by Wiener in 1948 and derives from 
the Greek for 'steersman'. Wiener's interest at that time was in the problems of 
tracking, control and prediction associated with anti-aircraft artillery and 
cybernetic systems were seen as open systems designed to track a moving target 
or maintain some state of a system against a varying environment. In a seminal 
essay in 1943, Roseblueth, Wiener and Bigelow linked the teleological concepts 
of 'behaviour; and 'purpose' to the engineering concept of feedback but only in
22 Many authors have considered the connection between entropy, cybernetics and life. 
Brillouin, (1949), gives a convincing and accessible account.
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the sense that purposeful behaviour requires negative feedback. This thesis has 
been attacked by Richard Taylor, (1950 and 1966), on the grounds that the 
purpose of an artefact with feedback can only be the purpose of its designer. 
For Taylor ‘purposes’ are transcendental to the physical embodiment of agents. 
“[T]he concept of purpose is as basic a category as that of cause and effect. 
Neither can be reduced to the other.” (1966, 256).
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, in a series of books and articles from 1929 to 1968, 
has developed the general systems implications of living organisms. Many 
writers including Nagel, (1979), have discussed the relevance of cybernetics to 
biology and organic behaviour. Shannon, (1948), introduced the notion of 
information in telecommunication and this has been linked with the counter- 
entropic implications of the maintenance of structure by purposeful or 
teleological, control. Rosen, (1991, 244), concludes that: "[A] material system 
is an organism if and only if, it is closed to efficient causation." And: "Biology 
becomes identified with the class o f material realisations of a certain kind of 
relational organisation, and hence to that extent divorced from the structural 
details of any particular kind of realisation." (245) Rosen's relational theory o f 
systems, (117) is close to the methodology of functional analysis deployed in 
this thesis and his notion of a causally closed system is closely analogous to the 
notion of agency expounded here.
3.9 Contingency
Recently, Coming, (1995) wrote, "Self determining systems are also cybernetic 
systems. And cybernetic systems are controlled by the relationship between 
endogenous goals and the external environment”. He quotes Powers, (1973), as 
describing organic goal seeking systems in terms of error correcting systems. 
That is, systems which can be described mathematically in terms of a tendency 
to oppose an environmental disturbance of an internally controlled quantity. 
This is the classic concept of negative feedback control and Sommerhoff, (op 
cit.), opposed its application to explaining the endogenous behaviour of an
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organism within its environment. He wrote (pi 17) "The control of goal-directed 
activities in servomechanisms and other automata is commonly effected by 
means of error signals which inform the control units about the magnitude and 
direction of the discrepancy between the desired output state and the actual one. 
It is frequently taken for granted that this must also be the case in the motor 
control functions of the nervous system. ... In so far as the overt acuities of 
living systems are goal directed they may, of course be viewed as error- 
reducing or error-eliminating activities. But this does not necessarily mean that 
their control mechanism depends on the generation of explicit error signals of 
one kind or another."23 Sommerhoff also described the principle of directive 
correlation. He distinguished between goal seeking and equilibrium seeking and 
argued that the actions of agency (though he spoke of goal seeking) are 
correlated with the events in the world that provoke them but these events are 
orthogonal to the states of the agent. He called this sort of correlation 'directive 
correlation'. In his words: "In the case of the directive correlations the variables 
concerned in the focal conditions are orthogonal variables. But in the 
equilibrium case the variables are not orthogonal." In his example of a 
pendulum, the pendulum is not responding to an unpredictable environment 
with appropriate behaviour. Regulation and agency depend on the essential 
orthogonality of perception to current representation. The statistical notion of 
correlation is defined in terms of the extent of correspondence between the 
ordering of two variables, it is neutral with respect to causal role. Directive 
correlation is concerned to elucidate the causally correlative implications of 
agency. Since agency is concerned with action that is for the agent in the 
context of the world, the causation between states of the world due to agency
23 This conflation between 'negative feedback' and 'regulation' has confused discussion in this 
area since the phrase was used by Rosenblueth et al, in their essay o f 1943. If what is fed back 
is extended to include information and the notion o f 'negative' is extended to include 'relevance 
to deviation from a goal' then the terms become synonymous but at a loss o f semantic precision. 
Sayre, (1976), accepts this loss. Bertalanffy, (!968, 150), distinguishes between kinetics and 
thermodynamics in open systems and feedback and information in cybernetics but he equates
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are essentially circular (or spiral) when agency impacts on the world. 
Representational states of agency are causally correlated with the states of the 
world that they represent through perception. States of the world are causally 
correlated with intrinsic representations within agency through action. Although 
states of the world will be statistically correlated through acts of agency, they 
are epistemically contingent for the agent24 in each act of agency.
This notion of environmental orthogonality is vital: it is a matter of a priori 
definition. If at least some of the changes of the environment of an entity were 
not orthogonal to that entity in the way described then the behaviour of that 
entity would be programmed by its constitution. The very idea of regulation 
implies an orthogonality of environmental change to agent structure. If we think 
of representational content in epistemic terms then at least some of the 
perceptions of agency are epistemically contingent for the agent. In a complex 
organism acts of agency will be woven in with actions that are planned. The 
actions of a predator such as a lion, engaged in hunting, are to an extent, 
stereotyped by learning and inheritance but at least some of the actions will be 
occasioned by the unpredictable. The very choice of that zebra will be 
contingent on that zebra being there, in a way that can be singled out by the lion 
at that time and the evasive movements of that zebra are in detail unpredictable 
for the lion.
The behaviour of examples of austere agency such as single cells, homeostatic 
mechanisms, reflexes, tropisms and simple control systems is characterised by a 
limited repertoire of response to a limited range of environmental variation. 
Each performance is to some degree, unpredictable for the agent; if it were not
cybernetics with the feedback cycle and relegates the feedback model to "secondary 
regulation".
24 Thanks are due to Bob Hale for discussion that led to this insight. The notion o f 'epistemic 
contingency1 seems to have been introduced by Taylor, (1966, p. 45). My usage o f this notion is 
much stronger than Taylor's since I hold that agency entails epistemic contingency.
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then its function would be of program rather than control. But without learning, 
the behaviour of the entity can be predicted, by a theorist, to remain within a 
limited range. The richer agency of organisms with nervous systems and 
complex artefacts such as robots and guided missiles is characterised by a rich 
variety of response so that a rich variety of unpredictable environmental change 
brings forth a rich variety of behaviour.
3.10 Variety
Complex environments require complex representations. Ashby, (1956), 
considered the theoretical requirements for a system to maintain complex states
• • • 25against variation in a complex environment. His law of requisite variety 
states:
In a regulator R controlling against variation in an environment D, the 
variety of outcome in R cannot be less than the variety of D divided 
by the variety of R.
Ashby drew an analogy between the regulatory requirements of an organism 
coping with a varying environment and a mechanism, which might be designed 
to restore the information lost by a noisy channel in a communication system. 
Shannon, (op cit.), showed that if the information rate lost due to noise is N
9 (\then the information capacity of a correcting mechanism must be at least N . 
This can be seen as analogous to variety in regulation. In Ashby's words, "R's 
information capacity as a regulator cannot exceed R's information capacity as a 
channel of communication". Organisms that have survived have a complexity 
of possible response that matches the complexity of their environment. Once an
25 Ashby's proof o f this theorem is summarised in appendix 2
26 Shannon writes in terms of conditional entropy and does not use TST but the argument is 
unchanged.
87
organism has evolved to relate to relations between events and in our case, has 
evolved to cope with entities that are representations of representations of 
relations between events the information becomes incommensurable but the 
basic principle remains. For an agent to be viable in its environment the 
representational content in the agent, measured as information must be at least 
equal to the content in events in the environment that are relevant to the agent. 
This can also be seen as the design challenge for the designer of any artefact in 
which the function of control is delegated to mechanisms. We can study tabular 
representations of information input at our leisure. In the real world of control 
in an environment of epistemic contingency the representational and 
computational mechanisms are processing information in real time. Information 
rates can be measured in bits per second or bandwidth, but this is still the 
mathematical description of the requisite complexity and processing capability 
of an agent in an environment of complexity and change.
I draw three inferences for agency from cybernetics.
(i) If agency is not a playing out of a prescribed programme then the 
perceptions of agency that are caused by changes in the world of the 
agent are necessarily at least sometimes epistemically contingent for 
the agent.
(ii) For an agent to be viable in its world the variety of its 
representations must be at least equal to the variety of world states 
that are relevant for it.
(iii) The ability of an agent to handle the variability of its 
environment, in space and time, can be characterised in the measure 
of information, in these terms: the information capacity of cognitive 
function viewed as a communication channel must be at least equal 
to the information rate of relevant change in the environment.
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3.11 Realisations of Agency
To avoid the circumlocution of 'entities whose behaviour is apt for description 
in terms of agency', I will speak of all such entities as agents. All agents then 
are either natural agents, including us and are living things whose agency is 
realised in biological form, or artefacts of agency in which the realisation of 
their agency derives from their function for us. Following Cummins, (op cit.), I 
take the explanatory role of function as relative to its necessary contribution to 
the capacity of a containing system27. For a living agent this is its capacity for 
intentional action. The agency of a living thing is manifest in the capacity by 
which it maintains its autopoiesis in a changing world. Although other species 
use tools, as far as we know, we are the only species that has produced artefacts 
that satisfy the minimal functional requirements of austere agency. If we design 
a thermally controlled chamber then we will produce a specification that 
includes the measurement of temperature, a supply of heat and a mechanism by 
which changes in temperature leads to the release of heat in such a way that the 
chamber is maintained at a desired temperature. Maintenance of temperature 
was our choice for the capacity of this system and since we designed it to do 
this, we may speak of this capacity as its goal. We may call such a device a 
regulator and our functional description of this device would describe the 
measurement as perception, a state of the device as a representation of 
temperature and the controlled release of heat as an act of agency. Any artefact 
that regulates can be described in these terms. This is an austere functional 
characterisation of regulation but any artefact that realises a richer regulatory 
capacity can also be described in these terms.
Within the axioms of this thesis, living things have not been designed to have 
goals. External explanation of the behaviour of complex organisms in their
27 Nagel, (op cit. 292-4), takes Cummins as espousing a teleological view o f 'function'. Nagel 
equates function and teleology, Cummins does not mention teleology and he writes of 
capacities rather than goals.
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world is in terms of their realisation of agency with permanent or transient 
goals and internal explanation is in terms of their realisation of autopoiesis. 
Their existence is explained by the accidents of evolution and autocatalysis.
Within my austere characterisation of agency all living things have agency but 
all agents are not alive. A living cell has agency: it is characterised by action, 
which is by it and for it. Within the closed containing system description of its 
autopoiesis28, its goal is the maintenance of its own organisation. The cell may 
have function within an organism, described as a containing system and that 
function may be within an organ, such as a heart. The presence of the heart can 
be explained by its function within the containing system of the organism and 
the heart can be described as a containing system, within which each muscle 
cell and each neuron has function. The function of the heart is to pump blood 
for the organism and the function of blood is to transport various materials for 
the organism. A muscle cell of the heart is alive, a blood cell is alive, a neuron 
is alive. An active heart, pumping blood in a living organism is not an agent, 
neither is it alive. It is not an agent since it has no perceptions, its actions are 
not for it they are for the organism. In the functional characterisation of ‘life’ as 
implying self maintenance of substance and form, as opposed to the everyday 
notion of life as characterised by its biological context, it is not alive since it is
.  29not autopoietic .
Homeostatic mechanisms within organisms meet our criteria for agency. The 
human endocrine system includes a feedback mechanism whereby the 
circulating blood hormones (from the endocrine glands controlled in this way) 
inhibit the hypothalamus and the anterior pituitary. Such a feedback mechanism
28 Autopoiesis as the system characterisation o f life and its interconnection with agency is 
described in Appendix 1.
29 Varela, et al, (1974) gave a six point key for identifying an autopoietic system, which is 
quoted in Appendix A. The heart fails the fifth criterion, the components of the boundary o f the 
heart are not produced by the heart.
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enables the levels of hormones within the blood to be maintained within close 
limits. This mechanism is not alive since it is not autopoietic, it is apt for 
description in terms of agency since its perceptions result in actions that are for 
it in terms of its capacity (to control blood hormone levels). Reflex mechanisms 
such as a knee jerk or a blink can be similarly described but such mechanisms 
are not alive although such mechanisms could be described as having natural 
function for agency.
The brain is organisationally closed, Varela, (1979) and is self organising, 
Edelman, (1992) but it is not autopoietic since it does not maintain its own 
boundaries or its own components, though it does maintain its own 
organisation. The brain does not possess agency either within an open system 
description of the organism in its environment or within an open system 
description of the brain in the organism. In neither of these does the brain act 
for the brain. Thus, although the representations of the brain are intentional, the 
brain is not an agent since its representations, within the open system of the 
organism in its environment, are not for it; they are for the organism. In a 
functional explanation of human agency the brain is the principle organ by 
which representations change representations within the processes of cognition 
and this is realised within our neural structures and the electrical and chemical 
processes of human cognition.
3.12 Conclusions
I have argued that if our concept of human agency rests on action that is intended 
by the agent under an aspect of a description then agency can be functionally 
explained in terms of perception, representation, cognitive process, goal and
30 Functional components o f the brain may develop and operate by a "reentrant processing"., 
Edelman, (1987),.and could be described in terms o f a 'local agency1. But they do not act in the 
world o f the agent with the brain.
31 Lyons, (1995, 161-4) writes o f brain-level intentionality. However, although the brain is the 
main site o f representation and cognitive processing in the human realisation o f agency, the
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action. This austere characterisation of agency gives a functional theory that 
explains the goal seeking behaviour not only of all organisms but also of all of 
our regulatory artefacts.
The interpretation of intrinsic representations within agency by a theorist will 
depend on the theorist’s description of the world of the agent. It will include 
things of the world of the theorist or properties of the world that are recognised 
by the agent in a given domain of description. Thus the content of such 
representations is conceptual for the theorist but is generally nonconceptual for 
the agent.
In a Normally successful agent the processes of cognition will be realised within 
a mechanism and the processes of that mechanism may be explained within a 
theory. If the theory is true then Normal cognitive processing will follow that 
theory. If some token processing event is abnormal then processing subsequent to 
that event will be abnormal. States caused by such processing may or may not be 
interpretable as representing within a theory of agency. In so far as they can, then 
their conceptual content attributed by an theorist in that theory will misrepresent. 
It may or may not be false but it will not be justified within the system of 
justification presumed by the theory. With respect to the survival of the agent or 
achievement of its goals, such changes may be beneficial or harmful, depending 
on luck and criteria. By and large, they may be expected to be harmful since 
Normal processing will have been designed or evolved around the survival of 
that agent type at least until the achievement of its goals.
Events in the world that drive the processes of agency include some that are 
essentially unpredictable for the agent. To be otherwise would be to be 
programmed. Actions of agency are determined by events perceived and the
intentionality o f the representational states o f the brain is within the theory o f the agency of its 
owner.
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current constitution of the agent. The current constitution of the agent includes 
the current cognitive processes that realise the current goals of the agent. Thus, 
although a theorist with knowledge of the current constitution of the agent and 
able to predict events in the world could predict actions of agency, these actions 
are necessarily, to some degree unpredictable for the agent since they depend 
on epistemically unpredictable contingent events.
The representational states of agency are real states that realise a 
representational function for the agency of the entity. They are not states of 
belief though I will argue that, through the functionality of practices of belief 
attribution within a linguistic community, the extrinsic representations of belief 
statements are closely associated with intrinsic representations within agency.
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4
LEVELS OF AGENCY
4.1 Introduction
Our concept of agency derives from our experience of the rich variety of acts of 
human agency. These range from our everyday decisions regarding what to 
wear or eat or stepping round an obstacle to more salient choices regarding such 
issues as career or mate or the local football club. However, as argued in the 
previous chapter, these manifestations of agency are complex, integrated 
examples of the behaviour of entities each apt for description as a system with 
capacities that can be explained in simple functional terms. The terms are those 
of an entity that acts in the world so as to maintain its goals in the world in the 
context of its changing perceptions of that world. The mechanisms by which 
these acts are chosen we call representation and cognition. If each action of 
agency is intentional then the content of that action can be construed as the goal 
of that action and 'goal' and 'intention' are synonymous in this usage. But this is 
not my usage of goal in this context. The goal built in to a central heating 
system is to keep a house warm and it will have been designed to pursue that 
goal against random variations in the environment. One of my goals is to stay 
alive and I will pursue that goal against contingent variations in my 
environment.
Realisations of agency within our world include all organisms and some entities 
that are combinations of organisms. Artefacts of regulation also meet the 
functional criteria of agency as do artefacts that regulate by combinations of 
regulators. We humans extend our agency by our use of artefacts and this
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combination may manifest agency within another aspect of a description1. In 
this chapter I will outline the range of complexity of actual realisations of 
agency in our world and will classify these by the distinction between organism 
and artefact and by the dimensions of complexity and combination. To illustrate 
the range of this classification, consider the simple example of a man driving a 
car. Put aside the complexities of navigation and control and consider the two 
quite separate issues of control that are concerned with fuelling the car and 
keeping the engine cool.
In the first example, I drive my car into a filling station to get petrol. My 
decision to get petrol was based on my reading of the fuel gauge, my beliefs 
about its reliability and my knowledge about cars and filling stations . To 
explain the relation between petrol in the context of the car, and the car in 
functional terms, we need a wider functional containing system. The petrol has 
function for the car, the car and the petrol have function for me and I decided to 
get petrol. My agency is manifest in; my perception that the gauge is reading 
low, my representations regarding this and its implications and my cognitive 
processes that maintained the representations and caused my actions of stopping 
at the garage and getting petrol. Running low on petrol is an epistemically 
contingent event for me as I rely on the gauge to tell me when I need petrol.
For a second example, we may note that the engine of the car is cooled by 
water, which is circulated round the engine by a pump. The heat generated by 
the engine varies in a way which depends on variables such as speed and terrain 
that Normally are causally independent of (orthogonal to) the water 
temperature. In order to maintain the engine temperature within a close range,
1 As an example consider the use o f a burglar alarm. The act o f seeking an intruder is caused by 
the perception of the alarm, which is caused by the burglary, but the setting o f the alarm was a 
previous act o f agency.
This is in the vernacular o f folk psychology. The relationship between belief talk and 
representational states o f agency is discussed in 4.11 below.
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the manufacturer has fitted a device which increases the water flow when the 
engine temperature rises and decreases it when it falls and this arrangement 
keeps the engine temperature reasonably constant. A valve lifts when the water 
gets hotter and this state represents the water temperature for the device. The 
entity, which is the device, has no input from my decisions in driving the car 
and without intervention from me, the right decision on water flow is made. 
Hotter water is an epistemically contingent event for the device as the device 
relies on water temperature for its operation. The water flow has function for 
the engine, the engine has function for the car in its function of moving me 
around but the decision to vary the water flow was not made by me.
Although getting petrol had function for my car in its function for me the car 
had no perception of its lack of petrol or of petrol in the filling station. I had 
these perceptions and I was the agent of the act of getting petrol. The device in 
the cooling system perceived the engine temperature via the water temperature 
and was the agent of the action of opening the valve. I had no perception of the 
engine temperature and had no agency in that action, though others had agency 
in delegating that agency to a device. In each case the appropriate action was 
taken by an entity, based on facts in the environment of that entity and causally 
available as action by that entity for the goals of that entity. In each case we can 
describe a functional containing system which includes every component which 
has function in the explanation. When I got petrol that action was an expression 
of my agency. The petrol was for my car, for me. When the thermostat in my 
car opened to cool the engine a little, the function of that action was for my car, 
and the function of my car was for me. In that description, the function of the 
agency of the artefact was for me but I had no agency in that action.
These are but two examples from a vast range of complexity and co-ordination. 
In what follows I will illustrate this range by examples of agency in our world. 
The first two sections describe examples of simple agency in which questions 
of complexity and co-ordination do not arise. More complex agency may be
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realised in the complexity of cognitive processes for a single agent. 
Alternatively, it may be realised in the co-ordination of agency in which some 
of the autonomy of an agent is subservient to a larger agency within which and 
for which, the subservient agent has function. Examples of this have already 
been considered in 3.6, above. In later sections, these will be extended to a 
consideration of the agency of social groupings of agent organisms that are 
themselves co-operative groupings of living cells and to social groupings of 
agent organisms some of which are also apt for description in terms of agency.
4.2 The Agency of Simple Organisms
Not all organisms manifest agency by purposeful action within their 
environment. Several bacteria and amoebae display behaviour which is random 
with respect to their environment and take nourishment and harm from the 
environment as it falls, but all can be described in terms of mechanisms which 
maintain their internal states and metabolic and reproductive rates by some 
form of homeostasis. Homeostatic regulation meets the functional criteria of 
agency but here as in the cooling system of a car, the environment is the 
environment of the controlling mechanism and is within the entity.
The "lactose system" describes the mechanism which govern the synthesis of 
three proteins in E. Coli. In this system a regulator gene directs the synthesis, at 
a constant slow rate, of a repressor protein, this repressor interacts with the 
DNA to inhibit production of the three proteins, the repressor protein is 
inactivated by a molecule of a an inducer galactoside which is itself inhibited 
by the three proteins3. In this homeostatic, regulatory mechanism the 
metabolism of the cell is maintained through the operation of the DNA of the 
cell and protein need is represented by the presence of the galactoside. The 
same organism controls its location in its world by the heterotelic regulation of
3 This process is discussed in depth by Monod, (1971).
97
agency. The movements of E. Coli are generally a random tumbling but "The 
normal swimming behaviour is modified by chemotactic attractants or 
repellents that bind to specific receipt proteins and affect the frequency of 
tumbling by increasing or decreasing the time that elapses between successive 
changes in the direction of flagellar rotation." Here, perception is realised by 
the binding of an attractant and the activation of three appropriate proteins, 
representation by the level of these proteins and action by a change in rotation 
of the flagellar motor4. This species of bacterium has survived because its 
regulatory behaviour leads to nourishment and avoids harm and this is the how 
this organism maintains its essential autopoiesis by its agency in the world.
Since such simple creatures as amoebae and bacteria lack nervous systems their 
behaviour is simple. This is an advantage in illustrating that their actions are 
regulatory and meet the criteria of simple agency but they do not illustrate how 
more complex organic agency would involve more complex representation and 
cognition. To isolate a neural state as a representational state is to describe a 
physiological state with a particular functional role in the shifting pattern of 
physical states within the nervous system. This is just possible for a range of 
invertebrates that includes the garden slug, the pond snail, the medicinal leech 
and the sea hare5. Lockery, (1989), describes the gill-withdrawal reflex in the 
sea hare and how second order conditioning of this reflex may be realised 
within the neural circuits. If this conditioning illustrates Normal or potentially 
Normal learning for the sea hare then the neural circuits described are 
realisations of representations of learning within agency.
The agency of complex organisms depends on the co-ordination of groups of 
cells into organs that have function within a theory of agency for each 
organism, as the gill is an organ with function for the sea hare and a muscle has
4 This account is taken from Alberts, et al., "Biology o f the Cell".
5 This list is taken from Lockery, (1989)
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function for a vertebrate. Each muscle cell is a living organism: it has agency. 
But, within the co-ordination of various proteins, following programmes 
realised in DNA, this agency is subordinate to the function of the organ for the 
agency of the organism. The agency of a muscle cell is not sensibly described 
as autonomous within its environment. Its autopoiesis depends on a supply of 
nourishment that is not acquired by its agency and its agency is limited to its 
perception of certain proteins and through its representation of these, its actions 
of contraction or relaxation according to these commands. A bacterium such as 
E Coli, flagellating away in its intestinal soup, may be less complex in its 
agency but its agency is autonomous within that environment.
We attribute autonomy to an agent within a description. If we were explaining 
the dynamics of an ecology we would describe how the agency of members of a 
species is limited by and maintained by the agency of other species. Each 
transaction of agency for each token agent is a unique transaction based on 
perception contingent for that agent but the scope of such transactions is limited 
by the structure of the ecology. An agent is autonomous under a description of 
its agency within an environment in so far as its actions are only caused by its 
perceptions of that environment. Autonomy is a system notion, as function, 
agency, regulation and autopoiesis are system notions.
4.3 The Agency of Artefacts
I have already discussed the agency of simple regulators such as a thermostat in 
a room or a car. Such devices are limited in their scope and do not demonstrate 
the distinction between states of representation and processes of cognition. 
Consideration of more complex devices such as robots and guided missiles will 
require this distinction but the technological complexity may obscure the 
simplicity of the issues involved. A mid course is to describe a functional 
specification for a device that is technically feasible and at the right level of 
complexity of goals and environment. We can then consider possible
99
realisations of this specification and some of the philosophical implications of 
its agency.
Consider an environment consisting of sources of sound and light at the 
periphery of a circular arena. In this environment we place a motile device 
equipped with a sensor for sound that will produce two signals; one a measure 
of amplitude and the other a measure of angle of source relative to the device, 
and a similar sensor, also producing two signals, for light. These signals are fed 
into an integrator, which is designed and built to produce a navigational output 
such that the device will steer towards light and away from sound. For each 
source detected, the device would produce three signals: a quantity proportional 
to brilliance of light or volume of sound, a quantity proportional to the angle of 
the source relative to the orientation of the device and a binary signal indicating 
whether the source is of light or sound. The sensors would be designed to rotate 
until a signal is detected and then track the signal as the device moves.
If more than one sound or light source may exist then the device can only 
pursue these multiple goals effectively by the provision of more sensors and a 
complexity of programming to integrate their output or by faster rotation of the 
sensors. Either will require the provision of a Teaming 4 capability to identify 
different sources as 'objects’ in the world. Ashby’s criterion will apply and the 
device will require variety sufficient to match the variety in its world.
The device would be designed to move at a constant velocity in the direction 
given by the summation of the input vectors. For the simple case of one sound 
of volume v and one light source of brightness b, at angles a  and p to the 
orientation of the device, the device would move at an angle 0 where 
b sin a  - v sin B
0 = t a n 'l -------------------------------------------------  (1)
b cos a  - v cos B
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Also, the device is designed to sense when its forward progress is impeded and 
stop until it is free to move. Thus, the device will follow a path that maintains 
the relative weightings between light preference and sound avoidance and 
constraint on motion. If the sources are constant in amplitude and location then 
the device will come to rest at some balance point or against the boundary wall. 
If the sources move then the device will move, if unimpeded. The device is then 
free in the Lockean sense. Some implications of this usage are explored in 
Chapter 6.
What such a device would be useful for is a matter for speculation. What is 
important for our purpose is that the device has its own goals, albeit given by us 
in its specification. Its actions are intentional under an aspect of a description. 
We may describe the device in terms of its sensors and their outputs and the 
causal processes by which these outputs lead to turnings of wheels and their 
rotation. In another description we may speak of the perception of sound and 
light and location and the action of moving toward light and away from sound. 
In the latter description this action is intentional. In a theory fully understood by 
us, it perceives and it represents and its acts are the outcome of cognitive 
processes on representations.
We can use this specification as a test bed for the theory of agency. This is not 
an exercise in artificial intelligence or artificial life. Any realisation of this 
specification would be necessarily artificial and the notion of intelligence has 
not been invoked. Any realisation of this device would not be alive since it does 
not meet the criteria for autopoiesis.
The functional specification for this device was based on an environment of 
sound and light and it was required that the entity be attracted to light and 
repelled by sound. Attract and repel are not of themselves intentional, magnets 
attract and repel. The intentionality of the device, under an aspect of a
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description, comes from its functional specification, which implies that its 
behaviour in this environment should be capable of description in intentional 
terms. Within that description, the Output State from each transducer is a 
realisation of an intrinsic representation within agency. The output of the sound 
transducer is a vector of two voltages. One of these is nomically related to the 
angle between the front of the device and an air pressure wave front, the other is 
nomically related to the instantaneous average power density of that wave front 
and it is these properties that are causally efficacious in further processing. The 
functional role of this state in the agency of the device is to represent the 
direction of the sound relative to the device so that the device can retreat from 
it. Not, where the sound is, as location has no relevance for the device within its 
intentionality. Its intentionality is necessarily indexical since that is how it is 
defined.
The functional specification left little room for ambiguity since sound is hard to 
confuse with light. However, we could specify a second device of greater 
complexity. Suppose we specify that red light or high pitched sound repel and 
blue light or low pitch sound attract. Then the intentionality of the device would 
consist in four distinctive behaviours, depending on the combinations of colour 
and pitch. The output from the sound sensor is now a triad of direction, volume 
and pitch. Pitch now has a place in the world of the device. In each token event 
of sound arriving at the first device the sound will be at some pitch but this 
pitch is irrelevant to the device. The world of our first device did not contain 
features distinguished by pitch.
We now have sufficient complexity for the issue of misrepresentation to bite. 
For the second device, a sound may be misrepresented if a sound source that is 
high pitched in its normal implication for the device causes a low-pitched 
action. For each source detected, the device would produce four signals: a 
quantity proportional to brilliance of light or volume of sound, a quantity 
proportional to the angle of the source relative to the orientation of the device, a
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binary signal indicating whether the source is of light or sound and a binary 
signal indicating the hue or pitch. The last of these of these would be 
discriminated by a filter and this could misinterpret.
The importance of history in function has been stressed by Millikan, (1984, 17- 
38). For Millikan, to be a direct proper function is necessarily to be a member 
of a reproductively established family and reproduction depends on a similarity 
of causal history and a Normal explanation is an explanation of how a particular 
reproductively established family has historically performed a particular proper 
function. For our second device; what the pitch Normally causes is determined 
by a design history that has established a Normality of outcome. Whether 
boundary cases represent or misrepresent will depend on what is Normal, which 
will depend on the design history. There is no issue of disjunction here since the 
functional specification did not include ambiguity. Were we developing a 
theory of agency for a strange device then our question would be of what is 
Normal for this device.6
We could also apply Fodor's, (1990), criterion of asymmetric dependence. This 
criterion relates the possibility of a token representation misrepresenting to the 
inferential dependence, within a theory, between Normal representation and 
misrepresentation. If the misrepresenting causal relation is inferentially 
dependent on the normal representing causal relation but not vice versa then the 
former relation is said to be asymmetrically dependent on the latter. In Fodor's, 
words, p. 182: "All that's required for ‘cow’ to mean cow ... is that some ‘cow’ 
tokens should be caused by (more precisely, that they should carry information 
about) cows and that non-cow-caused ‘cow’ tokens should depend 
asymmetrically on these." Normal operation of the device is, that high pitched 
noise is noise defined as high pitched by its significance for the device. If there
6 See Dretske, (1986), in Stich and Warfield, (1990), for a similar argument.
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had never been a misrepresentation and the notion was undefined the notion of 
Normal representation would not be affected but without the notion of Normal 
representation, misrepresentation is not defined. The logical dependence is 
asymmetrical and the criterion applies. Fodor appears to find use of this 
criterion incompatible with the teleological notion of Normality since under 
such theories: "... what’s special about false tokens is that they can't happen 
when circumstances are Normal". The two theories appear to be in harmony. 
The falseness of a false token depends on the Normality of true tokens and this 
can be seen in the asymmetry of the dependence.7
In our first and simpler device, the integrator could be realised in various ways. 
In one realisation, say, the integrator could comprise some mechanical
arrangement by which vector forces are added and the wheels turned until there 
is no angular displacement between their direction and the resultant. In another 
realisation, R^ the two angles could be interpreted as a number of degrees of
arc and the two amplitudes interpreted as numeric quantities. The formula, (1), 
for resultant angle would then be calculated and the wheels turned by that 
angle.
The designer can say, of Ri, that a mechanical state of the mechanical integrator 
is caused by a state of the sound sensor together with a state of the light sensor 
and that this combination causes the wheels to turn, thus. If the equipment is 
working properly this is true, if not it may be false. The designer can also say 
that this equipment meets its functional specification in this environment 
because that mechanical state represents the amplitude and direction polarity of 
the light signal together with the amplitude and direction polarity of the sound 
signal and that these events cause the device to move appropriately. He can also
7 This neglects Fodor’s distinction between information and meaning. The notion o f ‘meaning’ 
has no role in a cybernetic theory o f agency, the role of ‘meaning’ in a linguistic community of
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say that these states represent that there is sound here and light there, of these 
magnitudes and that this causes the device to act by going towards light and 
away from sound.
In there are particular electronic states that cause action and are caused by 
perception. The states may be of magnetic devices and can be interpreted as 
numbers in a binary notation. These numbers can be said to represent under the 
interpretation of a theory. There could be a radio link from the device to a large 
time sharing computer that performs the calculation. This computer may reuse 
memory constantly and each instantaneous representation will be a unique 
usage of silicon chips under some application of virtual memory in the 
computer but its representation is still of the same phenomena for the device in 
the environment of the device.
Within either realisation, misrepresentations will propagate through the 
cognitive process. Normal operation is maintained by Normal transduction at 
sensors and Normal processing, where Normality is historically defined. In 
Normal processing a blue light of brightness B at an angle a  (call it condition p) 
and a high sound of volume V at an angle B (call it condition q) will be 
represented by a token representation of p and a token representation of q. This 
will cause a token representation in the integrator of p & q and will lead to an 
action which may be described by us as moving in the direction given by (1) 
above. This action is represented by the output from the integrator. This output 
will consist of two conditions of mechanical position, voltage or digital code, 
depending on the realisation of the integrator. One will represent the angle to 
turn and the other will represent whether or not to move depending on whether 
the acceleration sensor had detected an impediment to forward or backward 
movement.
social agents is considered in 4.10, below. ‘Information’ is a quantitative measure of the 
probability weighted latent variety of a representation within a theory o f agency.
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The content of representation within the device is nonconceptual for the device. 
This is expressed in physical states that represent conceptual content for us in 
our theory of the design of the device. We are confident of the truth of the 
theory because we designed the device. The conceptual content of this 
information is within our theory of the world for the device. It could be 
articulated in sentences including mention of 'wave fronts at the sensors', or 
'sources at the arena boundary'. The content of action by the device is also non­
conceptual for the device. It, also, is described in terms of physical states that 
have conceptual content for us in our theory of the design of the device. It could 
be of ‘turning by an angle 0 and moving forward’ or’ moving toward a source’.
The physical processes that realise cognition in the agency of this device can be 
described in statements of our theory of the device — where we, the theorists, 
conceptually express the contents of the processes. Two questions emerge: 
Firstly, since these physical processes can be described in terms of changing 
representations, are these processes apt for description as syntactic? Secondly, 
since at least some of the processes are formally isomorphic to a computation 
are they apt for description as computational.
It may be that the analytical methodology of syntactical research will be of use 
in explaining a cognitive process but this does not make the process syntactic. 
Syntax is the formal description of the conventions of a language. A language is 
a set of social practices within a grouping of agents and each linguistic act is an 
act of agency by a member agent which is given semantic form by the syntax of 
that language. Acts of agency derive from the cognitive processes of agency 
which are either those that have evolved as functional for agency in this sort of 
organism in this environment or those that have been designed to make this sort 
of device work in this environment. Syntax derives from social acts of agency 
that are communicative. There are no signs in the cognitive processes of our 
artefact since there are no agents within such processes for whom such signs 
would have meaning. We may describe the cognitive processes of agency in
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terms of codes or quantities, as I did when considering representation within the 
integrating mechanism. Such states are represented as codes in my theory of the 
cognitive processes of agency of the artefact. They are not codes for the 
artefact. For the agent artefact they are states that cause states that cause action.
If the cognitive processes of an agent are such that the causal processes by 
which representations maintain representations will Normally preserve the truth 
of the semantic content as interpreted in a true representational theory and the 
actions Normally caused by those representations are apt for interpretation as 
for some goals attributed to the agent then the actions of that agent can be 
interpreted as Normally rational in the context of the pursuit of those goals
We can get yet more philosophical mileage out of this simple specification. 
Suppose that we had two devices of the second kind, one in each of two arenas. 
We then arrange things so that each is in an identical position with identical 
sources of light and sound identically placed in each arena. Each is identically 
specified regarding weightings of brightness and volume, and colour and pitch 
preferences. If one is realised mechanically and the other by a time sharing 
computer then their representations would be very different but each would 
have the same nonconceptual content for the entity. Each would have the same 
conceptual content for the observer in terms of incident physical phenomena 
and each would have the same conceptual content, for the observer, in terms of 
location of objects in the world of each entity. For an observer, aware of the 
two arenas, they each represent different things with different names in 
different places. The inner representations of each device are functionally 
identical though physically very different. The wide content semantic values of 
each representation will depend on the particular arena inhabited by the artefact. 
There might have been two independent constructions with neither constructor 
of an artefact knowing of the other. The two constructors might have chosen 
different frequencies and different volumes and a different size of arena but 
used the same terms and names for features of the environments. There are at
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least three levels of indexicality; that of the artefact, that of each independent 
constructor and that of a common observer. If the independent constructors 
were in separate linguistic communities but of the same kind of realisation of 
agency then by their agency they would classify their worlds alike though in 
different but inter-translatable terms. Each of the two artefacts are in worlds of 
light and sound and despite the different realisations of agency in the artefact, 
each constructor would mean the same thing by their terms for angle, pitch and 
hue in their conceptualised theories of the content of representation. This 
meaning is not in the head of either artefact; it is within the practices of the 
linguistic communities of the constructors. The conceptual world of each 
constructor includes the features that are within the attributed content of 
intrinsic representations in the theory of agency of each artefact. If the two 
constructors were of different realisations of agency then the world of one 
might not include the same features in its theories of agency as the other. There 
may be little or no common conceptual content.
We see that analysis of the behaviour of even a simple artefact with agency can 
yield insights into our use of the concept of representational content. More 
complex artefacts with agency will deploy greater cognitive complexity and 
may learn.
4.4 More Complex Artefacts
Robotics has begun to play a role in our everyday lives. Complex items are 
shaped, cut, welded, painted and moved by machines that have been designed 
to react to different things in different ways without a predetermination of 
incident event or outcome. The agency of such devices is limited by the 
simplicity of the world for them that our designs prescribe . One machine may 
recognise a new item and its boundaries and spray just the item. Another may
8 The 'frame problem' o f artificial intelligence arises from this self-evident fact.
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run along a track and branch according to various criteria and stop if it meets an 
obstacle. Within the technology of Knowledge Engineering, we now program 
our computers to 'learn' from history and use guidelines to reason from this to 
the implications of new input. We can program computers to play chess at 
grandmaster level. I will consider the implications of this for the computational 
theory of cognition in Chapter 6. We can construct guided missiles that will 
home on a heat source and compensate for intentional evasion by that source. 
The intentionality of this evasion may be that of human agency. Within the 
limitations of this context, as with chess, the agency of the artefact may defeat 
that of the human.
Isaac Asimov9 has written many novels, within the genre of science fiction, 
around a possible impact of the development of robotics on Western 
civilisation. In these stories, the final design of Asimov robots emulates humans 
sufficiently closely to pass as human in action if not in appearance. They are 
programmed to speak a public language and to learn. They are also 
programmed to a morality of deference in action for the protection of natural 
human kind. His novels in this genre have explored some of the problems of 
attribution of conscious morality and self-consciousness that the interactions of 
such artefacts with a natural human community would pose. Whether such 
robots are physically practicable is uncertain but their realisation is not negated 
by any of our current 'laws' of science. A new robot, straight from the 
production line, would manifest a rich agency with a variety of regulation equal 
to, if not greater than, that of an adult human but it would not have learned. It 
would have no experience of the world but its actions in the world would be 
based on cognitive processes, realised in an artificial medium but functionally 
isomorphic with human cognitive processes that have developed 
ontogenetically through years of interaction with the world of things and others.
9 All o f the Asimov robot stories were published under the title: "The Complete Robot", Harper 
Collins, 1993.
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According to Asimov, such robots would then begin to learn. Their 'positronic' 
brains would be plastic to the retention of memory and the evolution of 
subsequent behaviour so that their subsequent agency would be that of the agent 
at the instant, continually modified by its experience.
Analysis of Asimov robotics in terms of agency and intentionality would be a 
thesis in itself. Meanwhile, within our current technology, increase in the 
complexity of our artefacts is generally limited by application needs, cost and 
size. All of our artefacts with agency are realised within the causal structure of 
our physical world. All agency of artefact, from the simple thermostat to the 
most complex interplanetary learning probe is linked by a continuity of 
technological development within the physical laws of our world. We have 
developed talking robots that will tell humans to get out of their way but this is 
a simple parroting of speech. We have developed programs to parse speech but 
not to use it. Neither of these developments has much to do with artificial 
language but this issue must wait until we consider language and agency. 
Meanwhile, we should return to agency in the natural world.
4.5 More Complex Organisms
As with all organisms, the regulation of plants is a combination of homeostatic 
and heterotelic controls. Generally, plants are not motile. However, "plants are 
able to carry out movements and to respond to external stimuli. They turn their 
leaves to the light, their roots grow downwards, blossoms can open and indeed 
many insect eating plants make fast grabs for their victims", von Frisch (1964, 
p. 239). Hart, (1990, 2) distinguishes between two distinct types of mechanisms 
in plants. "Turgor movements are due to reversible changes in the sizes of of 
special cells which bring about the movement of a lever arm such as a leaf 
blade or a reproductive structure. Growth movements result from particular 
patterns of differential growth within and between organs and, although 
necessarily slow, are no less dramatic or crucial to the life of the plant."
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Turgor movements are brought about by osmotically driven changes in the 
volume of special cells, or of cells in special regions. Exogenously induced 
turgor movements, those relevant to our account of agency, enable plants to 
carry out rapid and repeatable movements and are involved in; protective roles, 
in processes of food collection, in both general and specialised situations and in 
reproduction. Growth tropisms involve the formation of a growth hormone, 
called auxin10. The phototropic, geotropic and haptotropic bending of stems, 
roots and tendrils comes about by unequal growth which is caused by unequal 
distribution of auxin.Which in turn, is caused by an unequal distribution of 
light, turgor, moisture or whatever environmental feature is appropriate for this 
change in the relation of this part of this plant to its environment. The major 
forms of movement are summarised in the Table below, from Hart, (op cit., p.
3)
Type of  
Stimulus
Turgor change Growth
Endogenous
Nyctinasty (leaves) 
Ultradian rhythms (leaves) 
flower movement (sunflower)
Nutation (all organs)
Temperature Thermonasty (petals)
Light
Photonasty (leaves) 
Heliotropism (leaves)
Photonasty^ (flowers) 
Phototropism^ (aerial
Seismonasty (Mimosa leaves) 
Thigmonasty (floral parts) 
(insect traps)
organs) 
Thigmonasty (most tendrils)
Mechanical Thigmotropism (some
tendrils)
Epinasty (petioles, shoots)
Chemical Chemotropism (fungal 
hyphae, pollen tube?)
Injury Traumatropism (all organs)
In tropic growth and in the reversible movements of turgor we can pick out the 
functional components of our regulatory system. Perception is realised in the 
way in which the incident phenomena affect the auxin production in this part of
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the plant and the spatial differentiation of auxin levels between cells in this part 
of the plant represents that incident phenomenon for that component of the 
plant. Due to the structural organisation of the leaf, the auxin differentiation 
stimulates appropriate differential growth and action is that differential growth. 
In the Venus fly trap, perception is realised in the way in which pressure on the 
touch sensitive hairs on the surface of the leaf, generate an action potential of 
about 50 mV in the base cells of the hair. This potential represents that pressure 
for the plant and action is the trap closure caused by the turgor loss in the motor 
cells along the hinge of the trap.
We must consider what we mean by the entity. A leaf turns towards the sun and 
this turning benefits the plant by enabling photosynthesis within the leaf. In the 
same plant, a root reaches downwards and this reaching benefits the plant by 
enabling ingestion of water and minerals and the alighting of an insect may 
cause a trap to close to feed the plant. These processes are causally 
independent. Each can be functionally described in terms of perception, 
representation, and action, and their realisation depends on the evolution of the 
plant. In each, the relation between the representation and the action enables the 
autopoiesis of that plant in terms of the nonconceptual content of the 
representation and that enabling is manifest in the structural arrangements by 
which representation leads to action. But it is the agency of the leaf and the root 
and the trap. The autopoiesis of the plant is not manifest in the regulatory 
behaviour of the component parts. It is manifest in the design of the plant, the 
causally independent regulation of leaf and root and trap and these have 
function for the autopoiesis of this species of plant within the functional 
containing system that includes the whole plant and its reproduction in its 
environment. The leaf satisfies our criteria for agency. It is intentional in that it 
has representational states, which are about a world that is for it in the context
10 In some tropisms, at least, changes in the cell membrane and electrical activity play a part. 
Hart, p. 21.
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of its desire for photons that realises its function of photosynthesis. Its actions 
depend on these intentional states in a way that is rational in the context of its 
photosynthesis and this rationality is manifest in the design of the leaf. It is this 
design that can be thought of as a representation of the goal of the leaf to obtain 
photons. A similar argument can be developed for the root in the context of its 
downward growth and for the Venus' flytrap in the context of its rational 
behaviour for catching insects. It would seem that our austere characterisation 
of agency is satisfied separately by separate components of a plant though not 
by the plant overall. As with the bacterium; for the leaf, for the root and for the 
trap the nature of the regulation is reflex.
Each individual regulatory mechanism of a plant is independent and each has 
the requisite variety needed to cope with the variety of its environment. For the 
autonomous living plant, there is no overall regulatory structure such that the 
regulation of the plant as a whole has the requisite variety to control against the 
variation of the total environment for the total plant. This is not to say that the 
plant is uncoordinated, the regulatory mechanisms of each component are co­
ordinated by the DNA of the plant through which the evolved regulation of the 
species is maintained, but this is the co-ordination of a programme. Co­
ordination of the organism to enable the organism to respond as a whole to the 
variety in its environment requires some method by which information, from 
the environment, obtained by perception across the surface of the organism is 
available for computation for action which is holistically for the organism. 
However, plant cells lack the capacity for specialisation that has led to the 
evolution of neural communication in animals. Chemical signalling in 
multicellular plants is limited by the presence of the rigid cell wall, which 
restricts access of large molecules to the plasma membrane.
Much of the homeostatic regulation in animals is mediated by chemical 
intracellular communication. "The physiological response a cell makes to a 
given signal is governed by its particular specialisation. ... The response is
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determined chiefly according to the functions a cell has become differentiated 
to carry out" Lawrence, (1989, 248). The differentiation of the neuron has 
permitted the development of; "[N]ervous systems which allow an animal to 
sense and respond to external stimuli and communicate between different parts 
of its body far more rapidly than would be possible if communication were 
restricted to chemical diffusion between and within cells", (ibid, 448). The 
mammalian peripheral nervous system is functionally differentiated into an 
autonomic nervous system, which includes the various homeostatic regulators 
that are under neural control and a voluntary nervous system comprising the 
nerves supplying skeletal muscles which are under 'conscious' control.
Ashby's principle of requisite variety establishes a necessary harmony of 
complexity between an agent and its world. In evolutionary terms we may see 
variety as one dimension of an ecological niche. One spectrum of phyla, past 
and present, is from simplicity to complexity. A worm that desiccates dies, if 
another worm can respond to a moisture gradient to seek out dampness then 
more of its descendants will survive. The cognitive complexity of the species 
will have increased to maintain a necessary harmony with the increased variety 
of the world for its members.
As the cognitive variety of vertebrates has increased so has the plasticity of the 
neural system and its importance for the ontogeny of the individual. The 
peripheral nervous system is separated by intemeurons that intervene between 
sensory and motor surfaces. This severs the one-to-one relations between 
perception and action and vastly increases the range of states open to an 
organism. Although the interconnection of the intemeurons remains constant 
their specific activity and through the blood supply, the general activity of the 
organism, changes their state. This results in behavioural changes, some of 
which may be described as learning. Through the intemeurons the nervous 
system connects together distinct sensory modes of the organism. The organism 
can thus react to relations between events as well as to the events themselves.
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Since the organism learns it can react to relations between events over time as 
well as sensory modality,
Explanation of the physical realisation of the complex agency exhibited by 
animals with nervous system is made difficult by the vast range of complexity. 
For simple organisms and artefacts we can demonstrate by example that 
conceptual content is for the theorist, not for the agent. Animals sufficiently like 
us for us, as theorists, to consider the attribution of propositional attitudes with 
conceptual content to their intrinsic representations within agency, have 
nervous systems too complex for us to begin to consider actual realisations of 
such representations, as we can for simple organisms and complex artefacts.
Although we are not able to build a systematic description of the cognitive 
processes of a complex vertebrate we have sufficient clues to consider some 
generalisations. Although we differ radically from other vertebrates in our use 
of language and the complexity of our reasoning and tool use, we are 
sufficiently like our anthropoid cousins and other higher vertebrates to use such 
terms as recognition, avoidance and pursuit reasonably in describing their and 
our behaviour. A baby, a lamb and a puppy will each recognise their mother. 
Although different sensory modalities are involved very similar sorts of neural 
syndromes are involved. In each case an innate agency is realised in a rapidly 
evolving neural structure. Each act of agency involves a neural event as a 
cognitive component and each such event changes the cognitive structure of the 
agent. This lamb or this child is a continuing entity in its world and the world of 
the observer but each agent at the instant may be markedly different, as neural 
structures develop to realise cognitive processes that give a richer agency.
The neural structures of a particular sort of frog are probably not very different 
between one frog and another, of the same sex. The neural structures of a given 
frog won't change much with time or maturity, although frogs may learn and 
the cognitive processes of this frog today may not be quite the same as this frog
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tomorrow. The cognitive processes of animals as complex as cats and apes 
certainly do develop through infancy: adults can and do learn. Our description 
of the agency of a kitten will be very different from our description of the adult 
cat though they will be different instances of the same cat. Each kitten from the 
same litter will be a distinct individual, though with very similar cognitive and 
sensory mechanisms. Each sensory event will cause cognitive events and these 
will include changed neural states that represent that sensory event for the 
agency of that kitten. These processes will lead to actions and the intemeural 
states of this kitten will change in ways that are normally for this kitten in the 
context of its history of sensation and action11. That they are Normally for the 
kitten depends on the evolutionary history of the species that has led to this 
pattern of development. The cognitive processes within the agency of the kitten 
of today are realised in its neural structures as they are today. The cognitive 
processes of the kitten of tomorrow will be realised in its neural structures, as 
they will be tomorrow.
Saving accidents, the kitten of today will lead to the cat of next year but the 
cognitive processes of that cat will be realised in the neural structures of a 
mature cat and what these become will be determined by the events of the year, 
combined with its genetic inheritance. The cognitive processes of that cat will 
be no more mysterious than the cognitive processes of the artefact of agency 
described in the previous section. They are far more complex and are realised in 
a rich combination of adaptive processes. They are also essentially 
unpredictable because the detail of the realisation depends on a variety of 
contingent events that is unique for each cat. But the realisations of perception, 
representation, process and action will be in the physical cellular substances of
11 I have not capitalised 'normally' here. Millikan defines a 'Normal' explanation as "an 
explanation o f how a particular reproductively established family has historically performed a 
particular proper function. A cat or a person establishes its own transient norms within the 
continuity o f its development and the notion o f a reproductively established family fails. These 
norms may or may not be functional for survival but they are what is normal for that individual 
at that time.
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nose, ears, eyes, neurons and muscles. Natural and intrinsic representations 
within the agency of the cat are caused by sensory input; chemical densities, 
incident pressure waves at the ears and patterns of light and shade. The actual 
cognitive processes by which these cause action will depend on the history of 
the cat.
That a cat recognises a location is determined by a history of acquaintance. 
Because of this history some gestalt pattern of sensory input will cause this cat 
to act. The cat, like us, has many reflexes that could be described as examples 
of simple agency. But the agency that is of interest is described by complex 
actions of the cat that are responses to aspects of its environment that we can 
describe as features and even as objects for the cat.
A cat may be in a field. This cat may never have hunted but it will have a set of 
inherited responses by which particular sensory combinations cause particular 
hunting like behaviour. If it had hunted or been shown hunting behaviour by its 
mother then these responses would have been modified for this cat. The neural 
causal sequences, by which these sensory combinations cause this behaviour, in 
this cat, at this time, are the cognitive processes by which this aspect of the 
agency of this cat, at this time, is realised. These causal processes will include 
neural states that we could correlate with different aspects of the sensory 
combination that caused that behaviour within that event. If our neurology were 
up to it we could say that one state represents that sort of smell, another 
represents that sort of sound and another that sort of pattern of light and shade. 
This is the complex, organic equivalent of the representations of angle, volume 
and pitch in our proposed artefact of agency. In a cat, this agency has not been 
designed. It has evolved and its Normal proper function for the autopoiesis of 
the cat has been honed over millions of generations of cats in environments in 
which this sort of behaviour sometimes leads to food or reproduction.
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Although the cat may be in a field, it is not a 'field' for the cat. Though the 
inherited and acquired cognitive processes of the cat may enable it to 
distinguish being in a field from being in a house and a gap in a hedge from its 
cat flap. We observers may describe the behaviour of the cat so that its actions 
are of agency under various descriptions. We may speak of it seeing the bird 
and catching a bird or of muscular contractions following sensory stimulation. 
Each description will be apt for attribution of truth within its own domain.
All of the thought experiments that we considered for our artefact of agency can 
be considered for the cat. In considering these for the artefact we gained 
confidence in our reasoning by the knowledge that we could actually make such 
a device and that it would behave thus and so. For the cat, as of now we have 
not the technical capability to make an exact duplicate and place it in an 
environment identical with respect to its agency. Even if we could, there is a 
sense in which we would not have made a cat. Although the conditional 
statements within a true system description of the copy and its environment 
would pick out an indiscernible set of possible worlds, the goals of the agency 
of that cat at that instant would be our goals. The goals of Same Cat, the one we 
copied; ranging from appetite and comfort to doing something about the new 
cat next door, have an aetiology that is a logical part of having been Same Cat 
with its unique experience, growth, damage and inheritance and they are its 
goals. Next day and next year, Same Cat and Copy Cat will be distinct 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively. To the extent that its current goals have 
been modified by its history, the agency of Copy Cat is realised in a different 
mechanism from that of Same Cat. They are different entities in different actual 
worlds; even if their environments were indistinguishable, the system that 
describes them would pick out different possible future worlds.
We must distinguish between two different distinctions. On the one hand, we 
may distinguish between entities of different kinds but each apt for system 
description in terms of agency or apt for system description in terms of the
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complex agency of a cat. On the other hand we may distinguish between stages 
in the becoming of an entity apt for system description in terms of learning or 
maturing agency. In our theories of the agency of such an entity we are 
describing the same thing over different realisations of agency. This distinction 
is more marked in the metamorphosis of a caterpillar into a butterfly. The 
realisation of agency in a caterpillar is profoundly different from that of a 
butterfly. They might be joined in a system description of the processes of such 
metamorphosis but within such a system, each creature of the instant can be 
described in system terms that pick out the possible future worlds that include 
this entity. As long as it lives, a constant capacity of the entity described is its 
agency: in general, the detailed functional specification of this agency and the 
detail of its realisation will change.
The dynamics of agency due to learning and adaptation has profound
implications for our attributions of personality and we will consider some of 
these in the next section. Chapter 6 is devoted to the metaphysical implications 
of this dynamics for our attributions of freedom and responsibility to one 
another.
I opened this chapter with an example of my agency as manifest in my action of 
getting petrol for my car. This was an action of agency, intentional under a 
description. It is an example of a rich agency involving a complex
interdependence between my perceptions of the petrol gauge and the filling 
station, my experience, the design of the car and all of the interactions between 
my agency and that of others in my community. The goal of agency maintained 
by that action is having enough petrol in my car. As a child I knew nothing 
about cars or petrol and my cognitive processes had no traffic with
representations of running out of petrol. My current agency includes a
realisation of such representations and my goals can be said to include not 
running out of petrol. The neurology of this is very complex and it is dubious 
whether we will ever be able to identify realisations of such representations but
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this does not make them less real. The distinction between representation and 
process may blur but this does not make it less real. My current agency is 
integrated, complex and dynamic but it is still apt for description in terms of 
perception, representation, cognitive process and action and each of these is 
intentional.
4.6 Learning and Adaptation
I have argued that a necessary accompaniment of life in our world is agency. 
Life itself requires autopoiesis but the counter-entropic realisation of 
autopoiesis against the variation of an entropic world requires that the living 
thing act in the world in response to events in the world and by that action 
classify the world for it. These, I have argued, are the criteria for agency. 
Within our taxonomy of zoology we divide the sorts of living things into 
species; sorts of living things that maintain a continuity of classification by their 
interbreeding for reproduction and their similarity. The realisation of agency 
differs, often dramatically, between species. It also differs between current 
members of a species and between current members and their ancestors.
That species differ in the way their members realise their agency is self-evident. 
Most birds see prey and predators and act by flight, grasping and tearing with 
the beak. Moles smell prey and predators and act by tunnelling and biting. 
Differences between members of a current species will be less dramatic. In 
simple organisms the differences may be negligible but in more complex 
organisms, particularly in those with complex nervous systems, these 
differences may be marked and will be due to the different genetic inheritance 
and the different developmental history of each.
Local differences between members of a species due to genetic inheritance will 
be random and distributed around some norm if the species is stable. If the 
dynamics of evolution are relevant then these differences may be significant
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and we would speak of the trend in differentiation as adaptation. Successive 
generations of this species in this environment will differ from one another, 
however marginally, in some components of their realisation of agency. There 
may be small differences in some sensory acuity such that intrinsic 
representations within agency represent some different aspect of the world. 
There may be small differences in cognitive processing such that action results 
from some new combination of aspects of the world. There may be some 
change in resultant action such that the world is changed differently. Over 
enough time, there will be some combination of all three. These changes will 
change the environment and this will also influence the genetic trend.
One class of changes of this kind within all animals except sponges has been
10the development of the nervous system. Abercrombie, et al , define the 
nervous system as: "A mechanism which co-ordinates the various activities of 
an animal with each other and with events in the external world by means of 
messages rapidly conducted from part to part. ... It consists of numerous nerve
cells which have branching thread like processes The nerve cells and their
processes, linked by synapses, form a system which permeates the whole 
body." We can distinguish between; the peripheral nervous system which 
consists mainly of nerve cell processes running directly to sense organs or 
effectors and mediates in reflex processes which depend on inborn nervous 
pathways, and the central nervous system which co-ordinates the activities of an 
animal.
Reflex processes can be described in terms of a simple agency, functionally 
similar to the turgor of parts of plants. Although such processes have function 
for the autopoiesis of the animal, their agency is autonomous and they do not 
directly contribute to the rich agency of the animal enabled by the central
12 From "The Penguin Dictionary o f Biology"; M Abercrombie, C J Hickman & M L Johnson; 
1980.
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nervous system. All animals of the same species will differ to some extent, if 
only in physical dimensions but our interest is in how each individual of a 
species may differently realise its agency within its environment. Each act of 
agency is a unique event that can be described as intentional under some 
description. For a given species of animal, within a reasonably stationary 
environment, we can define a class of sensory events to which the reactions of 
animals of this kind define a class of action. In the terminology of agency; an 
event within this class will Normally cause cognitive processes that will 
Normally cause actions within that class. We may then define:
Animals within a species are of similar agency in so far as they
1 O
Normally produce similar actions from similar events,
By defining similarity in this way we may bring out the way in which variety 
and learning produce 'dissimilarity'.
Simple animals within a species are very similar. Two Normal frogs or two 
Normal bats will act in much the same way within the same environment. Frogs 
may learn a little and bats may learn a little but their agency, the way they react 
for them, to events in their world, does not change much. Although the world of 
each token animal may be quite various in terms of space and prey and this 
variety is matched in the complexity of its agency, relatively simple organisms 
such as frogs or bats do not adapt to fresh variety in their world and each 
remains much the same as its conspecifics.
Colonies of social insects can and do, vary in character but each individual 
insect within a caste within the colony is very similar to its neighbour.
13 The notion o f ‘similarity here is close to the Wittgenstein notion o f  ‘family resemblance’.
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Behaviour of the colony is co-ordinated by complex pheromones14, stemming 
mostly from the queen, though produced by each insect.
Observation of complex vertebrates shows a marked diversity between 
individuals. This can be seen in studies of social animals such as chimpanzees 
where researchers name individuals and comment on their distinctive 
characteristics such as ingenuity and dominance. Studies of life histories of 
identical twins in Western civilisation today have concluded that about half of 
our dissimilarity is due to our genetic inheritance.
Whether the variety is due to genetic diversity or learning or environmental 
pruning, there is a clear correlation between individual variety and cognitive 
complexity. This has reached its peak in humankind but we can see and respond 
to, idiosyncratic behaviour in chimps and cats and dogs. Thus, any theory of 
cognitive processing that we deploy in our account of the agency of creatures 
that can learn and display a cognitive idiosyncrasy between individuals will not 
apply in detail between one individual and another. In describing the agency of 
our artefacts, however complex, we can describe how representation and 
cognitive processing is realised in this sort of agent. Each act of perception is 
unique and is epistemically contingent for that agent but the action of that agent 
to that perception is predictable, at least in principle, for the theorist. Similarly 
for simple organisms, the cognitive processes of the bat, as described by Akins, 
(1993), show a complex co-ordination of reflex processes that catch prey and 
avoid obstacles but leave no room for idiosyncrasy.
Animals as complex as the higher vertebrates are bom with more variability and 
this variability can be enhanced by learning within a lifetime of experience in a 
changing environment. The behaviour of each animal can be described in terms
14 These are chemical substances which, when released into its surroundings by an animal 
influence the behaviour or development o f other individuals o f the same species.
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of its agency. Within the terms of this description, the actual sensory organs are 
the mechanisms that realise perception for this agent. The actual intemeurons 
and hormonal secretions (in so far as they have a role) are the mechanisms that 
realise representation and cognitive process for this agent and the actual motor 
nerves, muscles and claws are the mechanisms that realise action for this agent. 
Another member of the same species or this member at another time will be 
similarly described, but the realisations of cognition will be different since 
significant parameters of the system differ. It is, however slightly, a different 
realisation of agency in this kind of entity due to its different experience and 
inheritance, and the agency of this species is sufficiently complex for this to 
matter.
Agency involves an agent with the world. Cognitive complexity is relevant in a 
complex world. This is the moral of Ashby's theorem of requisite variety. 
Organism with complex cognitive processes and the ability to learn have 
evolved through adaptation to greater environmental complexity and 
unpredictability. The agency of such organisms is idiosyncratic in that, within a 
species in an environment, each agent at the instant is dissimilar to its previous 
self and its neighbours in regard to the cognitive processes that lead to its 
actions of agency. This is one way in which my austere characterisation of 
agency must be enriched to describe our agency. Another way is by our social 
behaviour and this is the subject of the next section.
4.7 Social Agency
The agency of an organism will include the role of other organisms in its world 
for it. These roles are ascribed in our description of its agency and terms such as 
prey, predator, mate and symbiote are within our theories of ethology. Each 
agent will act in response to its perceptions according to its current cognitive 
processes. By these descriptions we classify interactions between organism as 
within the symbiotic, parasitic and predatory relations of an ecology or within
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co-operative and competitive behaviour of sexual reproduction or within the co­
operative and competitive behaviour of a social group. The agent interactions of 
an ecology describe the evolutionary niche inhabited by each member agent and 
each agent will manifest a regulatory variety appropriate to the variety of that 
niche. All animals reproduce by some sexual behaviour and goals for that 
behaviour will be implicit in the cognitive processes of each agent. This section 
is focussed on the interactions between membership of a social group and the 
agency of its members. To this end we should consider what it is to be a 
member of a social group.
A co-operative group of agents of the same kind is defined by its co-operative 
practices. If the perceptions of each member of a group of agents include 
recognition of other members and lead to action that is for the group then these 
actions will become practices that characterise this sort of group of this sort of 
agent. Groups of this sort will persist if the practices favour the survival of the 
members and some copying mechanism exists by which these practices can 
persist between successive generations. Alternative realisations of such groups 
will persist if they are successful within the normal dynamics of evolution.15
In the groupings of cells that comprise an organ of a complex organism, the 
DNA of the organism prescribes membership of the group. Each cell still has 
agency but the goals of its agency are no longer totally determined by the 
autopoiesis of the cell. The cell perceives and it acts but some of what it 
perceives can be described as commands; to contract or to relax, to fire at a 
synapse, to die or to reproduce. Each organ can be described by its function for 
the organism and by the way the practices of its member cells enable that
15 This is not Social Darwinism, at least, in its current pejorative usage. My argument is that 
types of human groupings have evolved by the accidents o f success just as types o f other 
anthropoid groupings and insect groupings have evolved. That they exist is evidence for their 
survival. If a kind o f social group has survived in virtue o f some o f its practices then, to that 
extent, the aetiology of those practices is explained.
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function. An organism, functionally described by its organs and their functions 
is apt for internal description in terms of autopoiesis and for external 
description in terms of agency. This is an extreme manifestation of social 
agency in which agent autonomy is totally submerged in a larger agency.
The practices of species of social organisms without productive language range 
from the instinctive and total obedience of the social insects to the loosely 
structured consensual behaviour of a tribe of chimpanzee. The agency of an 
organism may itself be subservient to its agent membership of a social group. 
Some of the group practices may be inherited and some acquired by learning. 
Some of these practices may involve goals of agency that compete with the 
goals of individual survival or reproduction.
Groupings of social insects such as ants are maintained by inherited practices 
which include mechanisms for the selection of a queen and her maintenance, 
and dietary practices that differentiate castes. The genes by which such 
practices are copied through the generations do not determine the caste of any 
female but they do determine the allometry of a colony and thus the 
characteristics of the caste system as a whole.16 Within a caste, member ants are 
very similar and one theory of agency will apply to each ant. Genetic 
differences between colonies will lead to substantial variations in differentiation 
between castes and the content of pheromonal communication and thus to 
variation between colonies.
In more neurally complex animals social groupings are more diverse. Lions live 
in prides whose enduring centres are closely bonded females and their young. 
Adult males live in separate groups, often as pairs of brothers. Adult males and 
females hunt together, with the females taking the lead role. Some of these
16 Wilson, (1992, 78-80).
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practices will be maintained genetically. Other practices will be maintained by 
copying and repetition of individual and co-operative movements. Although 
environmental pressures and the need for intra-species recognition will reduce 
variation between lions in a pride, enough variation will occur for dominance 
hierarchies to develop between members.
Many species of primate live in social communities bonded by complex 
practices of co-operation that maintain the group and its members but permit 
marked variation between members. Each agent member of a group is a unique 
individual marked by its own life experiences. They recognise one another and 
make use of the differences between others in furthering their ends within the 
community. They will deceive one another and grieve for the death of another, 
(Seyfarth and Cheney, 1992 ). Not only is each agent member marked by its 
own life experiences but also these experiences have been within the group and 
the goals of each will be at least partially the goals of the group. The agency of 
each monkey or ape is approaching the rich characterisation of human agency
1 7in that, although each free act is an act of agency, the perceptions, 
representations and cognitive processing that cause that act are distributed over 
a lifetime of experience.
4.8 The Agency of Social Groups
Each agent organism is a co-operative group of agent cells whose agency is 
subservient to the practices of that group. We can consider whether a social 
group of organisms such as a colony of ants or a pride of lions or a group of 
monkeys is apt for description in terms of its agency. In 4.2 above I defined 
agency in the terms: 'An entity is the agent of an act if what it does can be 
described under an aspect that makes it intentional for that entity.'
17 What it is for an act to be 'free' is discussed in depth in 6.8 below.
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Ants within a colony communicate by pheromones. An ant meeting prey, 
problem or predator will send out signals that cause other ants of appropriate 
castes to act in ways appropriate for the benefit of the colony. This signalling is 
an act of that ant but it is not an act of the autonomous agency of that ant since 
it was not for  the ant. The act was for  the colony, just as the synaptic impulse of 
a rod cell in an eye is not an act of agency for that cell but is an action of the 
eye which is for the organism. Actions of an ant can be distinguished between 
those that are in response to its own local perceptions and those that are in 
response to the stimulus of pheromones. A soldier ant will respond to distal 
stimulation by these pheromones, to come to the site of an attack and is 
programmed by its instincts to attack anything that is living and not another 
colony member. The actions of the soldier ant are actions of the colony and 
these actions are caused by representations within the colony, realised in levels 
of specific pheromones and the states of the ants releasing them. The goals of 
the colony are manifest within the practices of the colony and are realised in 
programming by the DNA of its members. Due to this programming, 
perceptions of individual ants cause the release of specific pheromones that are 
perceived by other ants and cause action by other ants that is for the goals of the 
colony. States of the world for the colony are perceived by member ant and 
represented by proximal levels of pheromones. These representations cause
1 ftaction by member ants, and this action is for the goals of the colony. Our 
functional characterisation is complete. The acts of a colony of ants can be 
described under an aspect that makes them intentional for that colony. The 
agency of individual ants is not entirely subservient to the agency of the colony 
since each ant will act reflexively to attack when proximally stimulated but we 
can clearly distinguish between acts of the colony and acts of an ant. We may 
conclude that
18 This in contradistinction to the independent agency o f the organs o f a plant. The agency o f  
the organ is for the good of the plant but its actions are for the goals o f the organ. The 
transmission o f perceived information by pheromones is analogous to the transmission of 
perceived information by neurons.
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An ant colony is apt for description in terms of agency.
"Vervet monkeys frequently grunt to each other during normal social 
interactions. ... Vervet monkey grunts are strikingly different from their alarm 
calls: alarm calls given in response to different predators are easily 
distinguished acoustically.", Seyfarth and Cheney, (op cit., 339). The agency of 
each member of the monkey group is partially subordinate to its membership of 
the group but the rich individual agency of individual monkeys is largely 
autonomous. Alarm calls given deceptively by individual monkeys will lead to 
a selective ignoring of that monkey's calls by other members. Giving and 
responding to alarm calls could be described as perception by the group and 
action for the group. Selective discrimination could be described as learning by 
the group that modifies the cognitive processes of the group. Current neural 
states of members that represent for the member agents could be described as 
representations for the group. The problem with this model of agency is that no 
coherent theory of agency of the group emerges; the theory shifts with each 
event. Some of the actions of members are concerned with maintenance of the 
group but generally actions of members are for themselves or one another. We 
cannot clearly distinguish between acts of the group and acts of monkeys. We 
may conclude that:
A tribe of monkeys is not apt for description in terms of
agency.
Human groups may be similarly described. Each human agent lives in several 
groups and generally, no single group can be described as autonomous in 
maintaining itself through the perceptions, representations and actions of its
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members.19 This distinction is vague. We may clearly distinguish at extremes 
such as a hive of bees or an organism of cells and a total plant. The 
distinguishing feature will be the existence of some co-ordinating mechanism, 
some medium of communication and institutional practices that realise the 
integration of agency across members of a group so that actions of members of 
the group are caused by representations within the group and are for the goals 
of the group.
However, humans do construct artefacts of agency that are made up of human 
agents. Such artefacts include the entities that we call corporations or states or 
universities. Such organisations are defined by their goals, which may be set out 
in a mission statement or charter and a constitution or system of laws that set 
out the practices of group membership. The constitution will include procedures 
to ensure the continuation of the organisation by appropriate response to 
external and internal events. It will also include functional posts to be filled by 
human agents with specific terms of reference and provision for the monitoring 
of their actions in these roles and their replacement on retirement or death or 
failing to meet the terms of reference. The construction of such an artefact will 
be an act of human agency but the actions of the human agents within their 
prescribed roles may be described as acts of the artefact. Letters of instruction 
to human agents may be signed "Clerk to the Court" or "Minister of State for 
Defence". It is difficult to deny agency to such artefacts. Such acts of human 
agents can be described under an aspect that makes them intentional for the 
organisation. Just as we can see the theory of agency of an inorganic artefact of 
regulation through its functional specification so we can see the theory of 
agency of an organisation through its functional specification. The inorganic 
agency of an artefact is realised in hardware. The organisational agency is
19 Searle, (1995, 25), discusses 'collective intentionality' which he defines in terms o f collective 
forms o f the propositional attitudes. This is an attributed intentionality, distinct from the 
intentionality o f the representations of the agency o f a social group.
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realised in people20 and the physical marks of rules and constitutions. In each, 
the processes of agency are actual, physical causal processes between states of 
physical, fallible components. The goals of the inorganic artefact are realised in 
the physical location of components or the marks of programs in digital 
equipment. The goals of the organic artefact are realised in the marks of 
constitutional procedures in text on physical media or within the memories of 
the community.
I conclude that the natural groupings of human agents are not apt 
for description in terms of agency but artefacts of human 
organisation can be if appropriately designed and realised.
4.9 An Example of Social Agency
In chapter 3 intentionality was defined in the terms:
An entity is the agent of an act if what it does can be described 
under an aspect that makes it intentional for that entity.
If the entity under consideration is a grouping of human agents then its 
intentionality will be manifest in acts of agents that are apt for description under 
an aspect that makes them intentional for the group. As with a colony of ants, 
the actions of human agents are to be explained as actions of a group when 
these actions are programmed by the rules of the group, in virtue of which the 
causal consequences and antecedents of these actions are best explained as 
behaviour of the group. For such programming to have effect, communication 
will exist between the human components of the group and this communication
20 The distinction between person and agent is spelled out in 7.7 below. By a person here I mean 
the ongoing agent at the instant whose personhood is attributed by the organisation. It is the 
organisation who will appoint people to posts.
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can be interpreted as the cognitive processing of intrinsic representations within 
a theory of agency of the group.
Consider a university engaged in admission procedures for the coming 
academic year. In what follows we will assume that the entity described is the 
university and that at least some acts of the university are apt for explanation as 
acts of agency. Such acts will be physical events involving components of the 
university. Such events will be physically caused by representations of states of 
the environment of the university, within procedures of the university that are 
such as to produce action that is for goals of the university in the context of 
these acts. These representations will have been caused by events in the 
environment of the university that are epistemically contingent for the 
university. One example of such acts is a series of letters sent to applicants 
advising them whether or not they are offered a place. Under an aspect of this 
description of the university, each posting of a letter is an act of the university. 
Under other aspects, it is also an act of the person who posts the letter, of the 
official who signed the letter and of the committee who agreed the selection or 
not, of this candidate. Any of these may or may not be agents under some 
description, though we will be focussing our attention on the university
A rough description of these procedures is that letters of application are 
received which contain details of qualification. Although the admission 
procedures have been established in the expectation of receipt of such letters, 
each letter is an epistemically contingent event for the university. Each letter is 
an intrinsic representation, within the agency of the university, of a candidate 
and his qualification. A clerk may produce schedules of numbers of 
applications for subjects within band of qualifications and such schedules will 
be representations. Within the procedures, numbers of applicants and their 
grades will be compared with current criteria for numbers and quality in each 
subject and cut off levels will be established according to the criteria and the 
number of applicants. These levels will be applied to the lists of applicants,
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applicants will be selected and the appropriate letters sent.
In this very simplified model of the process the goal of agency is to admit 
qualified students. This goal is not represented within these processes of 
comparison21: it is a possible world picked out by the system description of the 
university and this system has been designed so that Normally, these procedures 
lead to the admission of qualified students. The staffs carrying out these 
functions are human agents within a linguistic community. For each human 
interchange of information, the representations are explicit, recognised as 
representational by the people concerned. Within the procedures of the 
university these people are following rules. With respect to the functions of 
agency of the university as realised, these acts by these people are component 
processes within the cognitive processes of agency of the university
A planner who initiated the procedures and criteria may have designed this 
minor clerical mechanism. Representations, such as the letter format and 
criteria, would have been explicit for him and for policy makers who agreed the 
criteria. However, this does not make them explicit within the entity comprised 
of people following rules and it is the behaviour of this entity that we are 
explaining in terms of agency. When human agents use these representations in 
a programmed manner they are not representations for these agents; they are 
tacit representations of the agency of the university.
Within a larger system, the total number of places available is given to the 
university by an external agency and this event sets in train complex procedures 
of allocation of numbers between departments. The criteria followed in 
selecting applicants may depend on the number of applications received for 
each department and the form of this dependence may depend on the total
21 It may be that this goal is explicitly represented in a mission statement but this is not 
necessary for its role in the agency o f the university.
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number of applications to the university. Criteria for allocation of places to 
departments may depend on other contingent situations such as the relative 
quality of departments, current staffing levels and cross departmental teaching 
loads. If the events of setting admission criteria for each department are apt for 
explanation as acts of agency of an entity then this is in virtue of mechanisms 
within which, external contingent events are perceived and represented and 
these representations cause action that is for the attributed goals of the entity.
One goal that we can attribute to the university is that of continuing to exist. 
Another is of at least maintaining its size. It may be assumed that; if as a 
contingent input, an intake of N student is permitted then procedures will be 
established to allocate all of these between departments and this may include 
procedures to ensure that any unused allocation is redistributed. Representation 
of the total permitted intake will be an explicit representation in a formal 
communication between senior members of the university and the description 
of procedures to be followed will be explicit representations in communications 
between people. These communications may explicitly refer to goals of the 
university.
In our description of the complex mechanisms that realise the agency of the 
entity described, representations of fractions allocated to departments and the 
representations of procedures to be followed are parameters in the specification 
of a mechanism. If contingent inputs such as numbers of applicants and their 
quality are represented in text and this is read by staff independently of their 
programmed procedural role then these representations are explicit for them. If 
these same people are reading this data and acting in accordance with the goal 
seeking procedures established then the representations are of the agency of the 
entity within which these people are components and the representations are 
tacit in the sense of Dennett, (1982/3).
The term, 'following a rule' can be used in two distinct contexts. Firstly, if one
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is carrying out a long multiplication and one has had the appropriate tuition 
then, normally, one will set out the sum and proceed according to the rules 
learned. Similarly, if we program a computer to do such sums then we are 
setting out rules for the computer to follow. Our decision to do the sum or 
program the computer is not necessarily an act of our agency, we may be acting 
within some larger program, but it is, structurally, within our autonomy. 
Representations within such activities are then explicit: signs can be interpreted 
as numbers and numbers interpreted as representations in other acts of our 
agency
If alternatively, one is engaged in some activity in which the following of rules 
subsumes our autonomy; as when following established procedures within a 
university, then we do not interpret the representations that cause us to act. The 
rules that we follow may be complex and involve extensive computation but 
these acts of computation will be applied within the procedures, they are not 
interpreted by the staff whose acts are those of components, albeit complex and 
unique, of the mechanisms of the university. This is not to deny a quasi- 
autonomous agency to some human agents with Normal function within these 
procedures. The procedures may include a person or a group of people deciding 
on a procedural change or on some action outside normal procedures. Such 
people will be using explicit representation and carrying out autonomous act of 
computation. Their acts will be of their agency, intentional under an aspect of 
this description that makes their goals, hopefully, congruent with the goals of 
the university. Resultant acts, such as letters to candidates and response to the 
Funding Council will be acts of the agency of the university. Only in so far as 
such acts are for autonomous goals of the human agents concerned should they 
be construed as acts of human agency.
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4.10 Personhood
Perceptions of complex agents in a social group will include recognitions of 
other members of the group. Most basic of these will be the mutual recognition 
of mother and child. Adult recognitions will include recognition of other adults 
as dominant or weak, as friend or adversary. These recognitions are lasting, 
Seyfarth and Cheney describe a young male chimpanzee dying from grief for 
his mother's death. It is apparent that other advanced social species and us have, 
within ourselves or our social practices, a theory of mind. By a 'theory of mind' 
I do not imply a complex attribution of beliefs and desires or the recursions of 
emotional involvement but that intrinsic representations within agency include 
representation of another monkey or human as 'that monkey’ or ‘that human’. If 
this is so and the evidence is strong, then each social agent is aware of other 
agents as ongoing identities. The practices of the group will include treating 
others, not just as agents of the instant but as ongoing agents of whom one has a 
continuity of experience, that is, as people. Whether or not one expects others to 
treat one as a person, this continuity of recognition implies the attribution of 
personhood to others. In the higher apes this appears to be one sided. We with 
language, Normally attribute personhood to others, and ourselves expect others 
to attribute personhood to us and enjoy a self-conscious appreciation of our own
99personhood.
4.11 The Impact of Language
How language evolved is a matter for speculation. Parts of the human brain are 
specialised for the production and interpretation of speech and how this has
9 0
evolved is a matter for debate . My aim in this section will be to explore the 
effect of language on the manifestation of human agency within social groups.
22 The psychological syndrome known as ‘autism’ may be due to a defect in this process of 
recognition. See Carruthers and Smith, 1996, for an introduction to this theory.
23 See Beaken, (1996), for a plausible account o f the social evolution o f the practices of 
language.
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I will take as the basic entity to be described; a linguistic community. I will 
assume for simplicity that; a linguistic community is comprised of normal 
humans, that all adult members have the same intension for each extension 
denoted by terms of the language. Also, that their world is stable so that the set 
of extensions denoted by the language is stable. Such a language would be 
static and could be described in terms of Fregean sense, each adult member 
would have the same lexicon of terms and each would have the same intension 
for the extension of that term. Such a language is ideal, all natural languages are 
in flux and at least some human belongs to more than one linguistic community, 
but my aim is to construct a simple and practical theory around this ideal.
Millikan, (1984), has demonstrated that a language can be described in 
functional terms. If, despite her reservations regarding the use of Cummins 
functions24, we take a linguistic community as a functional containing system 
then, within this system the practices of language can be explained as having 
function for that social group. The group is comprised of agents and 
membership of that group has function for each member described in another, 
equally true, containing system. Members of an ideal linguistic community 
share a common agency. They do not, in general, share a common realisation of 
agency, but their agencies are functionally isomorphic with respect to those of 
their perceptions that are shared in the language. Quine makes this point in 
“Word and Object”, Quine, (1960, p 8). For a term to have the same intension 
for two speakers its place in the life of each speaker must be sufficiently similar 
for communication to be about the same state of affairs in the world for each. 
Each, by their agency, classifies their world for them. For common signs to 
commonly denote, the classifications must be sufficiently similar.
24 In Millikan, (1993, 20), she argues that the notion o f function that relies on explanation 
within a containing system does not recognise " that basic sense o f function that hooks function 
to purpose. This functional realism leads to a teleological account o f  evolution but a functional 
account o f language does not depend on this.
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As the cognitive processes of advanced vertebrates include recognition of 
things in their world so the cognitive processes of linguistic humans include 
recognition of the symbol and the thing in the world which the symbol denotes. 
Man is a social animal, living in groups bonded by shared practices. As with 
other social species these practices are concerned with co-operation in such 
tasks as hunting, gathering, carrying, defence and caring for young. It is likely 
that the practices of language have evolved around practices of communication 
to improve the efficiency of this co-operation, Beaken, (op. cit.).
Within the processes of cognition, some complex of perception and 
representation causes each act of agency. This causal process can be 
summarised in a simple causal statement.
x perc that p —» x rep that p -> x rep that q —» x does a (1)
Where 'perc' abbreviates 'perceives' and 'rep' abbreviates 'represents' and 
abbreviates 'physically causes'.
An equally simple statement for an elementary linguistic transaction would be:
y perc p & y hears (x say P) —» y rep that p —» y rep that q -» y does a (2)
Where ‘p’ and 'q' are some shared perceptions or 'categorical representations' of 
the world and ‘a’ is some shared practice appropriate to dealing with p and q. I 
will routinely use upper case to denote symbols and lower case to denote things
25 It is by such complexes that the acts o f agency categorise the world o f the agent for the agent. 
Hamad, (1996), defines "categorical representations "that..."preserve and encode only the 
invariant sensory properties shared by all the members of a concrete perceptual category".
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in the world, 'a' to denote action and 'p' or 'q' to denote a state of affairs or 
event.26
Perception of the world may be of lack as well as of incidence. This is not 
'desire' since at this elementary stage the community may not refer to the 
propositional attitudes. A member asking for food is not referring to his desire 
he is producing the symbol that means 'give me food' and recognition of that 
symbol is within the practices of this community. This is in accordance with 
Beaken's theory that language originated in the organisation of labour.
The actions of each member of this community are still the actions of agency. 
Perceptions in a linguistic community include recognition of others as 
individuals; dominant or subservient, friendly or hostile and recognition of 
symbols made by these individuals. Actions of agency include producing 
symbols. Just as each action of a solitary agent is caused by intrinsic 
representations that have been caused by perceptions of the world so, each 
action of a linguistic agent is caused by current and past intrinsic 
representations within agency. Some of these will have been caused by 
perceptions of the world and some will have been caused by recognition of 
symbols that, within the conventional practices of the language, denote things 
in the world.
Actions are in the world and cause change in the world. Whether an action is a 
physical manipulation or the production of a physical symbol it is an act of 
agency caused by intrinsic representations that have been caused and 
maintained by the perceptions and cognitive processes of the agent.
26 The mechanisms o f these extremely complex processes span several disciplines. Despite their 
complexity, they are physical processes realised within the perception, cognition and action of 
the human agent.
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At some stage in its evolution language will have become self-conscious. 
Members will refer to things that have been said. This is the stage of semantic 
ascent, (Quine, op cit., 271-276). If we, self-conscious observers sharing the 
same categories of representation within our agency, could observe a human 
community with a 'flat* language; that is, a community with linguistic practices 
that refer only to things in the world, we might say "By that symbol he means 
that" or "Having seen that event or heard that symbol he believes th a t...". We 
might also say of an utterance by a member "That is true" or "That is false" but
97we would not hear members speak of meaning or belief or truth. We, the 
observers, may say that the ontology of this language is only the ontology of 
things.
Suppose now that, within this community a new practice evolves. When an 
agent hears P and sees that not p, two sorts of response would be useful and 
thus likely to survive as practices. One response would be to say, perhaps 
expressively:
P * P (3)
The other, perhaps equally expressive, would be
Not P28 (4)
It may be that some expectation of p in our, the observer's, explanation would 
lead us to make this distinction. For the agent these are two states of affairs not 
to be simultaneously accepted. Psychology recognises the phenomenon of
27 'Meaning' here is entirely in use. I define a linguistic community by the practices described by 
statements: (4), (5) and (6). 'Meaning' is the name given to the relation between the two 
recognitions, correlated by the practices o f language.
28 This usage of'not' would be distinct from the negation o f the statement in (1). This negation 
would have been, x sees that not p -> x says Q, where Q is the symbol for the absence of p.
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cognitive dissonance as an unpleasant feeling due to opposite perceptions of 
the same event. Also, there would be evolutionary advantages in rejecting 
anomaly. Whatever the mechanisms, symbols have evolved to represent the 
concepts of meaning and falsity and the practices of reference to text have 
developed. Two principal practices may be summarised in causal form. Firstly:
y perc p & y hear (x say P) —» y say and indicate 'P * p'. (5)
Where the symbol * is a term in the language that denotes a relation of meaning 
between symbol and world. We observers may comment that * means 'means' 
but for the community this is an additional practice. The classifications of their 
ontology now include things that are items of text. They are explicitly aware of 
the relations between their usage of text and things in the world. The second 
practice would be:
y perc p & y hear (x say P) & y rep(P * p) -» y say P # (6)
Where '#' denotes that P is being properly used in virtue of its Normal usage 
and the perceived state of the world. For we observers, the '#' is a term in the 
language that denotes a relation of truth between usage of symbol and 
perception of the world.
If meaning has become tacit within the community then statement (6) can be 
simplified and translated:
y perc p -» y say 'P is true' (7)
29 See Festinger, 1956,
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This describes the practice of warranted assertion but the right hand side is not 
logically entailed by the left. We are describing a practice, not making 
metaphysical assertions. Normally, these practices will involve trust in other's 
statements so that:
y hear (x say P is true) -» y rep p (8)
And truth is seen, like trustworthiness, as a property of P. The trusting members 
of the community may now say 'p if P is true' and we have one half of the 
disquotational schema explicitly recognised within the community. However, 
trust may fail. Individual members of the community may prefer to rely on the 
warranted assertion of statement (7). For them, P is true if p is perceived: they 
will say: 'P is true if p'. This is the other half of the disquotational schema. 
Deflationists contend that 'P is T iff p' is completely descriptive of truth. To say 
'p if P is true' is to take an trusting role in the linguistic community. To say 'P is 
true if p' is to take a challenging role.
Meaning and truth are concepts of relations between agent, language and the
o  i
world. In a flat language without explicit semantic terms, an agent will say 
“P” because it has representations appropriate to perception of p or a need for p. 
If one wishes to ask another about p, he might say, questioningly; "P?" The 
other might reply affirmatively and the first agent now has a revised 
representation of states in the world. Also, the first agent will now have a 
revised representation of the representational states of the second. The practice 
of naming that state of another which is concerned with its representations of 
the world would lead to an attribution of a property to that other and this is the
30 This distinction touches on wider issues regarding the realist anti-realist debate that are 
beyond the scope o f this thesis
31 Whether semantic practices in humans evolved together with flat speech is a matter for 
research. Any functioning language requires a grammar and a syntax; practices that enable the 
productivity and comprehensibility o f complex communication. But neither grammar nor 
syntax need be self conscious in the sense that they are topics in the language.
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property that we call 'belief. The articulate attribution of belief requires the 
ontology of text. The attribution of belief to an agent is a separate practice from 
the attribution of truth or meaning to an item of text. Their relative priorities are 
arguable but each requires semantic ascent and the practice of reference to text.
Human language is about the world of the human agent. With the cooperative 
practices of language man can study the phenomena of his world. Using the 
extended ontology of a metalanguage, man can study the phenomena of 
language. Within the functional theory of systems and biology, man can study 
his own agency. Human agency can be explained in terms of the world and 
language can be explained in terms of social agency in the world, but language 
cannot be explained as an aspect of the world or in terms of human agency, the 
three are explanatorily inseparable.
4.12 A Theory of Mind
In the example above, the interrogated agent may have perceived p without 
articulating P. Does this justify the statement that it believed that p in virtue of 
its representation of p? Those neural processes that we functionally describe as: 
its intrinsic representations o f agency, leading to action appropriate to p, may 
be quite independent of language. If, by some chance, it were denied language 
but had the relevant experience of p, should we then say that it believed p but 
without the concept P? If we take this view then it is difficult to deny belief to 
any agent of sufficient cognitive complexity to act according to the content that 
an observer would attribute. We would say that my artefact, of Section 3 above, 
believes that a high pitched sound is incident at a given angle. 'Belief is now a 
term that we may apply to any representational state to which we can ascribe 
content in propositional terms. We may be aware of misrepresentation, as in our 
perception of the Muller-Lyer illusion but the representation that leads to action 
would be our real belief.
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Alternatively, we may hold that the state of belief is only possible for an agent 
capable of articulating that belief. This is the stance taken by Davidson, (1982), 
By taking this stance we deny the possession of a belief state to any agent 
currently lacking the term for a concept but otherwise fulfilling all of the 
possession conditions for that concept.
As a third alternative, we may deny representational status to belief and locate 
the attribution of belief within the practices of language and this is the 
alternative for which I shall argue. Whether we attribute belief to other 
creatures is then a matter of choice, based on whether our theory of their agency 
implies that such attribution will explain their behaviour. Whether we attribute 
the attribution o f  belief to other creatures is another issue and will also depend 
on whether we consider that their social life is mediated by a suitable theory of 
behaviour. That other social species use a theory of mind appears unlikely. 
Seyfarth and Cheney, (1992, 342), suggest that chimpanzees behave so as to 
alter or control other individuals' states of mind, but that "Even apes, however, 
seem to have difficulty attributing specific mental states to others." In our 
human communities children seem to acquire a theory of mind from about four 
years and can articulate an attribution of belief by about four to five years, 
Pemer, (1993, p. 184).
Languages that survive will be those that work for their speakers. Linguistic 
communities that survive will be those of which membership favours survival 
of the members and whose practices favour survival of the group. We would 
expect that the semantics of successful languages would favour the preservation 
of truth. We would also expect that practices of attribution of propositional 
attitudes would favour those attributions that correctly link the attributed 
attitude to the Normal representations of a Normal agent of those states of the 
world to which the semantics of the language refer.
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4.13 Hypothesis for the Status of Beliefs
I suggest that belief is not a physical state of an agent with direct causal powers. 
The attribution of belief is associated with representational states of agency that 
have causal powers but this association is through the practices of language. If 
an agent is so constituted that she will perform action 'a' because the intrinsic 
representations within her agency have content 'p' and she is a Normal speaker, 
possessing the appropriate concepts, then her honest utterance will be P. Others 
in the community who share possession of her relevant concepts and have a 
theory of her agency may attribute to her the belief that p. Due to cognitive 
dysfunction and consequent misrepresentation, her action may not be 'a' but the 
attribution may still be justified. We can formulate attribution conditions for 
belief in the terms:
The practices of belief attribution within a human linguistic 
community are such that a speaker who meets the possession 
conditions for the relevant concepts32 may honestly attribute 'belief 
that p' to another speaker if and only if he has evidence that that 
speaker, if cognitively Normal and in possession of the relevant 
concepts, wishing to tell sincerely and able to speak, would 
honestly affirm P.
This is a description of a practice in a language. If the attributer has no evidence 
to expect the other to honestly affirm P then he has no grounds for attribution. If 
he has such evidence then he is justified in the attribution. If the attributer has 
evidence that the believer is deluded then this may affect the grounds for 
attributing belief. If the speaker is unaware of the delusion but has the
32 This is the Peacocke, (1992), notion o f ’possession conditions'.
33 By 'honestly' I mean to discount any distinction between conscious and subconscious 
awareness as well as a lack of prevarication. If the attributer has no perception of subconscious 
denial then the fact o f such denial cannot affect his grounds for attribution.
145
perceptions appropriate to attribution then he meets the attribution criterion but 
his attribution may differ from the self-attribution of the putative believer.
Pemer, (op cit, 169), describes the acquisition of the concept of knowledge in 
children. He states that this proceeds in two stages. "Children start by using 
knowledge as a theoretical construct within a theory o f  behaviour that explains 
success and failure. Later, as children acquire the concept of representation they 
re-conceptualise what they know about knowledge within a representational 
theory o f mind." Pemer is writing here about concepts within language, 
possessed by people and deployed in linguistic acts. In such acts people talk 
about beliefs held by themselves and others. From this re-conceptualisation: "... 
The importance of informational access is fully appreciated, relegating 
successful action to its place as a 'mere' consequence of knowledge."
Nothing in the above suggests that knowledge or belief are physical states of 
the holder. Children learn to report; firstly, on what they can say or do and 
secondly, on their justification for what they can say. On page 148, Pemer 
quotes examples of knowledge talk in children. In one example a child of 
fifteen months is asked, "Where is X?" and replies "I don't know" (with a palms 
up gesture). One interpretation could be that the child was reporting on a 
personal state. Another, more plausible interpretation is that the child was 
following a practice: If you see or remember seeing, X and are asked "Where 
is X?" you say "There" and point or you say where you saw it If not, then you 
say "I don't know". At this stage the language of the child is flat and the child is 
reporting on the world. Semantic ascent and the textual character of knowledge 
come with insight into representation. As Pemer stresses, beliefs attributed are 
representations and the acquisition of skills in handling representation and 
misrepresentation are important milestones in development. But these are 
representations of convention, explicit within the conventions of language. 
There is no claim that these are intrinsic and nonconceptual representations 
within agency.
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Is there then a fact of the matter regarding a belief? It is common ground that 
belief statements are semantically opaque. A proposition embedded in an 
attribution of belief has truth conditions with respect to states of the world. But 
this does not bear on whether that proposition is truly believed. Since Freud, we 
distinguish between conscious and sub-conscious belief and accept that our self 
perceptions are corrigible. It may be that, with respect to some given domain of 
discourse, the content 'pf of the representational states of agency of a human 
agent at the instant may precisely match the content of some sentence 'P'. Also, 
that these states are consciously available to that agent and that the concepts 
within that content are equally possessed by all parties to that discourse. Under 
these conditions it could be said; “that agent truly believes P and P means that 
p", where p is the representational content and P is that sentence. In so far as 
beliefs attributed have propositional content and in so far as real 
representational states have propositional content, these contents may coincide. 
One could then speak of a true attribution of belief. However, due to intrinsic 
misrepresentation within agency, the content may not be true and this matching 
of content may have occurred despite the attribution being dishonest or without 
proper cause.
4.14 Support for the Hypothesis from the Supervenience of Intrinsic and 
Conventional Representations
In 2.8 above, I concluded that system properties are strongly supervenient on 
the physical properties of their realisation only if the system includes those 
mechanisms by which such properties are attributed and that this amounts to 
Horgans’ notion of regional physical supervenience. A system of agency will be 
described by a theorist, and the theorist may attribute properties within the 
functional description of the agency of an entity. For example, a representation 
may misrepresent and misrepresentation is a system property of a 
representation. Of the possible future worlds picked out by the existence of this
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entity those, between which physical properties of the entity are indiscernible, 
may or may not misrepresent depending on physical states of the world and the 
truth of the theory of agency. Completeness of the physical system requires that 
possible states represented include all possible states of the world as classified 
by the agency of the entity within the theory of a theorist. Misrepresentation 
requires that the theory be true34; the truth of a theory is a relation between the 
theory and the world and indirectly, a relation between the world and the 
theorist.
If an action of agency is attributed a quality by the theorist, such as that an 
action is reprehensible, then this attribution is made against a context of 
practices within a community. These practices are realised within the agency of 
members of the community and the memories and texts they share. A complete 
system description will include the community and its practices and in these 
terms, the quality of an action will be regionally physically supervenient on the 
physical states of the agent and the rest of the community, and the physical 
states of its texts and memories.
A similar argument applies to the attribution of a belief. Although the 
representational states of an agent member of a linguistic community are 
strongly supervenient on the physical properties of the agent and its world, an 
attribution of belief is made consequentially on recognitions within a linguistic 
community, shared within the practices of that community.
The property of being a state of attribution of a belief is regionally 
supervenient on the physical states of; the agent, the linguistic 
community making the attribution, their marks in language and the 
world they share.
34 In Fodor's sense of asymmetric dependence.
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If belief statements were replaced by physical statements, as Churchland, 
(1981), recommends, then in the consequent flat language, members of a 
linguistic community would have no way of expressing the theory of such 
replacement. Any theory of belief or attribution must be described by a theorist, 
who will be an agent capable of description by that theory The theory must be 
couched in a metalanguage including the denotation of object and text since it 
must include statements of belief. There seems to be no principled way in 
which belief talk or representation talk can be eliminated except by a decision 
by fiat to cease the practice of belief attribution. But, why should we do that? 
Folk psychology is not a theory, though it can be discussed within a theory of 
attribution. It is a practice that has function for the community that practices it.
Whether explanation of belief and representation in terms of physical 
mechanisms that pick out possible future states by their current actual states 
amounts to reduction is a matter of definition. Such states do not reduce in the 
Nagel sense of bridging laws. If, in the liberal sense suggested by Horgan, (ibid, 
575) “a metaphysical position will count as reductive merely by virtue of 
asserting (i) the causal completeness of physics and (ii) the thesis of regional 
supervenience.” then my position emerges as one of reductive materialism but 
without bridging laws. All of the functional models described are multiply 
realisable. Even within a realisation, the causal powers of specific functional 
properties do not correspond with the causal powers of specific physical 
properties in a type-type correspondence. Even the humblest control system 
must be explained as a holism of function. My preference is to deny reduction 
and suggest that physical explanation through regulatory mechanisms is neither 
eliminativist nor reductionist but requires an alternative term Perhaps Smuts’ 
term ‘holistic’ is appropriate.
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4.15 Conclusions
Building on the concept of agency defined in Chapter 3 above. I have described 
how all living things meet the criteria for explanation of their behaviour in 
terms of agency. I have also described the agency of those artefacts to which we 
human agents delegate the tasks of maintaining or achieving goal states against 
the variability of an unpredictable world.
The range of complexity of realisation between the austere agency of a 
bacterium, plant part or thermostatic control and the rich agency of a normal, 
living human is vast and the advent of learning and language lead to emergent 
phenomena such as personhood and the attribution of belief. My task has been 
to show that these phenomena, though complex in their manifestation, are not 
mysterious. The agent at the instant, continually changing in intrinsic 
representations within its agency and cognitive process and the person, 
recognised as an ongoing entity within a social grouping of agents, each 
themselves recognised as persons within the group, is the same physical entity. 
The same intrinsic representations that are causally maintained by perception 
and cause action within each human agent are components in the holisms of 
perception recognised by each person of others and themselves that lead within 
the practices of language to attributions of belief.
The diagram at the end of this chapter shows how things in this world may be 
categorised by their intentionality. Whether non-living things can be autopoietic 
is a matter of debate within the systems discipline that need not concern us 
here. Only the Asimov robots are not actual things that we can recognise in our 
world today. The distinction between integrated and reflex agency, at Junctions 
4 and 5, is vague. In her description of the cognitive processing of the bat, 
Kathleen Akins remarks that ’’the bats auditory system seems designed for 
sequenced non-integrated information processing". The behaviour of reflex 
agency can be described as functional within the design of an entity, which is
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autonomous in virtue of its topology and its DNA. However, some of the 
behaviour of higher mammals is clearly based on integrated information 
processing and this processing will be generally functional if the creature is to 
survive. I doubt if there is a clear borderline. The agency of a chimp is clearly 
integrated in this sense and that of a tree is clearly not. Less advanced 
vertebrates such as bats are somewhere in between.
I have concluded that, although none of our artefacts of agency compare with 
ourselves in the rich diversity of their agency, the only distinction of principle 
between them and us, with respect to agency, is in the aetiology of our 
functional organisation. We natural organic agents owe the rich variety of our 
agency to our evolutionary history. Although we can speak of our organic 
structure as realising the functional requirements of perception, representation, 
cognitive process and action, our function is for ourselves. Our agency supports 
sour autopoiesis and that is what it is to be alive. The functional containing 
systems in which we are best explained are of our selves within our worlds and 
the functional hierarchy is recursive. Our artefacts have function for us, It may 
be that we could break that link and create autopoietic artefacts but we would 
still have made them.
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THINGS INIHEWCRLD
active passive
(rocks, chairs 
clouds, crystals)
not intentional, 
allcpoietic intentional
(cars, automata)
living, 
autopoietic
artefacts,
allopoietic
integrated /  \
(parts of plants, 
governors)
solitarysocial
(robots,integrated 
control systems)(moles, octcpi)
linguistic groups with agency
(nations, clubs)
linguistic
(Asimov robots)
(chmps, ants) \  /  (us)
groups with agency 
(social insects)
groups without agency
groups without agency
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5
AGENCY & THE COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF COGNITION
5.1 Introduction
The object of this chapter is to explore the roles of representation and agency in 
computation and cognition. What it is that is meant by these terms, in this 
context, will emerge. Each has several usages and they vary in their pertinence. 
For example, and this is only to gesture at the subject of computation; we may 
speak of our mental calculations or of our use of an abacus or of our use of a 
digital computer or of our use of a differential analyser. All of these are 
examples of our following the rules of some process with the goal of solving 
some perceived problem. Some authors also speak generally of certain 
processes as 'computational' even when there is no problem perceived by an 
agent as a problem for which these processes are the computation of a solution. 
I will argue that; although cognitive processes have been described as 
computational, Normal1 examples of such processes are not computations. 
Also, the aggregate mechanism in which these processes are realised (in our 
case, a brain) is not, Normally, a computer for its owner.
I have already set out what I mean by agency. I will continue to describe agency 
in terms of a functional characterisation of perception, representation, goal, 
cognitive process and action; where the cognitive processes are such as to 
produce action that is for  the agent in the light of the representations caused by 
what is perceived. Action that is for  the agent is intentional action. It is about 
the world and is based on representations of that world. Intrinsic representations 
within agency may be distinct from the representations inherent in the human
1 As in 2.8 above, I use the term 'Normal' strictly in the sense stipulated by Millikan, 1984.
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practices of computation or communication. Within the processes of agency; 
perceptions amend and produce representations, representations produce and 
amend other representations and representations cause action. Whether these 
processes are apt for description as computational will depend on our 
characterisation of computation and will be a principle question for this chapter. 
It may be that an act of human agency depends on a computation and that this 
computation is carried out as a separate act of agency in the head of the agent. 
It will be argued that; although this computation is carried within the central 
nervous system of the agent it is not part of the cognitive processes of agency. 
A computation is an act of agency caused by cognitive processing of intrinsic 
representations within agency. The result of a successful computation is 
available for perception by the agent.
5.2 Computation
A question that is sometimes asked is whether the mind is a computer and 
another related question, is whether the brain is a computer. Each of these 
questions displays some ontological confusion but apart from this, the questions 
are not clear. Suppose we re-phrase the underlying question into a form like:
Has the neural realisation of the mental processes attributed in a 
propositional theory of mental representation, the same functional 
characterisation as a computer?
The question is clearer but we are still not including in the question, what the 
concepts of mind and computation are for that questioner. Computation as I will 
use the term, is an intentional act. So a computer is something which is used by 
an agent to perform a computation. We turn therefore to the question: What is a 
computation? Consider a few examples of computation:
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(i) If I am asked to divide a quantity of water by three I may do this by 
putting a third of the water in an open vessel into each of three other 
vessels. A practical way of doing this is to mark a graduated scale on to 
a fourth vessel of uniform cross section and then ladle out equal 
quantities until I have shared the liquid to a sufficient accuracy. In this 
simple action I have carried out a computation; I have divided the 
amount in the vessel by three. If the three vessels are identical then the 
height of the liquid is a representation of the quotient.
(ii) The flow of current through a thin flat layer of electrolyte between point 
sources and sinks is approximately given by formulae that are the 
solutions of linear differential equations of an active electric network of 
a complexity which is related to the number of sources and sinks. The 
action of setting up the tank and measuring the currents can be 
interpreted as either solving the differential equations for particular 
parameters or finding the roots of a pair of polynomial equations or 
doing an experiment on an electrolytic tank. Two of these 
interpretations are computations. In one case the locations of the points 
represent the eigen-roots of the system and in the other they represent 
the roots of the polynomials. The third is an experiment; they are all the 
same physical action but with different interpretations.
(iii) If I am asked to divide a number of sweets between five children and 
tell them how many each will have, I might do it by dealing out sweets 
one or two at a time. I am still carrying out a computation but in number 
rather than quantity. The computation lies in the interpretation of the 
outcome and the representation, inherent in the interpretation of the 
natural numbers by the quantities of sweets. Computation is an 
intentional act and in the example, the intentionality is manifest in the 
telling.
2 An early description of this device is in Huggins, 1948.
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(iv) As recently as 1964 a calculator was available which could be described 
as a hand held, mechanical abacus . Multiplication consisted in turning a 
shaft against an array of cams. Division was a precise analogue of long 
division using the device as a multiplier. One could even calculate 
square roots.
(v) We are all familiar with the current hand calculators with which we 
compute products, ratios, powers and surds by fixed programmes in a 
small digital machine. This is in contrast with my old hand calculator 
which was programmed by my actions upon a facilitating mechanism 
for the same sorts of computation as are pre-programmed into the 
pocket electronic calculator.
(vi) A modem desk top computer is essentially a Turing machine using the 
von Neumann architecture but it still consists of many electronic gates 
wired so that they can engage in processes exactly analogous to those of 
the old hand calculator and those that we do with pencil and paper. 
Where the computer differs is that the sequence of sums it does is 
determined by reference to a sequence of instmctions that are also held 
in digital form and can be entered or amended. The machine is hard 
programmed in this way to read a variety of programmes, as the user 
requires. This analogy between logics can be exploited so that each such 
machine is a realisation of a Turing machine.
In all of the above examples, actions are carried out according to rules and 
some of these mles concern the interpretation of outcome from input as the 
solution to a computation. The solution may be in number or in text or in a state 
of the world. Any process can be interpreted as a computation in some context. 
In the example of dividing sweets between children, this is not a computation 
unless the agent carrying out the procedure interprets; the number of sweets and 
the number of children as representing the input to a computation. And the
3
This was called the "Curta Calculator" made, I think, in Liechtenstein.
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method of distribution as a procedure that will lead to the number in each little 
hand apt for interpretation as representing the solution. Similarly, with the 
division of the quantity of water, and all of the examples. In each case we have 
a convention by which certain input states are interpreted as representing a type 
of question and a procedure that, if used intentionally, will lead to output states 
that, within a convention represent a solution. Input and output states represent 
within conventions and procedures lead from a problem type to a solution type.
Turing, (1937) formalised the notion of computation in terms of a Turing 
machine. The Turing characterisation of computation is in terms of a class of 
mechanisms defined by their formal properties of symbol manipulation and 
memory. This has led to the Church-Turing thesis, Church, (1956), that any 
problem that can be specified in terms of algorithms can be solved by such a 
machine.4 Also, since a Turing machine can be specified in functional terms, 
any Turing machine can emulate any other Turing machine, Galton, (1990).
Neurological research suggests that many of our mental activities can be 
modelled in algorithmic terms. Also, the neural processes of cognition consist 
of sequential neural processes and chemical changes to neurons which could 
themselves be realisations of processes that may be functionally characterised 
in algorithmic terms. From these insights the science of artificial intelligence 
has grown. The contribution of computer science and the mathematics of 
computability to neurobiology have been substantial, as has the contribution of 
neurobiology to computer research and its applications. Research into the 
parallel distributed processing capability of banks of neurons has led to the 
recognition of a new methodology of computing which has led to the 
architectural thesis of connectionism in cognitive modelling and a new
4 The notion o f computability within a Turing machine was first applied to the resolution of  
Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem but our concern here is with the practice o f computation.
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methodology of non algorithmic optimisation with practical applications in 
business and economics.5
Computation is a part of the way of life of a community that includes a problem 
set and the agent to whom the problem is posed. We need to be clear as to what 
aspect of our characterisation of mind we are construing as analogous to what 
aspect of computation within the linguistic and computational practices of this 
community.
In language we speak to one another and we are aware of one another as people 
with a place in our lives and in whose lives we have a place. The implications 
of this for our attributions of agency, personhood and responsibility were 
explored in the previous chapter. Also, we compute and examples of 
computation include those cited at the beginning of this chapter. Every person 
or dog that has caught a ball has carried out a procedure that can be described in 
computational terms but we would not describe their actions in catching the ball 
as computing. What is essential to a computation, as defined, is that the agent 
knows the permanence or at least reusability, of the methodology or algorithm, 
of the solution. She then does not just know how to catch a ball, she knows that 
her procedure is a solution to problems of that type in general. If we divide 
sweets between children by dealing them out then our actions can be described 
in computational terms. Had we had not noted the quantity and made a 
conscious decision to record the number each got as a solution to that problem 
then we would not performed a computation. If, when a dog catches a ball, we 
record every detail of the dogs movements and the trajectory of the ball then we 
may have a solution of that set of differential equations. Even if we could write 
them down, if we have not purposefully established all of the initial conditions, 
we have not intentionally solved the equations. It could be questioned whether,
5 Although the neural networks are usually simulated in algorithmic format using digital 
computers. See Sharda, (1994), for an application bibliography.
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even if we had the initial conditions and we recorded all of the dogs movements 
and the trajectory in order to solve those differential equations we would have a 
solution. We would not know which differential equations we would have 
solved as the dog is an agent and each throwing of the ball is epistemically 
contingent for the dog. However the throwing of the ball is not epistemically 
contingent for us. Monte Carlo methods of solving such equations are 
distinguished by their experimental nature and if by repeated throwing a die, we 
map some solution space for a range of such equations then we have an 
approximation to the solution of a mathematical problem6. The distinction still 
lies in the intentionality of the computing agent. If, after the division of the 
sweets, a child tells another; "There were fifty sweets and we got ten each", 
then a solution is available. But we have not carried out a computation unless 
this is why we did it and we knew that the procedure we were following would 
produce a solution to problems of this type.
One requirement for computation is that there is a problem and a solution. 
Another is that the solution be a representation. What the solution represents 
will depend on the domain of the problem but whatever the domain, whether 
numeric, qualitative or quantitative, if it can be shared in language then it will 
be apt for description and can be represented by a proposition. This suggests a 
first stab at a definition of computation as:
Some physical actions on representations following rules which, 
carried out intentionally, will lead to a proposition that satisfies a 
function.
6 See "Monte Carlo Methods", G W Brown in: " Modem Mathematics for the Engineer", E F 
Bechenbach, Me Graw— Hill, 1956. In Cameron, (1960), the author describes an application of  
this technique to finding a possible refuelling schedule at Berkeley Nuclear power Station.
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A 'methodology of computation' then, is a set of rules for actions that will lead 
to a proposition that satisfies a function, A computation is an instance of the 
carrying out of such rules, a solution is the proposition that satisfies the 
function, the problem is the function that the solution satisfies and the 
methodology is the computer. This is still not complete since we have not 
mentioned who is carrying out these actions and why. Rephrased to include 
this, I suggest as a working definition of a computation:
Some physical actions of agency on representations, following rules 
mastered by the agent, which, carried out intentionally will lead to a 
proposition that satisfies a function and is expected so to do, for and
n
by that agent.
A computational act is an act of agency, carried out to get an answer by a 
procedure. Although a computation may be a private matter the rules of a 
computation are not private in principle (if they were we could not include 'will' 
in the definition above). Since computation involves procedures that follow 
rules any description of a computational act will include a description of 
physical processes and these processes realise the functional requirements of 
this computation. Such processes are computational within the context of this 
description. In another description these same processes may have no 
computational significance. This point will come up repetitiously during the 
following arguments.
The definition of computation, given above, is pitched at a very general level. 
Although; as Turing, (op cit), showed, there are mathematical problems for 
which mechanical algorithms cannot be found. And as Godel, (1931), showed,
7 Hamad, (1994), defines computation as "implementation-independent, systematically 
interpretable, symbol manipulation". As has been demonstrated, not all computations are 
systematically interpretable or require the manipulation o f symbols, though some 
methodologies o f computation meet these criteria.
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there are logical problems for which algorithms cannot be found, there is a 
human practice that involves the use of algorithms for the solution of logical 
and mathematical problems. It is this activity that we call computing. The 
activity comprises: apparatus, rules, a question which is posed in text or 
conventional representation and may be described as a function, rule based 
combination of conventional representations and a solution which, if found, will 
be in conventional representation and will satisfy the function. None of the 
representations of a computation will be representations of the agency of the 
computing agent as the actions of computation are essentially contingent on the 
goals of the computation. The actions of agency are contingent on states of the 
world and goals of the agent within a theory of agency. They may be realised in 
neural states of the agent as in mental calculation or in the states of a digital 
computer as in a calculator or chess playing computer but computing is an act 
of agency.
An act of agency is an act on the world and the entire embodiment of the agent 
is in the world. Any apparatus and text of rules, which are used for 
computation, comprise a computer in the context of that activity. If I am 
calculating a budget 'in my head' in order to advise a friend then in the context 
of that question I am using my brain as a computer. I am not intentionally 
manipulating my neurons to find that answer any more than I am intentionally 
manipulating electronic gates when I push buttons on a calculator but in each 
case I am following rules in asking a question of a device. Represented in my 
brain are the rules of arithmetic as they are in the structure of the calculator. If I 
use pencil and paper then the computer comprises; my brain, the representations 
in my brain of numbers and rules, pencil and paper and the marks on the paper. 
If I use my old mechanical abacus then, since I intervene for numeric entry and 
register shift, the computational processes are divided between me, using my 
brain and hands, and the device. The program or schedule of processes and 
algorithms, are in my brain but so much of the algorithmic work is done by the 
device that we are justified in calling it a calculator. If I use a modem pocket
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electronic calculator then the 'computer* is still distributed between the device 
and me, but a lot more is in the device. The device now actually contains 
programs for sequences of algorithms and we might be justified in calling it a 
computer. If I use my desktop computer then most of the computation is in the 
device. In particular, the device can be re-programmed for a variety of 
algorithmic processes and we feel totally justified in calling it a computer. In all 
of these realisations of that computation there was a function, derived from a 
question, in text and an answer in representational form, apt for interpretation 
into text.
Collins English Dictionary defines a computer: "a device, usually electronic, 
that processes data according to a set of instructions." and distinguishes 
between digital, analogue and hybrid computers. This definition matches my 
usage above. I suggest as a working definition:
A computer is an artefact used by an agent to carry out
computations by reference to a program that is within it.
The usage of within is very broadly spatial. The program may be distributed 
between the memory of the agent, written text and a calculating device and we 
would then see the computer as distributed over these entities. Programs may be 
recursive and a recursive algorithm may fail to converge to a proposition. Thus, 
a computer may operate according to its program but not carry out a 
computation. It may hang up on an inconsistency or settle into a non- 
convergent process but writing the program and starting the machine will have
Q
been an intentional act of agency.
g
As will be, switching off and amending the program.
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Any computation will be achieved by some stream of physical causal processes 
that lead from some input states that conventionally represent a function, for the 
computing agent, to some output states that conventionally represent, for the 
computing agent, a proposition that satisfies that function. These states and 
these processes are computational under a description and this description 
includes the agency of the computing agent. Many processes found in nature 
could be described as computational in that some final arrangement could be 
interpreted as the solution of a computation if the input were established 
intentionally for this purpose. Distinction must be maintained between:
A process, which is intentionally computational, and a process, 
which is functionally isomorphic to a process which, if used 
intentionally, could be a part of a computation.
Many cognitive processes actually produce a representational state that can be 
interpreted in computational terms. If and only if, the agent interprets such 
states in computational terms then that agent can be said to have carried out a 
computation and these states are explicitly and conventionally representational. 
If such a representational state is used in further representational processing of 
agency or causes appropriate behaviour then the process is not a computation.
David Marr made extensive use of computer modelling in his work on visual 
representation. Many of the he visual functions that he explained are called 
computational because successful computer modelling demonstrates that the 
processes involved are procedurally isomorphic to processes that could be used 
in computation and can be explained in these terms. However, this does not 
imply that we human agent carry out computations with our brains when 
seeing. If some actions of a university are best explained by taking the 
intentional stance then we could speak of the agency of the university and the 
cognitive processing of this agency may include a clerk doing sums. Each of 
these sums will be an act of the agency of the clerk but it may lead to some act
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of the university, which is not computational for the university. However, the 
university may require an answer to some question and similar computations by 
university staff will be components of a computation by the university. In 3.2, 
above, I defined agency in terms of action, intentional under a description. 
Computation is an act of agency and will be seen as a computation within a 
description that includes that agency.
5.3 Representation by Convention
The distinction between intrinsic representations within agency and 
conventional representation was considered in chapter 2. In chapter 3, I 
contended that the function of intrinsic representation within agency is 
independent of convention, although its content can only be articulated in the 
doubly conventional representations of language. This chapter is concerned 
with computation and if, as I contend, computation is an act of agency then the 
representations of computation are, in some sense, conventional and we should 
consider this type of representation.
Utterances of propositions represent states of the world within the conventions 
of language. Maps, pictures and sculptures represent within the conventions of 
navigation and art. Intrinsic representations represent within the cognitive 
processes of agency. Representations of convention need not have any 
similarity to the represented within any given domain. Experts in the blending 
of beverages and perfumes share a vocabulary within which they can describe 
smells and flavours. Such a description of the smell of a rose is as much a 
representation of a rose as a painting or photograph or articulate description but 
in a different domain of description. An essential component of the use of such 
representation in communication is that it be within a shared domain of 
description and that the sharing of this domain will define a linguistic
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community9. A non-linguistic higher vertebrate may respond to a model of a 
conspecific and this response is recognition but although it may recognise 
representations it will not recognise these as representations. A dog may 
recognise the marks left by another dog and such markings are signs, singly 
conventional in Dretske's, (1988), terminology, for the dog. However, without 
language, the distinction between sign and object signified cannot be 
articulated.
We speak ordinarily of believing, hoping or fearing and the content of this 
belief, hope or fear will be some putative state of affairs. Thus, we speak of 
these propositional attitudes as 'representing' the state of affairs to which the 
attitude refers. I have argued in 4.12, above, that a belief is not a physical state 
of an agent but that the attribution of belief within language is an attribution of 
representational content to representational states of agency and this attribution 
is a physical state of a linguistic community. This representation is not 
conventional in the same way as is that of a sketch or icon as the believer may 
have no perception of those states that are the subject matter of the belief 
attributed. However, each attribution of a belief or aspiration is an intentional 
act, aimed at bringing about a representation of a state of affairs. The subject's 
attitude to it and the articulate attribution of that attitude is a representation, 
within the conventions of language, of the attitude attributed and it's content.
In computation we also represent. Fodor, (1975), has said that there is no 
computation without representation. However, Fodor claims that cognition is 
computation and a major concern of this chapter is to distinguish between 
cognitive processes that may be procedurally isomorphic to processes within 
acts of computation and processes that are component processes in intentional 
acts of computation. To this end we should consider the role of representation 
in computation.
9
Such conventions may be private but they can, in principle, be shared.
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I have defined a computation as
Some physical actions of agency on representations, following rules 
mastered by the agent, which, carried out intentionally, will lead to 
a proposition that satisfies a function and is expected so to do, for 
and by that agent.
Processes of computation may take various forms but all require, at least, the 
representation of a function and its operands and a representation of a solution. 
If computation is an intentional act then the form and media of these 
representations will have been intentionally chosen. In the terms of Cummings, 
(1989), who takes the example of addition; "To get a physical device to add you 
have to get it to satisfy a function interpretable as addition. And that means that 
you have to design it so that getting it to represent a pair of addends, causes it to 
represent the sum."
It is apparent that these representations of computation are of Dretske's type I. 
By our convention, a state of the world represents and by our convention we 
interpret consequential states of the world as representational. In any complex 
computation, physical causal processes are involved that transform states to 
states according to rules and so the question arises as to whether these 
intermediate states represent and if so what is the form of their representation? 
In a computation, the rules may be followed by the agent who is doing the 
computation or the rule following may be delegated to a device, as in the case 
of the digital calculator. In neither case is there any implication of 
interpretability of intermediate states. If one is interrupted in the middle of a 
long addition, one may use notes of the current states of the calculation to 
continue after the interruption but there need be no representations of 
computation within the partially completed sum with some columns untouched.
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However, the symbols used will have their usual conventional interpretation as 
representations of numbers and the sum can be completed.
The designer of a calculator or a teacher of long addition may interpret each 
stage in the calculation but they are not then doing computation in the sense of 
the definition above. If computation is an action of agency that leads to a 
proposition that satisfies a function then computation does need to traffic in 
symbols. But some computations do use symbols. Hamad, (1994), defines 
computation as "implementation-independent, systematically interpretable, 
symbol manipulation". It would appear that Hamad is here using computation 
as verb rather than noun. If computation (verb) is to be systematically 
interpretable then this definition is of a process of computations (noun), each of 
which has an input that can be interpreted as a function and an output that can 
be interpreted as a proposition that satisfies that function. Each output state and 
each input state is a type I representation. In the sense of Dretske, type I, it is a 
symbol. Many methodologies of computation are based on the manipulation of 
representations of natural numbers and quantities and these representations are 
also symbols. This symbolic representation is at the core of the methods of 
serial computation (verb), ranging from the abacus and long multiplication to 
serial processing within a digital computer. It is within this usage of 'symbol' 
that the intermediate states of computation in neural networks are 'sub- 
symbolic'.
Not all methods of computation employ symbols. Apart from artificial neural 
networks, including their simulation in von Neumann architecture, some 
methods of analogue computation may use representations that are continuously 
interpretable. Other methods such as computation using Monte Carlo methods 
may not have intermediate states apt for symbolic interpretation.
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5.4 Functions of Conventional Representation
Functions of conventional representations within systems that describe our 
world include; communication between members of a community and the use 
of representations intentionally processed by an agent within the rules of 
working out a computation. Communication is the exchange of information 
with shared concepts and this is achieved by the mutual perception of 
representations of these concepts. Such representations have meaning within the 
customs of the community and it is within these customs that these 
representations are interpreted as expressing these concepts. If a computation is 
an intentional process, that is, some sequence of intentional manipulation of 
conventional representations, following rules, which leads to a proposition that 
satisfies a function, then these representations have meaning within the context 
of the computation. It is within that context that the input, intermediate 
representations and the solution can be interpreted. Representations used in 
communication and representations used in computation are real physical states, 
given meaning by the interpretative practices of the communicating community 
or the computing agent.
5.5 Conventional Representations that Misrepresent.
Misrepresentation within agency has been discussed in 3.7, above. Our 
conventional usage of representation also leads naturally to the notion of 
misrepresentation. Within some conventions, a configuration can be interpreted 
as a representation with a reference and a sense, in the usage of Dretske, (1988, 
70). Since the sense of a representation will have truth conditions, if within the 
domain of the representation, correct interpretation leads to a false sense for this 
referent, this configuration, in this domain, misrepresents. The same usage leads 
equally naturally to the notion of metarepresentations of convention. A 
configuration in a common domain can represent to users of that domain that a 
configuration in this or another common domain is a representation. If I were to 
comment of a map that I believed that a symbol on that map represents a bridge
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then my statement is a component in a metarepresentation of whatever is 
represented by that map. If I have got it wrong then my statement is a 
mismetarepresentation or a misinterpretation depending on whether I am 
describing map reading or using the map. If I am right in my interpretation but 
the bridge is not there, then the map is a misrepresentation. If I misread the 
symbol on the map, perhaps because the light is poor, then intrinsic 
representations within my agency misrepresent the symbol on the map.
Conventional representations represent within intentional acts of agency. 
Misrepresentations within agency may combine with misrepresentations within 
convention. The example of navigation by map gives a general illustration of 
this combination. If I aim to walk to the other side of a river and I have 
mastered the rules of map reading; including that one icon at the representation 
of a river means a bridge and another means a ford, then I will walk to a place 
at a river represented by the map as having a bridge. My action in walking to 
that place is due to the conjunction in me of a representation of the terrain 
derived from my perception of that part of the map and my representation of a 
mark in the map as representing a bridge. If the map is right and I have read it 
rightly but due to some neural fault in me I can't make the conjunction then I 
might give up and walk some where else. I misrepresent the river as not having 
a bridge and this is a intrinsic misrepresentation within my agency due to my 
abnormal cognitive processing. If due to bad light, I misread the bridge symbol 
as a ford and give up, then my misrepresentation of the state of affairs at the 
river is an intrinsic misrepresentation within my agency due to that abnormal 
perception. If the map is incorrect and the bridge is marked as a ford then my 
giving up would be due to an intrinsic misrepresentation within my agency 
caused by a misrepresentation of convention with correct interpretation. If the 
map is correct and I misinterpret the bridge symbol as a ford then my wrongly 
giving up would be due to the misrepresentation within my agency caused by 
my misinterpretation. My acts of agency would be due to my perception of a
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ford and my subsequent behaviour would be appropriate to my intrinsic 
representations of a ford at the river.
The detailed processing issues may be further illustrated by the example of a 
'chess playing computer'10. The system can be taken to include:
(i) Perception of a move by an autonomous opponent, made on a 
board available to the perception of that opponent.
(ii) Representation of that move, representation of the new board 
position, representation of rules and the game and strategies.
(iii) Processes by which representations are appropriately 
maintained and representations of goals, rules and strategies lead to 
representation of a selected next move and application of that move 
to the representation of the new board position.
(iv) Procedures by which the position on the common board is 
appropriately amended as an action of the 'computer'.
This entity is apt for system description in terms of agency. Its actions are 
intentional under a description and this description includes; either in function 
or in realisation, perception, representation and cognitive processes by which 
the representations are maintained from perception so that action for the goals 
of the entity is caused by the representations. The principle goal of agency; to 
win, is realised11 within the cognitive processes as designed.
10 This term is in fact an oxymoron since, as I argue below, the human brain or any other 
mechanism that realises the cognitive processes of agency is not a computer for the agent. 
However, in common usage, we call this mechanism a chess computer.
11 'Realised' in the sense o f a possible world picked out by the system described.
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If the computer makes a bad move this may be because the strategic principles 
realised in the cognitive processes (programmed into the computer) are 
inadequate to the complexity of the situation. The opponent, man or machine, is 
a better chess player with respect to this game. It may be because, due to a 
faulty chip, the processing of the implications of a possible move led to a wrong 
representation of the consequent board position. In this case, that representation 
is a misrepresentation of that implication; in the wording of our logical theory, 
the processes are not truth preserving. It may be that the perception of the 
opponent's move was faulty so that the representations of the current board and 
consequent implications are misrepresentations and are false.
All of the representations in the computer are representations of agency. They 
have conceptual content for a theorist in a theory of agency within the system 
description outlined above, they have no conceptual content for the agent. In 
this theory we may comment that the state of a memory chip represents that the 
opponent's king is on gl. We may comment that this misrepresents, since the 
history of the game to date places that piece on f l . In this theory of this agency, 
representations have wide content, since this theory is of the agent in the world. 
In another theory of the operation of this entity, such as the theory described by 
the program specification for the computer, states may be described in 
representational terms. These terms may be those of chess but their content 
would be a narrow content, since they do not represent states or the implications 
of states, of the world.
Within the system description of agency, misrepresentations have content and 
this content is in error. The error derives from the function of the representation 
and this function is to track the world or the implications of the world in a way 
that is for the goals of the agent within the processes that characterise that 
agent. However, in the case of the chess-playing computer, some occurrent 
states will be representations of implications of alternative moves. The logical 
procedures leading to such representations may involve several layers of
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conditional terms involving the implications of possible future moves by
opponent and computer. Such representations do not represent states of an
actual world, though some may be actualised, but, Normally, they do not
misrepresent. Their function is to represent states of possible worlds. If the
conditional terms by which the computer has been programmed represent true
implication then, in the Stalnaker sense, they are true of a possible world and
10will preserve truth in that possible world. It may be that the strategic 
assessment of a possible board position leads to an inferior move by the 
computer and it loses. But if each conditional has correctly described logical 
consequence no misrepresentation will have occurred. The agency of a chess 
playing computer is limited in breadth, though deep within that breadth. It has 
goals and these goals are pursued by action in an epistemically (for the entity) 
contingent world.
If an agent were to use this computer, with these programs to solve chess 
problems, then the representations in the computer would not be the type III 
representations of agency. They would be symbols, representations by 
convention, explicit in Dennett's terminology. The usage of this equipment 
would then be as a chess computer, rather than as a computer programmed to 
play chess and each such usage would be a computational act by the user. If a 
chip were faulty and misrepresented then this would be a misrepresentation 
within a computation and in this usage of the computer, would lead to an 
intrinsic misrepresentation within the agency of the user.
If the same computer were used for other applications then the faulty chip may 
have no conventional representational implications. It may misrepresent at the 
symbolic level of numerical representation and lead to a misrepresenting output 
or at the sub-symbolic level of a neural network and only effect the time to
12 In Stalnaker's, (1968, 34), terms: "The assertion which the conditional makes is that the 
consequent is true in the world selected. A conditional is true in the actual world when its
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convergence. It may have no functional significance for some applications of 
the computer.
5.6 Cognition as Computation?
Agency is manifest in action that is intentional under a description and the 
agency of an entity can be explained functionally in terms of perception, 
representation, goal, process and action. Perception is a causal process by which 
changes in the world that are relevant for the agent physically cause change in 
states of the agent. Such states are representational for the agent in that such 
states cause actions that are for the agent in the context of the world. They are 
intrinsic representations, Dretske's type III and 'tacit' in Dennett's usage. They 
are not conventional representations, available for computation by the agent. 
This is a functional description and it explains actual behaviour if there is a 
physical realisation that is apt for description in a system that includes the agent 
in its world. Such a system description will include descriptions of states of the 
world and states of the agent. It will also include descriptions of the processes 
by which states of the world change states of the agent and states of the agent 
cause actions which change the world or the relation of the agent to the world, 
in a way that is for the agent. These processes I call the cognitive processes of 
agency.
Any actual description of a token cognitive event will be in some domain of 
description. The content of this description will be in the concepts of that 
domain, possessed by the observer. The world perceived would be described in 
some domain of description and the content of this description will be in the 
concepts of that domain. The observer may choose different domains of 
description and bridging statements will link these. Whatever domain is chosen 
the content of intrinsic representations within agency will be described in that
consequent is true in the selected world."
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domain. This content is realistically attributed. That this content is conceptual 
does not imply possession of those concepts by the agent. The content is not 
attributed to the sentient agent but to the representational states that explain its 
actions. Within the terms of this domain an observer may speak of a world 
event in specific terms.
For example, if we are describing the behaviour of a bacterium we may speak 
of a spatial field of density of some chemical which, in our theory, is 
nourishment for the bacterium and this field has a gradient across the 
bacterium. We may then explain the behaviour of the bacterium in terms of 
chemical reactions at the cell surface causing differential flagellate activity so 
that the bacterium tumbles upstream to its own benefit. In another domain of 
description we may speak of a nutrient gradient represented for the bacterium 
by chemical states at its surface and the processes built in to the organism 
causing it to act by tumbling upstream. We may relate these two domains by 
saying that the representational state has the content that nourishment is this 
way for the bacterium. This content is necessarily indexical and selfish, since 
what this content is, is for the agent.
Intrinsic representations within the Normal cognitive processes of an agent 
behaving Normally in its Normal environment are described in a theory of the 
behaviour of that agent in that environment. This is a functional theory, 
invoking the functions of perception, representation, process and action. If this 
theory is true then any token action in the world can be explained as physically 
caused by representational states that are physically caused by perceptions of 
the world. If the theory is true then Normal representational states of an evolved 
agent will be either those that represent those aspects of the world to which it is 
adapted or those that represent alternative possible aspects for which it is 
prepared. The functions of these states will be Normal functions in the sense 
defined by Millikan, (1984).
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Lockery, (1989, p. 152), has described the conditioning of the sea hare, Aplysia
Californica, in terms of mental code and a simple syllogism. His interpretation,
•  • 1 ^with minor adaptation, is as below :
T
Code Physical State
CSj predicts - shock SNj has facilitated terminals
CSj is - identical (<correlated) - to CSj SNj and SNj are coactivated
CSj predicts - shock (and closes gill) SNj has facilitated teminals (and fires
motor neuron)
Where the SN are specific neurons and the CS are symbols for the 
representational significance of the excitation of each neuron. Normally, 
stimulation of the siphon or mantle skin of the sea hare causes contraction of 
the gill and siphon. In the terminology of agency; the agent perceives an event 
in the world by sensory excitation of nerves at the gill, this event is represented 
by the neural synapse which causes which causes the action of contraction. 
Normally, the goal of this action will be apt for interpretation as 'withdrawal 
from intrusion'. The synaptic stimulation is a real state that represents a real 
event and causes a real action. The observer may choose the domain of 
description of representational content but the theory will only be correct if the 
concepts chosen explain the behaviour within the functional model of agency. 
The concepts 'shock' and 'predict' have been chosen by Lockery. He could have 
chosen others and if these were linked by bridging laws the correctness of the 
theory would not be affected.
Lockery stresses in his analysis that this effect is based on an extrapolation of 
current experiments. Also, the cognitive architecture of vertebrates may be very 
different. He suggests that; the physical states as conditioned in Aplysia, may
13 From Lockery, (1989), with adaptation in italics.
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be seen as a real representation of the syllogism. In his words, (p 157): "This 
suggests that types of representational state will correspond with types of 
neurophysiological states, insofar as representations of sensory conditions is 
concerned. This is the kind of relation that underlies type-type psychophysical 
identity. However, it is important to remember that the relation to sensory 
conditions is only part of a representational state's functional role and to 
identify a representational state with a physical state we must show complete 
causal role isomorphism."
The gill reflex of the sea hare has Normally, the first order representation of 
'something at gill' and this neural state causes the Normal closing reflex. If the 
behaviour which has been conditioned in these experiments, has Normal 
function for the sea hare then, in the same domain, we may describe the second 
order representation as having some content like; 'danger of something at gill'. 
In animals of greater neural complexity descriptions of cognitive processing in 
these terms may involve more complex representations linked by logical 
sentences of extreme complexity. Within such explanations of cognitive 
processes, representations may be attributed simple propositional or logically 
compound content. Our understanding of the neurobiology of complex 
vertebrates is still inadequate to support a modelling of our cognitive processes 
of agency in neural terms but research suggests that: "types of representational 
states will correspond with types of neurophysiological states14, in so far as 
representation of sensory conditions is concerned." (Lockery, p 157).
Assuming that this is true we may consider, as a first weak hypothesis, the 
statement:
14 This is evidently true at the linguistic level.
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Hji Any action of agency can be explained by a causal chain of
physical processes between physical states each of which can be 
attributed some order of direct or derived representationality 
relevant to the explanation.
If such an explanation is true then the representations hypothesised in H} are
real states since each is realised in a physical state. This is not an explanation in 
system terms as no counterfactual claims are involved. Each explanation is 
within a narrative description of a specific action and how it came about.
A stronger hypothesis is:
H2: If such explanation is true then the behaviour of any animal,
adapted to its environment, can be explained within a system 
description that includes an environment of states perceived and 
acted upon and an agent containing physical mechanisms that 
realise causal chains of such representational states.
H, is the hypothesis that the physical realisation of cognition is apt for
description in system terms. Evidence from neuro-anatomical research indicates 
that specific areas of the human brain are associated generally with specific 
cognitive processes. Other evidence suggests that within and between such 
areas there is substantial reusability of neural connections and that such 
connections are highly idiosyncratic due both to innate and acquired variability. 
Such idiosyncratic realisation may not discredit modular functional models, 
which explain Normal behaviour of Normal humans, but it may not be 
appropriate to reify such modules.15
15 See "The Modularity o f Mind", Fodor, (1983), for a paradigmatic example o f  this.
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The first hypothesis follows directly from the axioms of this thesis. If it is false 
then our behaviour is not apt for explanation in terms of physical 
representational states. If it can be sustained then any cognitive explanation of 
action will have a semantic content and if the theory is sound, the semantics 
will be truth apt for the observer. This need not be semantic content for the 
agent animal since it is these cognitive processes that comprise its agency. If the 
theory is correct then the content of a physical state that caused the action is 
semantically equivalent to the result of a computation. It may or may not be the 
result of a computation since the causal process leading to this physical state 
may or may not be an intentional act of computation leading to a proposition 
that satisfies a function for this agent animal. If the action explained by Hj is
not a component action within a computation then this physical state is not the 
result of a computation.
If H2 can be sustained then any act of agency can be explained by causal chains
of physical states that are predictable, at least ceteris paribus and within the 
limits of the counterfactual consequences of the system description. Any token 
causal chain of representational states will be comprised of real physical states 
with representational content that is apt for interpretation as described in the 
paragraph above. If this model of the cognitive processes of this animal is 
correct then the semantic content of any representational state will be 
semantically equivalent to a computation. If some of these physical states were 
available for intentional manipulation by an observer, who will be an agent, 
then the cognitive mechanisms of this animal could be a computer for that 
observer but this does not make the cognitive mechanisms a computer for the 
animal. Only if these physical states are available for intentional manipulation 
by the agent animal itself, and only if the system description of the animal is to 
be interpreted realistically, not instrumentally, will the entity containing these 
states be a computer for the animal itself.
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If all of our cognitive processes of agency are realised in physical processes that 
necessarily include our neural processes, and the evidence for this is very 
strong, then the spectrum of cognitive complexity, from sea hare to primate is 
associated with a range of complexity of neural tricks, evolved over time, 
within the lottery of climatic and ecological processes. Any one of these neural 
tricks can be interpreted as a process, which could play a role in some form of 
computer. Any of these interpretations can be metaphors that increase our 
understanding of how the totality of these processes realises the functional 
requirements of our agency. Any one of them could be used by another agent 
(so far, only we humans seem to be up to it), as a computer by applying 
interpreted input stimuli and interpreting the output to solve some 
computational problem. However, none of this means that the whole or any 
functionally described module, of the cognitive processes of this organism is a 
computer or that a Normal token operation of these processes should be 
described as a computation by the described organism.
As Lockery, p 157, concludes: ’’Obviously, there are a great many cognitive 
tasks for which there is no functional parallel among the physiologically 
tractable invertebrates." In any organisms such representational structures will 
be part of a complex whole concerned with the perception, representation, 
cognitive process and action of the whole organism and in the more complex 
vertebrates there will be many cognitive tasks distinct from associative 
learning. Actual behaviour of the animal will depend on complex interactions 
between stored representations and logical modelling in representational terms 
may prove intractable. However, this should not undermine the demonstration 
of causal role isomorphism and if this is assumed, then the requirements for my 
functional characterisation of agency are met at least for pre-linguistic 
cognition.
However, should we speak of these complex interactions of stored 
representations as computation? We can start with the simpler but fundamental
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issue of whether we should speak of the learning of the sea hare as a syllogism 
and we should try to see this from the point of view of the sea hare. This species 
of creature has evolved into a form such that, in its Normal environment, it can 
Normally cope with the variations of that environment. This is a platitude of 
evolution. For the sea hare, these variations include things which bump it 
around the gill and the creature has a reflex such that bumps cause the gill to 
withdraw. Also, our experiments have shown that we can change the character 
of this reflex to a state change that we can interpret as learning. 'Learning' of 
this kind may or may not have a Normal place in the Normal life of the sea 
hare. If it has, then there will be occasions in the lives of some sea hares when 
some intrusion is blocked by a more sensitive gill withdrawal and the process 
will include a neural modification which we can call 'learning'. If, on the other 
hand, it has not then this capability of learning is a coincident fact about the 
biochemistry of neurons, perhaps a fact which has made the evolution of more 
complex creatures which do 'learn' possible. Whichever of these is the case, the 
creature is not carrying out the syllogism during the experiment. The 
experimenter is carrying out the syllogism, using the neural mechanisms of the 
sea hare as a computer.
If this 'learning' has a place in the life of the sea hare then we could, in a first 
description, describe a token event of this kind in terms of a logical syllogism. 
In a second description, we might also say that the sea hare 'recognised' 
intrusion and had 'learned' to withdraw its gill in response to intrusion. In a third 
description of this event, we could list the causal chain of physical events from 
the first physical contact to the first synaptic stimulation and the way in which 
subsequent physical contacts caused chemical changes in particular neurons 
which in their turn caused changes in the overall reflex. The second and third of 
these descriptions are of the sea hare. The second is in terms of its agency; the 
creature is described in functional terms of perception, representation, which 
includes the syllogism, and action, and its representations include those of items 
which we may describe in our theory as 'irritation' and 'persistence', and action
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for the goal of survival. The third description is of a physical machine that 
realises the functional description of the second. Each of these are instances, 
cuts in possible worlds, from alternative system descriptions of a real sea hare. 
The first description is an interpretation of a sub-process within the cognitive 
processes of a sea hare. By describing this sub-process in these terms we are 
commenting on the fact that by manipulation of the sea hare we could use it as a 
component in a computation.
Alternatively, we could comment that; if we wished to produce an alternative 
realisation of the functional description of this sub-process, then any circuit that 
realised the functions of this syllogism would realise this particular functional 
component. This latter approach is the platform of AI and the approach is not 
belittled by our recognition that it does not describe the organism.16 This sub­
process is a fraction of the complexity of a living sea hare and the simplest 
vertebrates are more complex that the sea hare. If we can demonstrate that 
functional theories of complex cognitive processes really explain behaviour in 
modular terms and if we can demonstrate that these functional theories can be 
interpreted in computational terms then our understanding of these cognitive 
processes will have increased. Such functional characterisation, together with 
neurological investigation, may show the actual physical realisation of this 
computational function to be very similar to a the realisation of a computational 
device; whether analogue or digital, serial or parallel, serially programmed or 
connectionist, which we can actually make and use for computation. But this 
does not imply that the physical embodiment of this process in the living 
organism is a computer.
A living organism may be apt for description in many systems. From the inside 
it can be physically described in terms of cellular mechanisms and boundary 
conditions or functionally described in terms of autopoiesis. From the outside,
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in a system that includes its environment, it can be described in terms of 
physical interactions or the functional characterisation of agency. From the 
outside, a creature with language can be described in a system that includes an 
environment, which includes other members of a linguistic community to which 
it belongs. This latter system will include the customs of the community, some 
of which are to do with language.
Fodor, (1975), said that there is no computation without representation. For 
Fodor, cognition is computational and the representations in such computation 
are explicit representations, interpretable within the language of thought. 
Obviously, boringly obviously, it depends what you mean by 'computation' and 
I have addressed this question. If you define any process, which could be a part 
of a computation as a computational process, then it is reasonable to describe a 
tokening of such a process as a computation. However, the net is too wide. As 
we have seen, many processes that are observed in nature or are Normally part 
of non-computational acts could, given an intervention of external agency, be a 
part of some computation in some context under some interpretation. If as I 
suggest, we define a computation as an intentional act of agency which includes 
an interpretation and a methodology then we should define a computer as a 
machine, with rules for use, picked out by its functional role in a class of 
computational acts. Such acts will be acts of agency.
A biologist demonstrating a syllogism with the neurons of a sea hare may be 
using that neural structure as a computer but it is not a computer for the sea 
hare. In its functional role as a computer for the biologist, particular neural 
states can be said to represent the terms of the syllogism - no computation 
without representation - but this representation is within the computation of the 
biologist for the biologist. It is his intentional acts that apply the shocks and 
observe the behaviour. The solving of the syllogism is only a computation if it
16 A similar point was made by Putnam, (1988)
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is carried out intentionally to get an answer and it may be argued that the 
biologist is only concerned with how the creature protects its gills. But, if the 
biologist describes the neural process as a syllogism then he is describing this in 
computational terms, as illustrated in the table above. If the learning process 
demonstrated by this has a place in the life of the sea hare then a similar token 
neural state may represent a prediction for the sea hare. Within one of our 
possible domains of explanation of the behaviour of the sea hare, we may say 
that the creature learned that this area is bad for gills. Within another domain, 
we may say that this learning is realised in particular neural processes. We 
should only speak of computation or syllogism in this context as a comment on 
the process analogies between the neural processes of an animal and the 
functional processes of a computer.
This distinction goes all the way up. In research into human cognition we may 
find that various computational procedures such as component processes in von 
Neumann machines have analogues in neural cognitive processes. We may also 
find that specific cognitive processes may be explained at the neural level in 
terms of parallel neural networks and such neural processes may find useful 
application in our computing machines. This synergy between biology and 
computing has been extremely productive, both in extending our understanding 
of the neural mechanisms of cognition and extending our competence in 
applying electronic computer technology to complex problems in diverse fields.
The human brain is not a computer for the human who owns it. If, some alien 
intelligence were to use one of us to do his sums by intentionally applying 
stimuli and interpreting the resultant behaviour then that human would be a 
computer for it. If one of us does a piece of mental arithmetic for another then 
some components of her brain are used as a computer by the person who 
specifies the sum and interprets the answer. This distinction cuts both ways. 
The Von Neumann machine we have on our desks may be used as a computer. 
It may also be used for word processing or as a database or as a chess opponent.
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It is a tool, we call it a computer because, historically, that has been its principal 
use.
5.7 Conclusions
A computation is an intentional act of agency; it comprises a sequence of 
processing of representations, at least some of which are conventional because 
their interpretation is an intentional act, inherent within the conventions of the 
computation. Cognition, as in the cognitive processes of agency, is not an 
intentional act. The intentionality of agency depends on the processing of 
intrinsic representations. Cognition is not computation even though, the 
realisation of functionally described modules of neural architecture may be 
procedurally isomorphic to modules, apt for use in computation.
What we commonly call a computer is an artefact with the function of 
computation. A digital computer is a current realisation, using the von 
Neumann architecture, of a Turing machine. Thus any cognitive process, apt for 
description in system terms, can be simulated, to a given degree of accuracy, on 
a digital computer. The human brain or that of any complex mammal may be 
apt for description in system terms. This is hypothesis 2 of section 5, above. If 
this is so then, in principle given sufficient computer power and time and 
knowledge of Normal neural processes, a brain could be simulated on a digital 
computer. However, this does not make the brain a computer. If, some agent 
were to use these computational isomorphisms to solve some class of problems 
by input to and output from the neural mechanisms of a human's brain then that 
brain and the input-output transducers would be a computer for that agent. But 
it would not be a computer for the owner of the brain. Even if that agent were 
the owner of the brain, that brain is not Normally a computer for its owner. If 
the representations within the brain are component representations within a 
computation then they are explicit representations capable of interpretation by 
the computing agent in the context of the computation. In such usage, the
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representations are not intrinsic representations, either innate or caused by 
perceptions of agency, and within the cognitive processes of agency, causing 
action for the agent owner of the brain.
A human agent may carry out a computation using explicit representations of 
number, quantity or proposition and some of these representations may be 
within her brain. It is difficult to imagine any computation in which some 
explicit representation of quantity or procedure is not within a human brain. But 
this does not make the brain a computer or our Normal cognitive processes of 
agency computations. The distinction is between the processing of 
representations within acts of agency, some of which may be computations and 
the processing of representations within the cognitive processes of agency, 
some of which processes may be procedurally isomorphic to some processes of 
computation.
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6
DETERMINISM & AGENCY
6.1 The Problem of Materialism
Some materialists face an apparent dilemma. These are those materialists who 
are concerned to retain their own intuitions of free will, to attribute 
responsibility appropriately to others and accept it appropriately for them. Their 
materialism constrains them to accept the responsibility for our own destiny, 
which is involved in the acceptance that our physical constitution owes no debt 
to any immaterial agency. They believe that the physical world is characterised 
by physical laws, which constrain the possible outcomes of physical events. 
They are concerned that this belief implies that these physical laws determine 
the outcomes with which they are concerned so that these laws negate our 
responsibility for the outcomes of our actions.
My concern in what follows is to attempt to solve this dilemma. This solution, 
as I will argue, comes at a price. If a man's responsibility for his actions is 
bound up with his freedom to choose to act otherwise, then we must distinguish 
between two aspects of the same material entity. I will argue that we can and 
must distinguish between the agent which acts and is causally responsible for its 
own actions and the person who is that agent and who is held responsible within 
a linguistic community for those acts. The person, who holds himself 
responsible for his actions within a conscious narrative of the self, is 
quantitatively the same material entity as the agent which acts and generates 
that conscious narrative. The person held responsible for himself and others is 
the same material entity as the agent which acts in ways that change its future 
agency and that of other agents within the linguistic community.
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This distinction between the agent and the person is not a Cartesian dualism. It 
is a choice between two modes of description of a single material reality. We 
must also distinguish between actual metaphysical freedom and I will hold with 
Hobbs that such freedom can only be construed as an absence of physical 
constraint, and the freedom of a person to choose to develop or degenerate and 
to 'change her mind'. This, latter, 'freedom of the will' is a social construct with 
correctness conditions of attribution within the customs of the community, 
whereas actual metaphysical freedom is a matter of fact apt for ascription of 
metaphysical truth.
I have argued previously that agency is essentially regulatory and thus actions 
of agency can be explained within the theories of cybernetics. Within this 
account, each action of agency can be explained as a unique response to an 
unpredictable event. We human agents live normally within groups, 
characteristics of which include language and the attribution of personal 
responsibility. The customs of attribution of personhood and responsibility are 
social constructs that have evolved within our linguistic communities. I shall 
argue that the physical responsibility of actions of agency is a fact of agent 
cause. I shall also argue that this is compatible with the attribution of 
personhood between human agents who are members of linguistic communities 
and that a component of the attribution of personhood is the attribution of 
personal responsibility.1
Actions of agency are determined and this determinism is not incompatible with 
a freedom of choice which is expressed in the autonomy of the agent to chose 
its response to new events according to its own states, within its own regulatory 
disposition. Actions of the person are actions of agency but the personal
1 Since I am a realist about the realisations o f physical systems this makes me a social realist. 
People are not fictions constructed by our narratives. Their reality lies in the reality o f everyday 
practices o f recognition, blame and praise; by real humans about real humans.
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descriptions of on-going agency include the attribution of personhood to the 
agent recognised by another agent. Within such continuous sequences of 
descriptions responsibility is attributed to the person for actions of agency 
which includes the agent changing over time. Each person within this 
community of attribution is a self-conscious agent. This consciousness includes 
the memories of events and the recognition of self and others by which the 
attribution of personhood and personal responsibility to self and others is 
maintained. This recognition of self and other and the custom of attribution of 
responsibility psychologically entail the feelings of personal responsibility for 
actions of self and feelings of blame or praise for actions of others. As people 
we are taught to choose and we learn to explain our actions of agency as actions 
of choice. These explanations lead to profound intuitions of freedom of choice 
and the existence of these intuitions is compatible with the determination of 
each of our actions by our states at the time of the action and the incident events 
to which we are reacting. From this I shall argue that our intuitions of freedom 
of the will, within our community of personhood, are compatible with the 
determination of our actions by our material states and perceived events which 
includes the actions of ourselves and others.
6.2 The Determinist Debate
Determinism is the view that everything that happens has a cause. Cause is a 
notion of explanation, we seek for a cause to explain an event. If this is all that 
there is to 'cause' then determinism is the view that every event can be 
explained in causal terms. Indeterminists deny this and their denial of this is the 
statement that there are some events whose antecedents do not make them 
necessary. The basic intuitions of indeterminism are that if we are free to 
choose our actions then they must be underdetermined and that determinism 
makes nonsense of moral responsibility. These are cogent considerations and I 
will be concerned to answer them. Compatibilism holds that such causal 
necessitation does not reduce our freedom to choose since, although these
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choices are links in the causal chain, they are themselves freely made. I would 
count my argument as for compatibilism were it not that my use of freedom is 
not the one that compatibilists are concerned to reconcile with determinism.
Galen Strawson, (!986, p. 31) sets out the distinctions:
Incompatibilism holds that the falsity of determinism is a necessary 
condition of freedom. In itself it involves no view about whether 
determinism is true or false, or about whether or not we are free. 
'Libertarianism', by contrast, is the name of a positive 
incompatibilist theory of freedom, one that purports to show that we 
are free and so assumes (or argues) that determinism is false.
I will be concerned to challenge the libertarian thesis since I will argue that an 
ontological commitment to the reification of the concepts of 'freedom of the 
will' and 'freedom of choice' is incompatible with the regulatory determination 
of actions of agency. On his first page, Strawson, articulates the notion of 
freedom that concerns the libertarian and which I am concerned to oppose:
Freedom is now defined in terms of true responsibility, true 
responsibility in terms of desert and desert in terms of freedom.
I will argue that desert is a matter of attribution by a community for actions of a 
person where personhood is also attributed by a community to the on-going 
agent. Real, matter of fact responsibility, for the actions of the agent can only 
be attributed to the real, matter of fact agent at the instant, who acts.
Strawson concludes his account with three reasons why;
"... [We] are not really free and truly responsible agents at all, even if we cannot 
help believing that we are.
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(1) There is a clear and fundamental sense in which no being can be 
truly self-determining in respect of its character and motivation in 
such a way as to be truly responsible for how it is in respect of 
character and motivation.
(2) When we act at a given time, the way we act is, in some quite 
straightforward sense, a function of the way we then are, in respect 
of character and motivation. We act as we act because o f  how we 
are then in terms of character and motivation.
(3) It follows that there is a fundamental sense in which we cannot
be truly responsible for our actions. For we cannot be truly
responsible for the way we are, and we act as we act because of the 
way we are. '2
Strawson grants a special epistemic status to the narrative of the conscious 
person and argues that insistence that our conscious experience of freedom is a 
real freedom in his strong sense would entail a distinction between human and 
theoretical truth. He concludes that the price is too high.
I agree that this price is unreasonable and should not be paid. If we define 
freedom in simple terms of an absence of physical constraint and describe 
attributions of personhood and personal responsibility as social constructs 
within the life of a human linguistic community then actual responsibility 
remains defined as the responsibility of agent cause for its consequences and no 
contradictions arise. Feelings of personal freedom and responsibility are
phenomena, explicable within our theories of the neurological basis of
cognition and the customs of attribution of mind and personhood that have
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evolved within our communities. The price we pay is the distinction between 
the agent at the instant who acts and the on-going person whose personhood is 
continually reattributed by the recognitions and analyses of the conscious self 
and others in the community.
6.3 Cause and Determination
The community is aware that its environment can be described in causal terms 
that include the laws of science. In an earlier age this community attributed 
choice and responsibility to all components of its environment and this has led 
to a dual usage of the term 'cause'. If a stone falls by erosion, blocks a stream 
which floods a village and kills a man then the falling of the stone or the 
blocking of the stream or the flooding of the village can be said to have caused 
the death. If a man kills another from malice or greed then that man caused that 
death, not the swinging of the arm or the cutting of the sword but the act of the 
man. These two examples use two distinct notions of cause. Following our 
usage of, 2.9, above, we may distinguish these as physical cause and agent 
cause.
The modem physics of quantum theory denies that our physical world can be 
fully explained in terms of constant conjunction since, at the level of the very 
small, events may be alternatively described by theories that are mutually 
inconsistent. Thus, a particle may be ascribed a position or a velocity but not 
both and can be described as a wave motion or particle but not both. Also, 
nuclear events occur with probabilities that are independent of any known 
incident cause. For the purpose of this enquiry, I will stay with the causal 
implications of classical physics since this is the backcloth to our normal 
attributions of freedom and responsibility. Also, the distinction between the 
determinate descriptions of classical physics and the indeterminate descriptions
2 Ibid, pp. 311-2
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of quantum mechanics need not effect our attributions of responsibility. If I 
place an enemy for five minutes in a cell containing some element which emits 
a lethal particle according to a Poisson distribution with an average time 
between emissions of five minutes then he has a fair chance of survival. But 
should he die, his death will be as clearly my responsibility as if I had shot him. 
If one of the reasons that caused me to act in some way included a random 
event within my brain then my act of agency was as determined by my states as 
if each had contributed to a determinate causal chain. We may speak with pride 
of serendipitous reasons for our actions but not of risking a fortune on the turn 
of a card. The former opens up new choices and the latter constrains our agency 
but both introduce a random element into our choice of action.
To say that an act is determined is not to say that it is programmed. In its usage 
in human affairs 'programme' implies a programmer: an agent who intentionally 
designed and implemented that programme. Alternatively, we may say of a 
stream of events that they are so patterned that they appear programmed since 
we can predict future events in the stream. In this usage 'programmed' appears 
synonymous with 'determined'. However, as we have seen, the determination of 
an act of agency is not of this kind since the act is determined by the current 
state of the agent and the current state of the world and these are independent, 
prior to an act of agency.
That an event is determined does not imply that it is predictable. We must 
distinguish between predictability for an observer and predictability for an 
agent. A perfect observer, Laplace's all knowing intelligence, may be able to 
predict the actions of every agent. There are cogent arguments from cybernetics 
and quantum mechanics to the effect that this could not be so and that, even if it 
were, nothing could be done with the prediction but this is not to the point. An 
event that requires regulatory choice from an agent is necessarily unpredictable 
for that agent since this is why it requires regulatory choice. The programmed 
act of an agent may have been determined by previous choice of that agent but
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as I have argued previously, it is still a regulatory act. If this choice included 
formal randomisation of the outcome, the randomness of the outcome is 
determined by the choice of the agent, although the actual quantitative outcome 
is not. Thus, within this usage of 'determination' a random event may be 
appropriately described as determined. Since each such choice is determined, 
each act is determined.
Determinism is often opposed to the arbitrary or the random. The thought here 
is that if a stream of events cannot be predicted then some outcomes must be 
arbitrary and the stream of events is then essentially random. The definition of 
randomness is a vexed and difficult issue that I have not space to pursue. What 
is at stake is nearer to the opposed notions of correlation and orthogonality. The 
intuition is that responsible choice must be in some way independent of the 
outer world of events and that this independence will be manifest in 
orthogonality between event and action. Some philosophers have looked for 
this independence in the combinatorial processes of decision. Dennett3 follows 
a hunch of Russell in suggesting that a choice is: " . . .  [A]n intelligent selection 
from what may be a partially arbitrary or chaotic or random production” Some 
aspects of our mental processes may well be random in this way but this is 
speculation and we are looking for an ontological criterion, some reason why 
the very idea of responsible choice implies an orthogonality between event and 
action. Dennett was looking for the right thing but he was looking in the wrong 
place. The orthogonality between event and response is necessary from the 
nature of agency as a regulatory process.
Any unconstrained act of an agent is an act chosen by that agent in response to 
some event. That choice by that agent is determined by that event since it is the 
response of that agent as constituted at that time to that event. Also, that choice
3 "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want" in Dennett, (1981).
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by that agent is determined by the constitution of that agent at that time. Thus 
the response of that agent to that event is determined. Reflex, autonomic and 
integrated acts of an agent are determined by the inherited and developed 
constitution of that agent, which is itself determined by previous causal chains 
in the ontogeny and inheritance of that agent. 'Determinism' is an observer 
concept, belonging in an open system description of the world containing the 
linguistic community of agents in which the terms of freedom and 
responsibility are used. 'Freedom' and 'responsibility' are agent concepts 
belonging in the closed system description of the linguistic community in which 
constraint is an option and responsibility is attributed. Any agent member can 
describe his community in open system terms and recognise its determinism. 
This is totally compatible with his attributions of freedom and responsibility to 
himself and others, including agent members of other species or even his own 
artefacts of regulation in his closed system descriptions of his community from 
his point of view4. This external notion of responsibility is of an epistemic 
responsibility attributed by members of the community in virtue of their beliefs 
about that agent in contrast with the metaphysical notion of responsibility as 
necessarily relating an agent to its acts of choice.
In our explanations of behaviour we distinguish between predictable and 
unpredictable behaviour and we link predictability with determinism and 
unpredictability with autonomy and the freedom of the agent to choose. I 
contend that we should distinguish not between predictability and 
unpredictability of behaviour in the light of events but between the 
predictability and unpredictability of events for the agent. When real choices 
occur we act according to our own nature. We are responsible for these choices 
because they are our choices but each choice can be explained by reference to 
the entity we are at the time of the choice. We are not responsible for being that
4 This is the solution to the dilemma posed by Nagel, (1986) in the words; "We can act only 
from inside the world but when we see ourselves from outside, the autonomy we experience
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entity. To follow that logic leads immediately to regress as it conflates the 
attribution, by an articulate community, of responsibility to one of its members 
with the responsibility for the way that member is. A mother may rear a child in 
ways that inculcate feelings of self-reliance and personal responsibility in the 
person whom that child becomes. That person will be aware of her 
responsibility for her actions and will be held responsible by the community. 
That mother is at least partially responsible for that person. Another mother 
may bring up a child to a lack of feelings of personal responsibility. The 
community will also hold the person whom that child becomes responsible for 
her actions. She may not be aware of her responsibility for her actions but they 
will still be her actions, each determined by events in the world and her current 
agency.
6.4 Regulation
I have previously characterised agency in terms of regulation. Also, I have 
argued that the thick notion of agency that we attribute to ourselves can be 
characterised in terms of complex, integrated, learning and reflexive regulatory 
processes. It is these processes that are realised in the complex mechanisms of 
our brains and it is these mechanisms that realise the functional system of 
perception, combinations of representation, goals and action that describes the 
regulatory theory of agency.
The complex agency that we attribute to ourselves includes our conscious and 
subconscious processes of decision, our reflexive articulation of these to one 
another and ourselves in language and gesture and our co-operation and 
competition with one another. The complexity of the physical processes 
involved are currently beyond our descriptive powers but it is an axiom of this 
thesis that all realisations are physical Another axiom of this thesis, argued for
from inside appears as an illusion, and we who are looking from outside cannot act at all."
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in 3.9, above, is that this thick characterisation of agency is still essentially 
regulatory. This is a thick and complex realisation of regulation. It is within this 
realisation of regulation that each action of a normal human being in a normal 
human community can be described as a component of a regulatory response 
and can be described as determined by the regulatory processes that are realised 
in the human agent.
We are animals and animals react to change perceived. But we are very 
complex animals and our reactions are to complex patterns of perceptions of 
states of affairs; past and present, sensed and learned. I shall use the term 'event' 
as an abbreviation for this complex pattern of perception but every such 'event' 
is assumed to include some phenomenon of change which is relevant to us in 
that it requires some action or chosen inaction by us. An event is a real change 
in a real state of affairs. An event is identified by its location in a causal nexus 
that may include its perception by an agent. An event thus described, is a 
particular.5 A person may choose to examine a state of affairs that may not be 
changing but this act of observation will have been caused. There will have 
been some particular event in which a part of its causal nexus was the 
perception that led, via the cognitive processes of agency, to the choice of this 
act of observation. An act of observation may also be an act of reflex agency as 
a sudden noise may draw the attention.
Within this theory, the cybernetic theory of regulation, especially that 
regulation is essentially counter-entropic, can be applied to the explanation of 
our behaviour in the world. Regulation is counter-entropic because it maintains 
order within the entity against disorder in the world. Order and disorder are 
relative to the agent. Each action of an agent is a response to events in the 
world, perceived by the agent, that are contingent for the agent. Such events 
may or may not be metaphysically contingent. Laplace may have been right and
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all events are predictable for an all knowing intelligence but they are 
epistemically contingent6 for the agent. The decision processes of the agent 
have evolved to produce the action that is best for the agent by the criteria of 
these processes. It is because of the harmony between 'best for the agent' in the 
processes and 'best for the agent' in the world that this sort of entity in this sort 
of community in this sort of world has survived. Because of this harmony the 
regulatory agent can cope with events that are predictable in type, in that the 
processes can cope but are not predictable in token and it is this sort of 
unpredictability that regulation is about. For the agent, each token event could 
have been otherwise in the system that picks out possible worlds of states of 
affairs, relevant for this agent.
Any regulator is in the business of maintaining or achieving some goal state 
against variation in an environment. It is of the nature of regulation that this 
variation should be unpredictable for the regulator. This is what regulation is 
about. If variation is predictable then for any agent designed or evolved, the 
behaviour of the response is programmed. From the humble temperature 
controlled chamber to the guided missile and from the prokaryotic cell to us: we 
are all in the business of regulation. As an example of an artefact of regulation 
without consciousness, consider a guided missile.
Firstly, the missile is equipped with propulsion and steering capability and with 
sensors which respond to such features of its relation to its environment as its 
orientation, wind pressure, obstacles ahead and features of the terrain below. 
Secondly, it is equipped with physical representations of these, features in its 
world, representations of its prime goal of landing on a destination and 
representations of secondary goals such as keeping going and avoiding objects 
ahead, some of which may be intentionally aimed at it. Thirdly, it is equipped
5 This is exactly the characterisation o f events given by Davidson, (1969) and (1970).
6 The notion of'epistemic contingency' was introduced in 3.9, above.
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with devices by which representations are combined to derive actions that are 
appropriate to the situation in the world for the represented goals that have been 
programmed into the missile. All of this design is based on predictable types of 
event which are relevant for this missile with its goals. It is designed as a 
regulator because actual, token events of this type are essentially unpredictable 
for it. If a gust of wind shifts the orientation then the missile will correct. This 
gust of wind was not predicted but from the instant of the gust and its sensing, 
the response of the missile was determined. In the terms of our discussion we 
may say that the missile was responsible for that correction and that it chose to 
correct in that way. There might have been a learning capability in the 
electronics so that the designer could not have predicted the response but it 
would still have been determined for that missile for that event. There may be 
clutter sent by an enemy to confuse the controls. The missile will still be 
responsible for any response that it makes, including one which leads to its 
destruction. If an enemy succeeds in affecting the combinatorial equipment in 
the missile so that its reactions led to self-destruction then this action would still 
be the choice of that missile but it would not be of the same agency. In the 
terms of our previous discussion, this is not now a Normal agent. It, the 
modified agent, is still responsible for what it does; though our judgements of 
that responsibility have changed. If, in the design of this missile, token events 
of wind and debris had been predictable or ignored then the missile would have 
been programmed and its behaviour would not be apt for explanation in terms 
of agency. Had the enemy, by some transmission, converted the regulatory 
arrangements to a programme then, the missile would cease to be an 
autonomous regulator and could not be a responsible cause. Its actions would 
be those of the agency of the enemy.
As with the missile, so it is with us. We have goals; some of these are delegated 
to autonomic functions like breathing and sweating and others are central to the 
self to whom integrated agency and the intentional attitudes are attributed. Of 
these latter, central goals, some are inherited and some are acquired. Many of
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our actions are part of a regulatory response but are programmed within that 
act; as when we ride a bike, drive a car or even chatter amicably. The 
distinction between programme and choice can be a matter of degree. We may 
stop to check a map, consider, choose and drive on and all of this within our 
decision to attend that conference. We are all aware that interwoven with the 
stream of expected events, for which we are programmed, is another stream of 
the unexpected, things that require decision. It is to our response to these 
unpredictable events that the notions of choice and responsibility apply. 
Organisms are programmed as well as regulatory. Each of us is programmed 
from conception for our cellular development and growth and this programme 
is coded in our DNA. A part of this programme is the engineering of our 
various regulatory capabilities, which range from simple reflexes to our ability 
to learn complex strategies for choice in our social world.
Regulation is concerned with response to the unpredictable. If an organism is 
provided with a simple response to an anticipated event then that response is 
programmed by that provision. This is the regulation of reflex rather than the 
regulation of choice. If an organism is prepared to cope with the unexpected 
then it is prepared to choose. There is no hard line between the response of 
choice and the response of reflex. As we vertebrate organisms have evolved in 
neural complexity our regulatory arrangements have evolved into a tangle of 
feed forward and predictive arrangements that defy description in terms of 
functional circuitry, but the simple truths remain. When we are responding in a 
programmed way to predicted events we are not making choices. When we are 
making choices we are dealing with the unpredictable and these choices will be 
for the goals of the agent making them. The goals of the social agent often 
extend beyond the selfish needs of the solitary agent. We are social animals and 
our group behaviour has evolved to include sacrifice for the group or the 
family. The social and inherited conditioning of an adult human has led to a 
concept of goal that is complex but it is for the current goals of a unique adult 
human that its choices will be made. Such choices will be its choices made in
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response to those events, for its goals. They are acts of agency, interpreted as 
choices by a theorist since they could have been otherwise.
6.5 Actions of Agency
Before we consider our responsibility for our actions we should examine what it 
is to be an action of an agent. If we consider the agent as the entity in the skin 
then an action of that entity is any change in the entity which is caused by the 
internal processes of the entity and which causes change in the world o f the 
agent. This is an inclusive definition, the entity to which we attribute agency is 
in the world and it is of the world. Thus, the world of the human agent includes 
the neural structures within which the processes of human agency are realised. 
An act of human agency may be a thought, such as the running through of a 
mnemonic, by which the act of the agent of the present may change the agent of 
the future without any visible change to other members of the community who 
attribute personhood to that agent.
Some of our actions are the result of regulatory processes that are autonomic in 
that they are not normally under our conscious control. We breathe and we 
sweat; we can hold our breath to survive briefly under water but we cannot 
restrain our perspiration. It would seem then that some of our autonomic 
processes are within our conscious control and some are not. In speaking of 
conscious control I am not concerned, with the distinction between our 
conscious and sub-conscious mental processes. I am concerned with the 
distinction between those of our actions that are autonomic within us as 
integrated agents, as the tropisms of a leaf or root are autonomic within a plant 
and those which are actions of the integrated agent. Since I can hold my breath 
the question of my responsibility for my breathing or not breathing can be 
sensibly raised. It may be that we physically hold our breath within a dream. 
Should this happen then it would be the act of the agent though not within the 
narrative of the conscious self. If it is a physiological fact that I cannot start or
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stop perspiring then any agency attributed to this regulatory process is a thin 
autonomic agency and attribution of responsibility is merely a question of 
causal explanation. Other actions are reflexes such as a knee jerk or a blink or a 
sneeze. Again, within this class of actions, we can distinguish those actions that 
we can control or inhibit from those which are autonomic. A knee jerk can be 
inhibited by a separate constraint but is generally not within our control, I don't 
know if I can always control a blink but I do know that, within variable limits, I 
can control a sneeze. It would seem that among our reflex actions, some are 
actions of autonomic agency but some may be sensibly described as actions of 
the integral agent and are therefore, apt for attribution of responsibility to the 
integral agent.
Other actions which may be described as components of autonomic processes 
are the component actions of activities like walking, swimming, cycling, or 
playing a well rehearsed piece on a musical instrument. Each of these activities 
may be initiated by an action of the agent but component actions are so 
habituated that they may be sensibly described as component actions within an 
autonomic process. Again, as with our inherited autonomic processes, the 
distinction can be made case by case and we can distinguish; within those of 
our actions which are components of a practised programme, between those that 
have become autonomic and those that are, at least potentially, acts of the agent. 
For these latter actions, the process can be stopped or restarted and these are 
acts of the agent. How or when we make the distinction is not important, what 
is important is that the distinction can be made.7
Some of our actions may be component actions within plans that we have 
initiated. Within such a plan we expect that an action will lead to some 
consequent event which we will perceive and if this event is 'according to plan'
7 This is close to the argument in Ryle, (1949, II.3)
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then our action will be 'as planned'. A first intuition is that such actions are not 
regulatory since they are not responses of the agent to events contingent for the 
agent. However, just as an act of sneezing is not autonomic since it can be 
inhibited, so our actions within a plan may not autonomic since events may not 
be according to plan. Although an event within a plan may be according to plan, 
it could have been otherwise and its occurrence is epistemically contingent for 
the agent. If the event, as perceived by the agent, is recognised by the learned 
and evolved cognitive processes of agency as requiring further combinatorial 
processing of representations then, in a Normal agent, this processing will occur 
and this may lead to the action of a change of plan. Thus, even within a plan 
proceeding according to plan, actions of an agent should be described as 
regulatory.
The thick notion of agency with respect to plans can be contrasted with the thin 
agency of inborn reflex action and the programmed actions of cycling or 
rehearsed performance. The essence of a programme is that each step 
necessitates the next and since, at least some, of our programmed behaviour 
may be interrupted by an act of conscious agency the distinction between plan 
and programme is vague. But starting and stopping programmes and starting 
and stopping plans are all regulatory at some level or range of levels. I conclude 
that all actions of human agency are regulatory in that they are caused by those 
complex combinatorial processes and those representational states and goals 
that functionally describe this agent. How these functional states and processes 
are actually realised in we humans is a matter of on-going research and debate 
and is not the subject of this thesis. Except, in so far as I rely on the contention 
that this realisation is within a physical stuff, the behaviour of which is, in 
principle, capable of description by the laws of our physical sciences.
If an 'agent acts' within the sense of agency and action that I have identified 
with regulation then this action is this agents response to some event in the 
world. That there is a response is caused by this event but this agent causes this
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response. It is that response which was causally implied by this agent's current 
set of representational states and this agent's current structure as this agent's 
response to this event. In 1971, Davidson posed a dilemma. He wrote: "Either 
the causing by an agent of a primitive action is an event discrete from the 
primitive action in which case we have problems about acts of the will or 
worse, or it is not a discrete event in which case there seems no difference 
between saying someone caused a primitive action and saying he was the 
agent." (1980, p. 52)
Davidson rejected the first horn of this dilemma since the causes of the 
primitive act do not include the agent. Doing is synonymous with agent cause 
although intentional action is physically caused through cognitive processes 
that combine representational states. The second horn does not impale us since 
an agent does not cause an act of agency. Agent cause is synonymous with 
primitive action. As Davidson remarks: "an agent causes what his actions 
cause". Primitive intentional action will generally result in events beyond the 
intention of the act.
Our normal form of speech is to say that an agent acts or that an action was the 
action of an agent. An entity which is a token of the natural kind 'human being' 
is a causal nexus that can be described in different ways and one of these is the 
system description of agency. If a clerk within a university were to write to a 
prospective student on university headed paper, we might say that the university 
wrote to the student. We would not say that the university physically caused the 
letter to be sent, though we would say that consequences of the sending of the 
letter were caused by the action of the university. The clerk caused the letter to 
be sent within the causal nexus of roles and procedures that are described 
within a system description of that university.
All actions of agency are regulatory. Thus, all actions of agency which are apt 
for the attribution of choice can be described as actions chosen by the agent for
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the agent. These actions may be actions of initiation, actions in reaction to the 
unexpected or the default actions that are within an on-going plan. I stipulated 
earlier that action is change of the agent that causes change in the world. But 
this change in the world depends on a world in which such change may occur. 
The agent may choose to act but the act may be constrained. The agent may not 
be free and we need to consider what it is for an agent to be free.
6.6 System Descriptions of the Temporal Agent
The basic functional system of agency comprises perception, representation, 
goals and action. In we humans and in all organisms, this system is realised 
entirely in physical components and all processes are physical processes. This is 
the naturalistic stance. It is an axiom of this thesis. An action of an agent is an 
action of that agent at the time of that action and is determined by the states of 
that agent at the time of that action. If those processes by which the action is 
determined are internally constrained in then any such constraint is a physical 
state of the agent at that time and is therefore an attribute of that agent. If we 
construe freedom as an absence of constraint and we attribute agency to the 
corporate entity that acts then, we cannot sensibly speak of freedom of an agent
Q
in terms other than the lack of Hobbsian physical constraint on action.
If we question whether, under some characterisation of agency, an agent can be 
described as free to choose then we must distinguish between the freedom of 
the agent and the freedom of the choice. We may postulate some state of the 
agent, say the last representation prior to action as his choice and the other 
states of the agent as having come to that choice. If we somehow affect these 
other states so as to restrict their power to affect this state of choice then we
8 Peter van Inwagen, (1989), argues that, in the classical philosophical usage o f 'free will1 our 
wills are at most very rarely free and that this does not imply that they are ever free at all. My 
arguments o f the preceding paragraph conclude that statements about o f  will and its freedom  
are phenomena o f practices that have evolved within a linguistic community.
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have changed the agent. This change may be more or less permanent. It may be 
possible to remove from an agent the power to decide. This may or may not be 
reversible but at the time of inaction this agent is an agent that does not act 
because the combinatorial processes by which action is normally chosen do not 
converge or in the terms of another theory, 'it can't make up its mind'. The 
community may identify this agent by continuity of external features but the 
agent who acted was the agent existent at the time of the action or inaction. At 
any time there is only one actual, physical agent but this agent is in the 
environment, which includes other members of the linguistic community. Any 
system description of agency will be an abbreviation, since no finite description 
could include all of the alternative events and their effects on the states of the 
agent that will determine his actions. We may choose from various alternative 
descriptions of an agent, not physically constrained.
(i) We may describe the agent as instantaneously constant in its physical states 
so that the counterfactuality of the occurrent system will relate to some range of 
possible events. Outcomes will be possible actions that are the responses of this 
agent at this time to these events. In this system, the actions of the agent in 
response to unforeseen events are determined by the physical states of the 
agent. The agent is free to act since it is not constrained. Its actions are the 
actions of this agent and it is this agent which causes events by action and it is 
this agent causation that is responsible for the consequences of such action.
Within a token system of this type a state of affairs perceived by the entity will 
be described as leading to an action. However, an observer may say that the 
agent will 'choose' an action and that what the agent does is the agent's choice. 
For the observer, within this system description of the agent in an environment, 
the agent could act alternatively since the agent is not constrained and the agent 
could have been otherwise. Some of the actions of the agent at the instant may 
be such as to change the agent in the future. Each such action will be apt for 
explanation in terms of perceptions, representations and goals at that time. The
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current goals of agency may or may not be consistent with the future health or 
welfare of the agent in the future but it is the agent at the instant that acts.
(ii) We may describe the agent over some period of time and characterise the 
agent by his physical states at the start. The counterfactuality of the system will 
relate to the changes of the agent that will result from events in the environment 
and from his actions that are responses to events in the environment. Also his 
actions will change the environment and thus influence the subsequent events to 
which he will respond. This description will include the conscious self of the 
agent, which may also observe and describe those aspects of agency available 
to consciousness in both narrative and system terms. Each action of this on­
going agent can be described in the terms of the first description, each action of 
the agent described in the first description will change the agent in the future 
and will be described in the narrative descriptions of the on-going agent. Thus, 
the on-going agent is determined by the actions of the agent at the instant and 
the agent at that instant is free, although its character and dispositions which 
determine its decisions are, at least in part, determined by past actions 
attributable to the on-going agent. The agent becomes but what it is that 
becomes is the on-going agent described. It is the agent at the instant that acts 
and we should not confuse the determination of its acts by its current character 
and dispositions with the constraint of an agency external to the evolving agent. 
To use 'freedom of the agent' as an absence of some past determination is to 
confuse 'freedom' which is a lack of physical constraint with the absence of 
some determination of the agent by its past.
We humans have consciousness. How this works is not known, although 
Dennett, (1991) has given us a plausible explanation. We share with one 
another, in language, our experience that when consciously faced with 
alternatives we are conscious of our 'choosing'. In our conscious experience we 
are aware that we could act alternatively. Our descriptions to others and 
ourselves of such experiences may be narrative or system. We may end a
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narrative with a phrase like ' ...and this is what I chose to do'. Also, we may 
consciously describe ourselves in system terms and it is in such descriptions 
that we attribute to ourselves the power to choose.
(iii) We may describe the linguistic community, which includes the agent. In 
such a description we will include other agent members of the community 
whose actions affect the agent and those members of the community whose 
actions describe the agent in both narrative and system terms. To say an agent is 
describing herself or another in narrative and system terms may not be to 
attribute any articulate complexity of description. We all commonly make 
statements like; 'I wonder what he will do about X since I know that he likes Y' 
or 'I wonder what X will do to Y'. We may also ponder in terms like: 'what shall 
I do about X given that I like Y', without giving much thought to the 
counterfactuals involved and distinguish these from narrative descriptions of 
what somebody did. Within a system we may describe how the community, 
which includes the agent, will, either separately or collectively, attribute 
responsibility to the on-going agent that they describe. Within the customs of 
the community and its concepts, denoted by terms in the language in which the 
on-going agent is described, the responsibility attributed by the community is 
made normative. An agent may be described as responsible, in that 
consequence appears to have been considered before action or irresponsible if it 
does not so appear. It is within this system that we can describe how the 
customs of the community may include punitive or rewarding behaviour toward 
agents and the criteria by which the community attributes personhood to its 
members. It is within this system that we can describe the community 
questioning its own attributions of responsibility to people and debating 
whether determinism, freedom and responsibility are compatible.
Within the linguistic community, we attribute responsibility to agents in terms 
of their choice, which we attribute synonymously with the attribution that they 
could have acted otherwise. This attribution of the power to choose, that he
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could have acted or could act otherwise is an attribution of choice to the on­
going agent as identified by the community. This usage in our communities is 
not unambiguous. If we are aware of a rationale for the agent, which we expect 
him to find compelling, we may say that he could not have acted otherwise. 
This inconsistency does not mean that the agent has no power to choose, we are 
drawing attention to our deduction that this rationale makes his action more 
predictable for us; it has reduced the contingency in our description of this on­
going agent in this environment.
6.7 The Person in the Community
We may describe a community as comprised of autonomous agents, animals 
like us, who are bonded by the social customs of the community, which include 
a spoken and written language. This system also includes an environment, the 
events of which, members can partially control and partially predict. Each of 
these people is an animal with an inherited repertoire of biological drives such 
as fear, lust and anger and these are denoted by terms in the language. Content 
that is associated with the customs of the community may be denoted by such 
terms as desire, belief, responsibility, choice and freedom and these become 
concepts possessed by members of the community. Other content is of features 
of the world for the community and this are described by propositions using 
concepts. Also, each of these people is an animal with a repertoire of goals. 
Some of these are inherited, such as staying alive and finding a mate, some are 
acquired through interactions within the community. Some are articulated in 
propositions using concepts denoted by terms in the language.
One practice of such a community is the attribution of belief. Such attribution is 
associated with the exposure of a member to perceptions of states of affairs in 
the world or exposure to communication about such states of affairs, which he 
may be expected to take as reliable indications of the truth of the proposition 
denoting that state of affairs. Another practice of the community is that of
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occasionally restraining members from action by force or edict and the 
community recognises that accidents of the environment may also restrain 
action. Thus, they may say of a member not so restrained that he is free to act 
although, in this attribution they are not distinguishing between the freedom of 
the agent and the implications of a perceived edict for an agent's choice of 
action.
Just as the community attribute belief to members because of their observed 
perceptions and freedom because of their lack of physical restraint, so they 
attribute responsibility to members on account of their observed actions. This 
attribution is based on the appreciation that the response of a free agent to an 
event is his unique response to that event. Within the community, an agent 
member can be described in terms of a unique set of goals and perceptions, 
which lead to the attribution of a unique set of desires and beliefs. Not all of 
these goals and perceptions are consciously available to the agent or other agent 
members. Some are inherited and some are forgotten. Those not articulated are 
private to the individual. Each agent can be attributed any of a denumerable 
infinity (denumerable as they are logically derived from a finite base) of desires 
and beliefs that are logical consequences of those which are apt for attribution 
because of goals and perceptions that are acquired or inherited.
A human community is comprised of people and it is as persons, that members 
of a community attribute responsibility to one another. The concept of a person 
is distinct from the concept of an agent. Locke says that "person is a forensic 
term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent 
agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery. This personality extends 
itself to what is past, only by consciousness-whereby it becomes concerned and
accountable."9 This is close to my distinction between the on-going person to
9 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 1, XXVII, 26
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whom responsibility is attributed and the actual responsibility of the agent at the 
instant. The Lockean account was opposed by Bernard Williams, (1973), on the 
grounds that false memories can be engendered. For Williams, personhood is 
supervenient on physical continuity. Parfit, (1984), questioned whether bodily 
continuity is adequate since a baby is initially of the same flesh as its mother 
and a person can be physically reduced without loss of personhood. Parfit 
concluded that personal identity is unimportant and that what is important is the 
normative nature of personal continuity. I will argue that personhood is a matter 
of attribution and that normativeness is within the practices of the community.
Dennett, (1976) gave six conditions for personhood. In order of dependence, 
these are:
(i) that persons are rational beings,
(ii) that persons are beings to which states of consciousness are 
attributed or to which psychological or mental or intentional 
predicates, are ascribed,
(iii) that attributions of personhood depend in some way on the 
stance adopted to it,
(iv) that attributions of personhood are reciprocal, people attribute 
personhood to others,
(v) that persons are capable of verbal communication,
(vi) that persons are self conscious in a way that they share.
The first three of Dennett's conditions almost amount to the forgoing 
characterisation of agency. Dennett's insistence on the intentional stance is
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famous but it does not contribute to this analysis. If, as Dennett argues and I 
agree, an intentional system will Normally behave in a way which is rational in 
the context of its intentional predicates, then rationality is a component of 
intentionality. If an entity is apt for description as an intentional system then 
that description will be the act of an observer. It is this act of description that 
Dennett describes as 'taking the intentional stance' but the entity is prior to its 
description. We are talking here about real entities, which may be described in 
various ways. An entity will be apt for description in a particular system 
whether or not such a description is articulated. The agency of an agent is prior 
to its membership of a community or its description as an agent by members of 
that or any other, community. Using the methodology of system description we 
can rephrase Dennett's first three conditions as follows.
Necessary conditions for the attribution of personhood to an entity 
by other members of a linguistic community include, that the 
members of the community recognise the agency of that entity. This 
condition implies that the entity be apt for system description as an 
agent and that this description be made and used by members of the 
community.10
This condition, together with Dennett's remaining conditions, amount to a 
definition of a linguistic community in terms of its criteria for membership and 
could be rephrased:
A human linguistic community is a social group of human beings 
who are agents with self-consciousness. Customs of the group 
include participation in a common language, which includes 
articulation of self-consciousness and recognition of other members
10 Though not in the technical usage of Chapter 2.
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by their agency and articulate self-consciousness. The term used 
reflexively within the group to name the social kind picked out by 
this custom is ’person'.
Described in this way, necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood are 
contingent on the customs of the linguistic community, which in their turn, will 
depend on the physical constitution of the members. Another custom of human 
linguistic communities is the attribution of 'responsibility'. Responsibility is 
attributed for the consequences of actions of members. Thus responsibility for 
the consequence of an action is attributed to a person. The self-identity of the 
person and the identity of the person for the community are within the system 
descriptions of the agent by the agent and of the agent by other members of the 
community. Each of these is of a continuous on-going entity described in 
factual and counterfactual terms. But actions of agency are actions of that agent 
at that time and will be determined by the states of that agent at that time. Such 
actions of agency may include actions, which change the agent in the future. 
The system description of the agent, which exists in principle though not 
available to the community in practice, will include in its counterfactual terms 
the possibility of actions which change the agent in the future by internal 
deliberation or external consultation. The person for the community or the 
person for the self-conscious agent is an on-going entity whom they recognise 
and their recognition will be of a sort of running average of the changing agent. 
Because of these distinctions 'responsibility' has at least three senses.
(i) The responsibility of the agent at the instant is the basic fact of 
agent cause. Just as a stone that falls into a stream is responsible for 
the flooding of a village so an agent who releases a brake is 
responsible for deaths caused by a runaway vehicle. Agent cause is 
distinct from external physical cause in that it is determined by the 
regulatory actions of agency.
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(ii) Responsibility attributed to a person by other people is for those 
events caused by actions of the agent recognised as a person. 
However, responsibility is attributed by people to a person and this 
person is recognised as an on-going agent responsible not only for 
his actions of agency that effect others but also for those actions of 
agency that effect his future self
(iii) As each agent attributes responsibility to others so each agent 
attributes responsibility to himself. Attribution is itself a conscious 
act of agency which is determined by incident events and the 
current states of the agent. Thus, although members of the 
community may differ in their attribution of responsibility to a 
person and may or may not reach a consensus within the institutions 
of the community, such attribution is distinct from the responsibility 
consciously attributed by an agent to the person whom he 
recognises as himself.
For each human agent, the self of consciousness is the awareness, more or less 
articulate, of the current instant and this awareness will include the currently 
consciously remembered past. The continuity of this self for the self-conscious 
agent lies in the continuity of memory. This self is continuously changing but in 
a continuous process of change in which each self, as it is, is a change from the 
previous self, as it was. The self of consciousness is more or less aware of its 
responsibility for its actions and these may be actual actions of the agent or 
actions imagined. The current self experienced in consciousness is determined 
by current and previous states of the body, including the neural system, some of 
which are immediately caused by events in the world. This is the conscious self 
of Dennett, (1991). Dennett offers an explanation of what is going on within us 
when we produce, for others, or ourselves a description of what we thought, 
felt, heard or did. In his words,
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"ur tales are spun, but for the most part we don't spin them; they 
spin us. Our human consciousness and our narrative selfhood, is 
their product, not their source. These strings or streams of narrative 
issue forth as i f  from a single source ... their effect on any audience 
is to encourage them to (try to) posit a unified agent whose words 
they are, about whom they are; in short to posit a centre of narrative 
gravity, (ibid, p. 418)
Just as the self of consciousness is continuously changing so the person, 
identified by the community and to whom this self is attributed, is changing. 
This, also, is a continuous process in which each state is a development from 
the previous state. This process of change is recognised by the community and 
the identity of the person for the community is maintained by the continuity of 
the person in the conscious memories of the member agents and the text of their 
records. Similarly, the identity of the self for the self is maintained by its 
continuity of the self in the memories of agent and the text of his records. 
Although we may separately describe a self and a person, these are two 
descriptions of one entity, which may also be described in terms of agency.11
6.8 Attributions of Freedom
An animal is free if it is unconstrained. We are free in so far as our actions by 
which we manifest our choices are unconstrained. If I have chosen but my 
choice has been made in the light of my knowledge of statutory laws then my 
choice was not constrained. My knowledge of the law and its consequences are 
among my representational states at the time of the action. If I have chosen but 
my actions are constrained, say by tying my hands or removing paper and
11 McCall, (1990, 7), makes this point clearly: " ... there exists only one ontological entity, a 
biological social and self conscious being, this entity is thought o f and conceived in different 
ways. The terms person, self and human being, when referring to the concepts or ways of
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pencil from my cell then I am not free to act. Such lack of freedom is an aspect 
of the situation and not an aspect of the agent. The choice of the agent, to which 
we attribute responsibility, is free in so far as it is unconstrained. This choice is 
determined by the events to which it is a response and the representational 
states at that time of the agent who chose. The distinction between choice and 
action would be described in counterfactual terms such as: he would have acted 
thus had his hands not been tied. An action may be made predictable by a 
constraint but the choice, what the agent would have done, is unpredictable in 
so far as it is a reaction to an event, which was unpredictable for that agent. 
Although that choice was determined by that event and the current states of that 
agent.
I shall hold axiomatically that an agent is not free to act if it is physically 
constrained and that this is all that there is to freedom. Physical constraint may 
be intentional, as when one agent restrains another or it may be accidental as 
when a man is trapped by a fallen tree. The act of constraint will be the act of 
an agent and the constraint will be caused by that agent and may be held to be 
the responsibility of that agent. An accidental constraint will be an accidental 
cause and the notion of responsibility does not arise. Without such constraint an 
agent is free. This is Hobbe's notion of liberty, set out most clearly by Locke, 
who wrote:
[T]hat liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring; but 
to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do,
19according as the mind shall choose or direct.
conceiving an individual have different, distinct meanings." In the terminology o f this thesis 
they are component concepts in different system descriptions that include the same entity.
12 Book 1,XXI, 10
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Locke went on to argue that "liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to 
agents, and cannot be an attribution or modification of the will, which is also 
but a power." This may be regarded as a very weak notion of freedom but any 
extension of this notion is incompatible with my account of agency. Given this 
account, the extension of the notion of freedom beyond that of physical restraint 
on the power of the agent to act on the world is incoherent.
6.9 Attributions of Choice
Agency is concerned with perception and action. Simple realisations of agency 
such as; unicellular organisms, simple artefacts of control and the components 
of plants, act in a way which can be reliably predicted by an observer who 
understands the mechanisms of agency and can measure and interpret variations 
of the environment as it is for the agent. Such actions of agency are by the agent 
and are for the agent. They are determined by the events in the environment and 
the states of the agent. They may be predictable for an observer in virtue of the 
transparency of the mechanisms of agency. We would not normally speak here 
of the agent choosing to act in this way since we know that; although for the 
agent, the event and response are unique events of agency; for the observer, the 
event and response are programmed by the mechanisms involved. The observer 
can choose the action by her choice of stimulus. However, each Normal action 
of agency is an act of choice of the agent since the events perceived are 
epistemically contingent for the agent.
In more complex realisations of agency such as the higher vertebrates, the 
octopus or complex artefacts of regulation such as a learning robot, the 
mechanisms of agency are no longer transparent. Actions of agency are still 
determined by the states of the agent and events in the environment but the 
observer cannot now choose actions of agency. If this were an artefact we 
would normally say that choice has been delegated to the agent. If this were an 
organism we would normally say that the organism has the power to choose.
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Since outcomes are essentially unpredictable for the observer the observer must
say of each action that; for him, the observer, the agent could have acted
otherwise. Choice, on this interpretation, is a modal notion and is linked to the
modal 'can'. Taylor, (1966, 40-56), denies that the 'can' of human agency is
1 ^merely a matter of epistemic contingency. He concludes that: "what is meant 
by 'can' in: 'I can move my finger' is that it is something 'within my power'."
Taylor defines epistemic contingency in terms of the knowledge of the agent. In 
this context, I am describing the agent in system terms and the contingency that 
I describe is epistemic for the agent, described in that system. The idea that 
something is 'within my power' is an idea articulated within the stream of 
consciousness of a conscious agent and belongs in another system description 
to which I shall return. Choice is attributed within a system description of 
agency in which the agent can not be manipulated by the observer and is 
implied by the autonomy of the agent.
Most complex animals can be described as making choices. When in discourse 
we comment on such choosing we can without any anthropomorphism attribute 
the responsibility for that action to that animal and thus attribute the 
responsibility for that choice to that animal. This is not to suggest that each 
animal is self-consciously aware of having made that choice. Our attribution of 
choice to ourselves is within our description of ourselves as agents and it is 
within that description that we are aware of our power to act. If, for the reasons 
previously given, we attribute agency to other creatures then our attribution of 
choice to them is within the functional description of agency. If as agents, we 
act, then as agents, we choose and those choices for which we wish to consider 
the attribution of responsibility are those which are in response to the 
unpredictable in our lives. Other complex creatures, such as dogs, cats and our 
anthropoid cousins, display individual personalities and it is with reason that we
13 Authors italics.
217
hold them responsible for their actions but we cannot tell whether they hold us 
responsible for ours. Each of these creatures, like us, displays a range of reflex 
behaviours, which can be distinguished from the behaviour of choice, which is 
manifest in its reaction to complex challenges of the world. A cat that decided 
to go out on a wet night rather than soil the house and Buridan's ass had a 
choice to make. Where we differ from other animals is in our social articulation 
of our notions of free will and responsibility and this is based on our 
articulation of our sense of self to others and ourselves within the customs of 
our linguistic communities.
Three senses of 'choice' emerge from our three system descriptions of the 
temporal agent. These appear similar in content but they are in distinct domains 
and should not be conflated.
(i) An observer, considering an open system description of an agent, is 
concerned with a metaphysical notion of counterfactuality associated with the 
agent system. When he says 'the agent chose' as a synonym for 'the agent could 
have acted otherwise' he is describing in system terms the variety of outcomes 
that are contingent on the current states of the agent. We could say that he is 
describing the possible worlds accessible from the actual world prior to the 
action, in the absence of detailed knowledge of the states of the agent.
(ii) An observer considering a system description of a conscious linguistic agent 
will describe the agent subject as describing his conscious experience in the 
vocabulary that he has learned within the linguistic community. During this 
learning, he will have been offered choices say, between sweets and treats. He 
will have learned that his decisions may have consequences. His narrative 
account of conscious choice will be in concepts learned by observation of his 
and other agents, action and consequence that he has learned to call 'an act of 
choice'. This is a pre-scientific account but it must be in some way like this that 
we learn to choose and master the concept of choice.
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(iii) The community usage of 'choice' will be close to that of the conscious 
agent since they are in the same language game. The attribution of choice 
within a linguistic community is a custom of the community. In a system 
description of a linguistic community we would include the practice of 
attributing choice to an agent as, in the description of an agent, we attribute 
choice to an agent. In the description of an agent we are describing that agent as 
it is now. The can in the counterfactual account derives from the contingency 
associated with this agent, here and now. In the description of the community 
we will also include the customs of the community, which include the 
attribution of the on-going identity of personhood to each agent member. For 
the community, 'what a person can do' will be taken over time. The person who 
has chosen to become depraved could have acted previously so as to become 
otherwise and in the eyes of the community, is the person who executed a 
depraved act. According to the customs of the community, this person should 
have not executed this depraved act but this person chose to act in this way and 
could have chosen otherwise.
6.10 Attributions of Responsibility
The responsibility attributed to an agent is a relation between an event and an 
agent. The attribution will be by an agent about an event and an agent. I will 
take it as a matter of definition that an event is the responsibility of an agent if 
and only if that event was physically caused by an intentional action of an 
agent. If an action is the action of an agent then it is the action of that agent at 
that time. This is a metaphysical notion of responsibility and it derives from the 
epistemic notion of contingency which I have described above, It is a matter of 
causal explanation of a regulatory response, no different in kind from the
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autonomic action of perspiration14 though enormously more complex in degree. 
It is distinct from the legal practice of holding a person responsible for those 
consequences of an action that he or she should reasonably have foreseen. 
Within this notion of agent responsibility, an agent is causally responsible for 
the results of unforeseeable actions of its offspring but not intentionally 
responsible. An act of agency is by definition intentional. Whether specific 
consequences of the primitive action15 lie within that intention is determinable 
by reference to the theory of agency that explains that action.
This strict restriction on the temporality and autonomy of agency has important 
implications, (i) If an agent is aware of edicts which penalise certain actions but 
he is physically free to act then his action, whatever it is, as an un-programmed 
action of choice in response to an event, is his action of choice and he is 
responsible for that action, (ii) If an agent is radically but temporarily changed 
by ingestion of some substance, such as alcohol or a truth drug, then it is this, 
changed agent who has acted and that choice of that action is the responsibility 
of that agent at that time. The responsibility for the ingestion of the substance 
may be of that agent if he imbibed the alcohol freely or of another if the truth 
drug was administered by force. Subsequently, the recovered agent may be 
judged by the community, which includes himself, as to his desert16. 
Responsibility for the act cannot logically be separated from the agent who 
chose the act. The acts of administering a drug or encouraging the consumption 
of alcohol are the acts of agents who are responsible for their choice of these 
acts, (iii) If an agent is changed permanently by physical or psychological 
trauma, as by brain damage or brain washing then it is still this, changed, agent
14 The odour o f perspiration is the responsibility o f  the thin autonomic agency o f the body's 
cooling system. The use or not o f a deodorant is the responsibility o f the thick and complex 
agency to which personhood is attributed.
15 This is Davidson's, (1971), usage of the term.
16 The custom o f the community is to attribute responsibility to the on-going agent and judge 
desert according to the contribution to consequence or the state o f the on-going agent, by 
accident or the actions o f other agents.
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who is responsible for his acts. The community may have sympathy for the 
agent, anger with the agent who caused the trauma and mourn the loss of the 
agent gone. However again, responsibility for an act cannot be logically 
separated from the agent who chose the act. I am not, in this thesis, considering 
the theory of justice or desert, which I see as separate issues from freedom and 
responsibility, (iv) If an agent is hypnotised and instructed by the hypnotist to 
carry out acts without the intention of the agent then these acts are the acts of 
the agent hypnotist. The system that describes these acts must include the agent 
hypnotist, the means of communication and the passive agent whose body is 
being used as well as the environment in which the acts are performed, (v) An 
agent can choose to change his future self. The actions resulting from that 
choice are the responsibility of that agent at that time. The future agent will be 
responsible for his actions as and when he acts, (vi) An agent can act to change 
another as when a mother encourages a child to face the consequences of its 
own actions with the intention of producing an adult aware of its responsibility 
for its own actions. The mother is responsible for the consequences of her 
actions as the future adult will be responsible for his. An adult, not so trained, 
may not be aware of its responsibility for the consequences of its actions but it 
is still responsible as that agent at that time which acted with that intention.
People attribute personal responsibility to people. The act of attributing 
responsibility is an act of agency and that agent at the instant that acted is 
responsible for the consequences in the world of that attribution. Normally, 
personal responsibility is attributed to a person who is recognised by the
1 7attributer as that agent who is that person. Attributions of responsibility may 
have consequential implications through the community; A attributes
17 In the aberrant case of multiple personality an observer may attribute responsibility between 
separate people whom he distinguishes within one body. At any time there is one agent who 
acts and metaphysical responsibility rests with that agent. This metaphysical responsibility can 
be distinguished from the responsibility, epistemic for an observer, attributed by that observer 
to a person identified by that observer.
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responsibility to B for the consequences of his attributing responsibility to C for 
the consequences of C's action. A, B and C are each people who have each 
acted and each of these actions have been actions of agency with consequences 
in the world for which these agents are responsible. When we speak of a person 
as 'personally responsible' we are drawing attention to the identity between the 
person and the agent in the context of an event which is the consequence of an 
action either in prediction or in actuality. In all of these events of attribution of 
personal responsibility the attributions are acts of agency and each attribution is 
within a system description of that human being as a person who is an on-going 
agent.
6.11 Spontaneity and Responsibility
Some writers hold that the spontaneity of human choice stems from the 
rationality of human nature. Kant wrote, and McDowell, (1994, p. 4) has 
quoted:
If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations 
in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, 
then the mind power of producing representations from itself, the 
spontaneity of knowledge should be called the understanding. Our 
nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than 
sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected 
by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think 
the object of sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither of 
these powers may preference be given over the other. Without 
sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no 
object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind.
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For Kant and for McDowell, it is from this spontaneity of knowledge that 
rational decision stems. In McDowell's words:
When Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity, 
that reflects his view of the relation between reason and freedom: 
rational necessitation is not just compatible with freedom but 
constitutive of it. In a slogan, the space of reasons is the realm of 
freedom.
McDowell's concern is to show that spontaneity is a human faculty, a second 
nature which is developed with language by the normal human conditioning to 
rational behaviour. This he calls Bildung (ibid, p. 84). His argument goes 
something like this. We know that we are free or at least, this is our 
fundamental intuition. We know that we are rational and we ascribe the 
effectiveness of our rationality as responsibility for our actions. If a rational 
agent is responsible for her actions then these actions stem from her, from her 
understanding and her rationality. They have not been caused by external agents 
within some causal, law-like structure. They arise spontaneously, from her. 
Hence the hypothesis that her exposure to the processes of Bildung have 
enabled this spontaneity. McDowell, in company with Davidson, (1982), but for 
different reasons, rejects the suggestion that other animals beside man may 
posses any of these characteristics. Davidson rejects the notion that other 
animals may have beliefs since without language they have no concepts. For 
McDowell, second nature evolves out of first nature, which we share with other 
animals, but only man develops this second nature. In Part IV of the Afterword 
to his six lectures McDowell is at pains to deny just Kantian spontaneity to 
dumb animals. He freely admits that cats and dogs are not automata but states 
that the freedom they lack is the freedom that consists in potentially reflective 
consciousness to putative norms of reasoning.
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McDowell is making two distinctions and each of these extends the usage of an 
everyday word into a complex conceptual holism, which is some way from its 
ordinary usage. Freedom is now not just a lack of constraint on action but a 
freedom that consists in potentially reflective consciousness to putative norms 
of reasoning. Spontaneity is now; not just an original response, though 
predetermined by current events and current agency, but a response that 
depends on understanding within a conceptual structure. Each of these extended 
definitions depends not just on language, but also on the metalanguage of 
reference to text.
I agree with McDowell that obedience to putative norms of reasoning by an 
agent requires understanding of these norms and this requires reference to the 
text in which such norms are held. However, a child who has recognised that 
turning knobs is wrong is no more and no less, responsible for so doing than a 
cat which has recognised that jumping on beds is wrong. McDowell would say, 
and I would agree that a person who can knowingly articulate their 
responsibility for turning knobs has entered the space of reasons. But, the child 
and the cat are still free in that each, may or may not, act against their 
conditioning. None of us finds any inconsistency in blaming the child or the cat 
for the resultant mess, though our behaviour may be influenced by the ages of 
the child and the cat.
What emerges from this is that Kantian freedom and spontaneity are social 
constructs. In early language, we learn what is or is not permitted. Before or 
without, language we act and observe the consequences of our actions. As fully 
practising members of a linguistic community we can speak of responsibility 
and share with others our articulations of our responsibility for our actions. This 
is McDowell's second nature but he speaks of acquiring a second nature as: " ... 
having ones eyes opened to reasons at large." (ibid, p. 84) In this usage, it is by 
the recognition of our responsibility that we are responsible and by the 
recognition of our rationality that we are rational and this would seem at risk of
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leading to an infinite regress. This regress may be avoided by the suggestion 
that our rationality is acquired step by step with our acquiring the ability to 
recognise and articulate it. This is an empirical question and research may 
answer it. My account, above, is an alternative approach by which we can 
restore simplicity to our notions of freedom and spontaneity and retain a baldly 
naturalistic account of us in our world.
We are rational animals in so far as our behaviour is rational. Each action of 
any animal is its response to some situation. This situation may be more or less 
complex. It may be a dog's response to a cat climbing a tree, it may be a child's 
response to a car arriving at the time Daddy comes home or it may be an adult 
person's response to a letter from the bank. The dog may bark at the tree, the 
child may run to whoever gets out of the car, the adult may decide to sell the car 
or pack his bags and run away. Each of these responses is that of a rational 
animal. The action may be more or less rational; the dog may be barking up the 
wrong tree, the child may run up to a salesman, the adult may even have 
misread the bank statement. We, in the linguistic community, will assign 
responsibility to the adult because he is a fully-fledged member of the linguistic 
community who has had training in money. The community has judged that 
person as responsible and that person knows that this is so. These are the 
practices of this community. It is this and many other social practices that 
define this community. The dog had spontaneity and freedom, there were 
pressures on it to chase that cat and bark but there was no strict, deterministic 
law in virtue of which it could be predicted. The child did not have to run to the 
car: it did because it chose to. We can analyse this singular event and explain 
this running but it was the child’s choice; not one the child might choose to 
explain, except as; "I thought it was Daddy".
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6.12 Conclusions
If determinism is the thesis that every event has a cause then; within the domain 
of classical physics and given the distinction between the causes of events, 
which are epistemically contingent for an agent and the responsible cause 
which is an action of agency, the truth of determinism is self-evident. If 
determinism is the thesis that; given full knowledge of a situation then from the 
laws of science, again within classical physics, the outcome is predictable then 
again I agree, since the response of an agent to an event is given by the 
combination of this agent and this event. Although, in a material world the 
observer will be a regulatory agent and his world is epistemically unpredictable 
for him. Although its outcome is predictable, the event is unpredictable. If 
determinism is the thesis that all events are predictable then I hold that this is 
false, since an agent is a regulator and the regulatory response of an agent is to 
events that are epistemically unpredictable for this agent.
Within the above definition of determinism if an agent is free to act then the 
actions of that agent are free since this is all that is meant by freedom. If an 
agent is mentally changed but left free to act then the actions of this agent are 
still free but it is a different agent since it has been changed. Strawson, (1986), 
in his opening paragraph, defines 'free' in "... the ordinary strong sense of the 
word. According to which to be a free agent is to be capable of being truly 
responsible for one's actions". I think that Strawson's usage is less natural and 
more problematic than my own but each usage is coherent. My use of freedom 
is in the tradition of Hobbes, Locke and Hume. This usage is resilient to 
arguments of agent change since, such changes modify the agent but leave him 
free unless constrained.
If incompatibilism is the thesis that determinism and freedom are incompatible 
then in the terms of the above definitions, I am a compatibilist. If libertarianism 
is opposed to compatibilism then I hold that libertarianism is false but the
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central tenet of libertarianism that we are free to choose is true within my usage 
of'freedom' and my usage of'choice'.
Whether responsibility depends on rationality depends on the community 
notions of responsibility and normality. A Normal agent will behave rationally 
in that its actions are a rational response for it to events that are relevant for it in 
the world. An agent may be abnormal in that its capacity for rational response is 
defective. How the community judges the responsibility of agents is contingent 
on the customs of that community. In my terms, if an agent chooses, then it 
must choose as a regulatory agent, since to be an agent is to be regulatory. That 
agent is responsible for its actions, however irrational they may be by the 
standards of Normal rationality for that type of agent
My thesis is on the metaphysics of agency, based on the use of system and so 
my use of choice and responsibility is that of the system description of the agent 
who acts. Had my thesis been on the metaphysics of moral philosophy, based 
on the use of system then my use of choice and responsibility would be that of 
the community and would have an equal claim to truth. This is not to deny the 
truth of our profound intuition of personal responsibility for our lives. Over the 
relatively short times over which we consider their actions, agents are normally 
unchanged with respect to their decision making properties and, by and large; 
the agent to whom the community attributes personal continuity and 
responsibility, and the agent responsible are sufficiently alike for our intuitions 
to be reliable. Were they not, these customs and concepts would not have been 
viable and would not have evolved within our communities.
Many writers have felt that to accept a deterministic account of our actions is to 
rob us of the dignity which is inherent in our freedom for our own actions and 
our ability to rationally choose. Also, that to accept this is to deny the right of 
members of a community to hold themselves and others responsible for the 
consequences of their actions. What follows must be an account of my own
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intuitions but I believe that the evidence from evolutionary biology and 
neurology that is in so far supports them.
I find dignity in the appreciation that each of us, as we are now, will be 
responsible for any actions that we are about to make and for all of their 
consequences. These actions may result in consequences that will change each 
future self and for each of us; the agent of the here and now, is responsible for 
these. None of us is without responsibility for what he or she is today. Many 
actions of many people in the past and many accidents of history have 
contributed in the historical process that has led to the current person attributed 
in the here and now. This process must be determinate as it has determined 
'what' each person is, although the numerical identity of each person is given by 
their continuity of structure and components, and naming and recognition is 
within the customs of the community. What one is determines what one does. 
In Walt Disney's immortal words "I am what I am and that's what I am." (I 
leave it to the reader to complete the quotation).
To say 'the actions of an agent are determined by what the agent is' is not to say 
that the actions are rational. I have learned rational techniques for predicting the 
likely consequences of my own and others actions and sometimes I use these. 
However, I have learned that my actual actions are chosen within a wider 
rationale. In this sense they are also rational in that each action could in 
principle be predicted from a complete knowledge of my states, including my 
perceptions of recent events. Each of us has been shaped by our own histories. 
In this sense what we are is determined and in this sense each of our actions is 
determined. However, to be an autonomous agent is to maintain an internal 
autonomy against external events that are epistemically contingent.
Each of our actions is determined by our agency but only a selection of the 
states of this agency is available to the narrative recall of consciousness. I 
believe that the distinction between the conscious self and the acting agent is at
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the root of the profound intuitions that many writers have expressed regarding 
spontaneity and personal responsibility. In conscious decision making one is 
aware of the conflict of difficult choice and one will engage in lateral thinking 
to develop a novel solution. In poetry and in music, solutions and ideas 'come 
into consciousness' but within the limits of the 'entry' metaphor, each has come 
from somewhere. Each of us is a unique combination of character and 
disposition with a unique history of exposure to events including ideas. Each of 
our choices is a unique event, uniquely determined by our complex history but 
and this is what I think is found difficult, it is still our choice made by us.
We are all free in so far as we are not physically constrained but each of us is 
constrained by our location, by our physical abilities, mental capabilities and by 
the combination of character and dispositions that make each of us what we are 
now. This combination of constraints is what one is in the here and now. To say 
that it determines one's actions in response to events, which require choice does 
not reduce the freedom to choose. Strawson summarised the apparent paradox 
of objective freedom in the first page of the second chapter of his book:
"Surely we cannot be free agents, in the ordinary, strong, true- 
responsibility-entailing sense, if determinism is true and our actions 
are ultimately wholly determined by "causes anterior to [our]
1 ftpersonal existence" ? And surely we can no more be free if 
determinism is false and it is, ultimately, either wholly or partly a 
matter of chance19 or random outcome that we and our actions are 
as they are?"
18 The quoted clause is from H. Sidgwick, The Methods o f Ethics, p. 66.
19 The current constitution of each o f us is due to the accidents of our experience and 
inheritance, but this is not the 'chance' that Strawson is concerned to oppose.
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This apparent dilemma is a consequence of his definition of freedom. If we 
reject the assumption that freedom must lie in the acceptance of true 
responsibility, where true responsibility is defined in terms of 'desert' and 
accept the contention that our actions are "wholly determined by causes anterior 
to [our] personal existence." Then we can accept the first horn of the dilemma 
since it is clearly not a matter of chance that our actions and we are as they are. 
Our actions are determined by the events that have shaped us and these are 
anterior to our 'personal existence' where the community attributes personhood 
to the ongoing agent. Strawson has denied himself this solution by his 
insistence that true responsibility must entail desert, giving freedom, 
responsibility and desert equal ontological status. In my alternative thesis, agent 
responsibility is determinate and is independent of desert, personal 
responsibility is attributed within the customs of the community and is bound 
up with the attribution of desert.
With this sense of 'freedom' we can only act as free agents if we are not 
constrained and as agents, we act as the agents that we are. We can only be the 
agents that we are if what we are, is determined prior to our action. Thus our 
actions are wholly determined by the events to which they respond and by the 
agents that we are and each of these are causes anterior to our personal 
existence. Secondly, it is partly a matter of chance that our actions are as they 
are since the fact that events require choice by us implies that they are random 
for us and the way in which we are derives from the accidents of history that 
have shaped us. Neither of these statements implies that we are wrong to feel 
free to choose, since our conscious feeling of freedom is a component of 
conscious choice. Or that we are wrong to attribute responsibility since our 
concepts of normative responsibility are woven into us as members of our 
community designated as 'persons'.
My theory of agency is not anthropocentric. My theory of human action is of a 
complex agent for which Normal action is that chosen in virtue of the
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representations and combinatorial processes existent in that animal at the time 
of that action. Humans are very complex agents and they live in communities 
with language but it is as agents that they act. Because of their complex 
integrated agency and language, they can articulate the conscious processes of 
their choice and they call it thought. Because of this, they feel different from 
other less complex natural agents without language and their theories of 
conscious action have emphasised this difference. I do not feel belittled by the 
appreciation that the decisions which I make are made for me by my states that 
I call my reasons just as my cat goes out at night for her reasons. My dignity for 
me lies in my autonomy and I hope that for the cat it is the same.
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IMPLICATIONS
If we believe in a world solely comprised of some physical stuff, causally 
closed and causally symmetric in unidirectional time then it follows that we, 
who are in this world, are of the same stuff. This is the thesis of naturalism. If 
we believe that the phenomena of this world, including the phenomena of our 
perception, are constrained by universal physical laws that describe our 
expectations from similar events then this thesis implies that the way we are is 
constrained by these same laws. Not to believe in these implications is to 
believe that we are in some way set aside from the world that we are in. If we 
also believe that this world is all that there is, then we can only explain how we 
have become what we are, in terms of a causal history of accidental events. To 
ask why we are what we are, is not a sensible question unless we believe in 
some purpose transcendental to this world. This is not to say that there is no 
such purpose; the challenge faced by the thesis of naturalism is to assume 
nothing that is not explicable within a framework of physical cause.
We observe our world and ourselves within it and as observers we can 
comprehend what it is to be an observer. A theory that explains the physical 
context of observation is the theory of agency. We cannot prove this theory, we 
can only test it by observing phenomena in the world, experimenting with 
artefacts and considering its plausibility. Does it fit within our framework of 
physical law? Does it account for the phenomena of biology and the other life 
sciences? If we accept this theory then we have an austere account of man in 
nature. Accidents of physics led to the formation of this universe, which has 
included this planet circling this sun. Accidents of physics, describable within 
the science of chemistry, led to the phenomena of life: apt for system 
description in terms of agency, reproduction and autopoiesis. Accidents of
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genetic evolution, describable within the science of biochemistry, have led to 
the complexities of ecology and cognitive process that we see in our current 
taxonomy of life. Further accidents of genetic and social evolution have led to 
the development of human linguistic communities and the practices of 
communication, observation and description. Within these practices we speak 
of purpose but these are the purposes of our daily lives. Because of the ubiquity 
of purpose in our descriptions of our daily lives our intuition is to look for 
purpose in our aetiology. As naturalists, we test this intuition and fail to justify 
it.
The signs that denote things in our world are given conventional meaning for us 
by our practices of use to refer to such things. By our agency we classify our 
world for us. Any thing that we name, we name because it has natural meaning 
for us through the classifications of our agency. The conventional meaning of 
the symbol for us is the relation between our perceptions-of-agency of the 
symbol and our perceptions-of-agency of the thing. As agents we do not name, 
we act. Our Normal cognitive processes of agency cause us to act in ways that 
are for our goals in the light of our representations. There is then a relation 
between the content of our representations and the content of the world 
represented such that the natural meaning of the world that is represented is the 
natural meaning of the representation and this relation can be thought of as 
truth. But this thought is in language: as agents we do not think, we act. 
Conventional truth and conventional meaning are concepts in a metalanguage, 
only available after semantic ascent. Natural truth and natural meaning are 
concepts within a theory of agency but this theory can only be articulated in a 
metalanguage that includes the denotation of propositions. It is in this 
metalanguage that truth and meaning can be defined.
If the conventional meaning of a symbol perceived corresponds with the natural 
meaning of a thing perceived then we speak of the symbol as true. By our 
theories of our world we generalise and distinguish between realist and anti­
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realist conceptions of truth. To be a realist about a concept is to hold that 
application of this concept tracks a state of the world classified for us by our 
agency or derived from such classifications by theories that we hold true. Our 
intrinsic representations within agency are real states, realised in the neural 
states that are physically caused by our perceptions of real physical states in the 
world. That an attribution of belief is a state of a linguistic community does not 
make it any less real. Its realisation is within the conventional articulations of 
the community and these articulations are actions that have been caused by 
perception of agents in the world by agents in the community. Such attributions 
will be reliable in so far as the perceptions of the community and their theory of 
one another's goals are reliable. That such practices of attribution and the 
attribution conditions for belief have survived implies that they are appropriate 
for the survival of the community.
We are in the world and we are of the world. We are also observers of the world 
that includes ourselves. The accidents of history that have led to our existence 
as active, sentient and articulate observers have enabled each of us to recognise 
the responsibility of our own unique agency. Through the self and articulately 
shared, consciousness of our linguistic communities, we accept responsibility 
for the personal development of others and ourselves. That we have occurred by 
accident and that our choices are to do with the contingent in our lives does not 
imply that we lack choice or personal responsibility for our futures. That a 
psychopath has been created by the actions of others is a fact of history that 
places responsibility on those others who, as agents, were responsible for their 
actions. But this does not change the current pathology or change the current 
physical and personal responsibility of that agent for his or her actions. We 
cannot be solely responsible for what we are; we cannot be responsible for the 
contingent events that make us choose; but, who we are is what we are and we 
are responsible for what we do
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The range of complexity of realisation between the austere agency of a 
bacterium, plant organ or thermostatic control and the rich learning agency of a 
normal living human is vast. Also, the advent of socialisation and language has 
led to complex emergent phenomena such as the attribution of personhood and 
belief and our political and economic institutions. My task has been to show 
that these phenomena, though complex beyond theoretical prediction, are not 
mysterious.
The agent at the instant, continually changing in its realisation of intrinsic 
representations and cognitive process and the person recognised as an ongoing 
entity within the social grouping of agents, is the same physical entity. The 
same intrinsic representations within agency that are causally maintained by 
perception, of world states, speech and text, and that cause action by each 
human agent are components in the holisms of perception that are recognised 
by each person of themselves and others and cause attributions of responsibility 
and belief.
Although so far, none of our artefacts compare with us in the rich complexity of 
our integrated agency, the principle difference between them and us is of 
function: not ‘function o f  but ‘function for’. We organic agents owe the rich 
variety of our agency to our evolutionary history. Although we can speak of our 
organic structure as realising the functional requirements of perception, 
representation, cognitive processes and action, our function is for ourselves. 
The primary goal of any life form is set by its autopoiesis. However, since it 
survives in a contingent world a basic goal within the theory of its agency is to 
survive. Other goals of complex organisms emerge from the evolution of 
complexity of classification of the world for them. Our goals have evolved 
biologically and socially and they have been shaped by our own on-going 
agency but they are ours. Our artefacts, however complex and to whatever 
extent their agency or autopoiesis is delegated, owe their goals to us and their 
initial function is for us. It may be that any such artefact could cease to have
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function for us and through an artificially created autopoiesis, have function for 
itself but its function would still stem from our agency.
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APPENDIX A 
AUTOPIESIS, ALLOPOIESIS, AETIOLOGY AND AGENCY: 
CRITERIA FOR LIFE 
A l.l  The Concept of Autopoiesis
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela created the concept of autopoiesis in 
the early 1970s to identify those system characteristics that distinguish the 
living from the non-living. Since then, autopoiesis and its applications has 
become a discipline in its own right as various writers, including its creators, 
have considered the application of the concept to problem areas as diverse as 
law, family therapy and social organisation.1 In developing this concept, 
Maturana and Varela brought together four fundamental observations about the 
nature of living systems:
Firstly, their autonomy. Although any living thing may depend on 
another for its survival, each living thing is a separate entity, 
bounded in space and self-defined.
Secondly, life is a physical phenomenon. Every token phenomenon 
can be explained in physical causal terms.
Thirdly, the phenomena of life are explained within descriptions 
made by observers who are themselves living entities, external to 
the phenomena that they describe. Observers can perceive an entity 
and its environment and enter into relations of perception with each.
The physical components of an entity can only relate to other 
components.
1 A summary o f autopoiesis and its applications can be found in Mingers, (1995)
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Fourthly, since they are rooted in physical cause, the phenomena of 
life are, in the terminology of 2.6, above, accidental. Explanations 
of life should have no recourse to ideas of teleological function or 
purpose. The observable phenomena of living systems result purely 
from the causal interactions of causally contiguous components.
Any explanation of these interactions in terms of function is by an 
observer who can interact with the component and the whole.
In these terms they concluded that; what makes an entity living is that it is 
organised in such a way that all its components and processes jointly produce 
those self-same components and processes, thus establishing an autonomous 
self-producing entity. This autonomous self-production of autonomy is what is 
meant by autopoiesis. The structure of living entities is such that they produce 
and maintain themselves. Entities that are active but do not produce themselves 
are allopoietic, that is, 'other producing'. Cars, robots and factories are 
allopoietic. They change the world and they produce things but what is 
produced is other than them. Autopoietic entities are self-producing, allopoietic 
entities are other producing. Cars or factories, however automated or 
regulatory, may produce services such as transportation or things that are used 
elsewhere but do not produce themselves. In the terminology of this thesis, an 
entity can have agency without being autopoietic.
A1.2 Criteria for Autopoiesis
Maturana, (1980), defined an autopoietic system as:
A dynamic system that is defined as a composite unity as a network 
of production of components that,
2 Maturana and Varela speak o f teleonomy to emphasise the instrumental nature o f purpose 
attributed by an observer.
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a) through their interactions recursively regenerate the network of 
productions that produced them, and
b) realise this network as a unity in the space in which they exist by 
constituting and specifying its boundaries as surfaces of cleavage 
from the background through their preferential interactions within 
the network.
Varela et al., (1974), gave a six point key for the identification of an autopoietic 
system which can be summarised as follows:
(i) Has the entity an identifiable boundary?
(ii) Can the entity be described as constituted by components?
(iii) Is the entity apt for description as a mechanism or structure of 
mechanisms?
(iv) Do the components that constitute the boundaries do so in 
virtue of their own mechanisms?
(v) Are the components of the boundary produced by the 
mechanisms of the entity either of itself or by transformation of 
substance imported through the boundary?
(vi) If questions (i) through (v) are answered positively and all other 
components of the entity are either produced by the interaction of 
components as in (v) or are permanent constitutive components that 
partake in the production of other components then you have an 
autopoietic entity in the space in which its components exist.
The first three criteria require that the entity be apt for system description as a 
physical mechanism. The remaining three questions set out the central notion of 
autopoiesis; the notion of an autonomous entity that, in virtue of its own 
organisation, maintains not only its own components and boundary but also 
maintains that organisation. In Maturana's terminology, a living entity is 
structurally determined and organisationally closed. Structural changes
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maintain the organisation that defines the identity of the living entity. In the 
terminology of this thesis, living things are apt for description, within a closed 
system, as autopoietic in that they are characterised by a circular organisation of 
processes that continually produce and replace the components and boundary 
necessary to that organisation
A1.3 The Place of the Observer
"Everything said is said by an observer. ... The observer is a living 
system and an understanding of cognition as a biological 
phenomenon must account for the observer and his role in it."
It was in these terms that Maturana commenced his essay on the "Biology of 
Cognition" that set the stage for his co-development of the concept of 
autopoiesis. Life and its manifestations do not depend on their being observed. 
But the description of life and its explanation does depend on the evolution of 
living things that, through the complexity of their cognitive processes and the 
consensual interactions of language can describe and explain those processes 
that constitute their own living organisation.
A1.4 Autonomy and Function
In their description of autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela eschew the notions of 
function and purpose.
Autopoiesis specifies certain necessary condition and if these arise 
then an autopoietic unity is established ... There is no need for 
functionalist explanations or teleonomic ideas such as purpose in 
the explanation of living things. (Mingers, 1993, p. 38)
3 Part 1 o f (Maturana and Varela, 1980)
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[I]f living systems are physical autopoietic machines, teleonomy 
becomes only an artifice of their description, which does not reveal 
any feature of their organisation, but which reveals the consistency 
of their operation within the domain of observation. Living systems 
as physical autopoietic machines are purposeless. (Maturana and 
Varela, 1980, p. 86)
Maturana and Varela distinguish not between 'function' and 'realisation' but 
between 'organisation' and 'structure'.
[Organisation] refers to the relations between components that 
define and specify an entity as apt for description as a system of a 
particular class and determine its properties as an entity.
[Structure] refers to the actual components, their relations and how 
these determine the space taken by the entity but the structure does 
not determine the properties of the entity.
This appears close to the distinction between function and realisation given in 
2.9 above, wherein some capacity of an entity is explained by reference to some 
component of that entity, the presence of which enables that capacity, and the 
function of that component can be realised in alternative physical structures. 
But this appears to oppose the very definition of autopoiesis. There are two 
distinct notions of function in play here. The teleonomic notion of function that 
Maturana and Varela are concerned to oppose is of function fo r , where for  
implies some use of the entity in some application and function of this kind 
would negate the autonomy of autopoiesis. A more modest use of function as 
enabling the essentially self-serving capacity of autopoiesis does not threaten 
the autonomy of autopoiesis and this is the argument that I will pursue.
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A1.5 The Capacity of Autopoiesis
Interpreting the above within the methodology of this thesis: the capacity of 
autopoiesis can be described within a containing system that has no explanatory 
need for inclusion of an environment and in this sense, the system is closed. 
The system will include the boundary of the entity and those components so 
structured that they comprise a mechanism with processes that maintain the 
boundary, the components and the self-maintaining structure. This does not 
mean that the entity is isolated from its environment. All of these processes will 
dissipate energy and the entity is apt for functional description under another 
system description, open in the Bertalanffy sense, which includes mechanisms 
with the functions of import of energy and excretion of waste.
Also, living things are plastic in that their structure can grow or change in ways 
appropriate to their ongoing autopoiesis. Maturana described those processes by 
which the realisation of autopoiesis in an entity is either enabled or modified by 
environmental perturbations as structural coupling and the dynamic outcome of 
such coupling as ontogenetic structural drift.
This mode of description of an entity is essentially self-centred. An entity is 
either autopoietic or it is not and with respect to this question, the only 
interaction an autopoietic entity has with its environment are those that trigger 
its birth, ontogenetic change or death. Within this description of autopoiesis, an 
organism does not act, its autopoiesis is functionally autonomous and it is blind 
to the environment due to which it survives, grows or dies.
Agency, as I have defined it, is concerned with action in the world and an entity 
is characterised as having agency in so far as it manifests the capacity for action 
in the world that is for  it. Autopoiesis as defined by Maturana and Varela is 
concerned with self maintenance in the world and an entity is characterised as 
being autopoietic in so far as it manifests the capacity to maintain its own
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organisation by its own structure. From this analogy, it seems reasonable to 
apply the methodology of functional explanation to the mechanisms of 
autopoiesis.
From Varela's six point check list an entity is autopoietic if:
(i) The entity has physical boundaries and these boundaries have the 
function of maintaining organisational closure whilst facilitating 
structural coupling, (ii), (ii) and (iv) There are components of the 
entity and these have function within a system description of the 
entity as mechanism. Any physical causal explanation of such a 
mechanism will explain how specific physical interactions realise 
functional components of the mechanism, (v) & (vi) If the 
components of the boundaries of the entity and other components 
are produced by interaction between components of the entity and 
transformations of imported substance then we have the functions 
of production, import and transformation.
In these terms, we have a physical boundary with a function and this function is 
realised by specific causal relations between components of the entity. We have 
a functional organisation that enables the capacity of autopoiesis. This is 
realised in the structure of components that comprise mechanisms and these 
mechanisms realise the functions of importation, transformation, production 
and excretion that enable the capacity of autopoiesis.
A1.6 The Complementarity of Autopoiesis and Agency
Autopoiesis describes a living entity from the inside. The function of self­
maintenance may be partially realised by homeostatic mechanisms and these 
satisfy the criteria for agency but such functional components are not 
autopoietic if they are maintained within the autonomous organism. Maturana's 
concept of structural coupling is of an autopoietic entity achieving a dynamic
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balance with its environment, but the real physical world is continually 
changing relative to each entity within it. For autopoiesis to persist in a dynamic 
world any structural coupling must continually adapt to the changes of that 
world. Autopoiesis does not require agency but an autopoietic entity will only 
survive in so far as the dynamic adaptation of its structural coupling can 
maintain those variables essential to its autopoiesis within their essential limits 
against contingent events in the environment, and this requires agency.
Autopoiesis is a necessary criterion for life and agency is a necessary criterion 
for the ongoing maintenance of autopoiesis in an entropic world. The 
explanations of agency place an entity in an environment and require functions 
that relate to the furtherance of the goals of its agency within the environment. 
The explanations of autopoiesis place an environment around an entity and 
require functions that relate to the self-maintenance of the entity.
Autopoiesis requires production and an organisation that gives purpose4 to this 
production. Also, that this purpose be the maintenance of that organisation. 
Production requires the import of material, the metabolism of that material and 
the export of waste
Agency requires action that changes states of the world, perception of states of 
the world, states of the agent that represent states of the world. Also, an 
organisation such that perception of the world by the agent leads to action that 
changes the world in ways that are for the goals of the agent, in particular, its 
goal of remaining autopoietic.
Agency does not logically imply autopoiesis since the function of acting for a 
given purpose against the contingencies of a changing world is independent of
4 Note that this is not the teleological notion o f final purpose.
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the function of self-maintenance. Autopoiesis does not logically imply agency 
since its functional specification as production to maintain the organisation that 
produces, does not mention the environment of risk and resource.
However, any physical entity will exist contingently in the context of an 
unpredictably changing world and the ongoing maintenance of such existence 
by the processes of autopoiesis must depend on agency. In so far as states of the 
world that are relevant to autopoiesis are predictable, in the sense that the 
organisation of the entity can be described as if it were programmed for them, 
then autopoiesis does not require agency. In so far as the world is unpredictable 
for the entity then continued successful autopoiesis requires agency
A1.7 Teleology and Aetiology
If we are concerned to explain the behaviour of an entity in the world then we 
may, in the terms of Dennett, (1987) choose a stance for this explanation. We 
may choose the intentional stance and recognise that the entity is apt for 
description in terms of agency. We may choose the autonomous survival stance 
and recognise that the entity is apt for description in terms of autopoiesis. We 
may choose the historical stance and recognise that the aetiology of the entity is 
apt for description in terms of evolution. If the entity passes our test for the 
autonomy of autopoiesis but fails on agency, although it survives in a changing 
world, then we must conclude that the resources for its autopoiesis are not 
contingent on its relationship to the world. If the entity passes our test for 
agency but is not autopoietic then its purposes do not derive from the purpose 
of maintaining its structure. Either; its goals are inconsistent with its ongoing 
autopoiesis and it will not survive against the contingencies of the environment, 
or it is an artefact and its agency depends on other agency that requires 
explanation. If the entity passes our tests for agency and autopoiesis but has not 
naturally evolved then; either its occurrence is an unexplained accident or its 
purposes are real in the sense contended by Richard Taylor. In this, latter case,
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its agency and autopoiesis are realised within artefacts of other agency that 
require explanation.
Real states of representation and real processes of perception, cognition and 
action can be explained in terms of their function or purpose but the nearest that 
we can get to real purpose without agency is the self maintaining purpose of 
autopoiesis. Because of the ubiquity of attribution of purpose in our daily lives 
we look for purpose within our selves but our purposes derive from our history. 
Our best current explanation of this derivation is our theory of evolution as a 
sequence of accidents by which, living things and their reproduction effect and 
are effected by, one another and their environment. I conclude that necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the attribution of natural life to an entity are
(i) that its autonomy be apt for explanation within the closed system 
description of autopoiesis and
(ii) that its behaviour be apt for explanation within the open system 
description of agency and
(iii) that its aetiology be apt for description in terms of the accidents of 
evolution.
If to be autonomous is not to depend on other agency then autonomous life in a 
physical domain is natural life since it has occurred naturally.
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APPENDIX B 
REQUISITE VARIETY
In his treatment of cybernetics, Ashby, (1956), develops a methodology of 
system description in which states of mechanisms are described in tabular 
terms. He defines a determinate machine a s ;"... that which behaves in the same 
way as a closed single valued transformation." (p. 24). "When a real machine 
and a transformation are so related, the transformation is the canonical 
representation of the machine and the machine is said to embody the 
transformation." (p. 29). Variety is defined with respect to a set and generally, 
the set will be the range of identifiable states of some machine. Any given 
machine will, by its mechanisms, constrain1 the range of values possible for its 
states. With respect to a location within a machine the variety of its possible 
states is the number of distinguishable elements within the set of values that 
describe these states. In these terms regulation can be described as a 
transformation that reduces the flow of variety of some variables, relevant to an 
entity, from an environment within which disturbances to these variables arise. 
Looking ahead; in the diagram on page 251, D is the environment and E is the 
entity, T is the mechanism by which the disturbances reach the entity and R is a 
regulatory mechanism that effects T so as to reduce the flow of variety from D 
to E.
What Ashby proves, within a metaphor of combinatorial games, is that; only 
variety in R can block the variety from D. In a slogan; only variety can destroy 
variety. In the terminology of communication theory, R's capacity as a regulator
1 Within this terminology, the laws o f physics are a constraint on the states possible for a 
machine.
2 Regulation is not just error control. Hiding when stalking prey or the use o f camouflage, are 
examples o f regulation.
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cannot exceed R's capacity as channel of communication. Or, rephrased into the 
metaphor of combinatorial games;
In a formal system that describes a class of events and outcomes 
available to an instigator D and a respondent R, where R is 
controlling against variation due to D, the variety of outcome in R 
cannot be less than the variety of D divided by the variety of R.
Ashby demonstrated this law by a series of simple decision tables.3 These can 
be read either as input tables for an elementary game or as an illustration of a 
principle of regulation. As a game, if the convention of the game is that an item 
in a table is either good or bad for R and R must choose a response to each 
move of D then R will establish some strategy, expressible as a decision table, 
to maximise his benefit from the game.
As a first simple example, consider Table 1, below. If r is attempting to score an 
a then, if D plays 1 then R will play p, if D plays 2 then R plays a  and if D 
plays 3 then R plays y. If R plays according to the strategy:
1 2 3
P a y
He can always force the outcome a. In fact R has complete control.
Table 1
R
a  p y
1 B a c
D 2 A c b
3 C b a
3 Examples are adapted from Ashby, (1956, 202-206).
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Other situations may be less favourable. For example, in table 2, if R wants a or 
d then he can always chose a, if R wants a and d does not play 5 then R need 
only play y. But, if R wants b and D plays 2 or 3 then R loses. These simple 
example begin to show that, in any strategic situation with pay off for a 
respondent, the numerical relationship between the variety of incident states 
and the variety of responses available will be significant.
Table 2
R
a P y 6
1 b d a a
2 a d a d
D 3 d a a a
4 d b a b
5 d a b d
However, tables that require a real response from R are those with no 
repetitions within columns. In such tables, any change by D requires a response 
from R. For example, in Table 3, since no column contains repetition, any 
change by D requires a change by R.
Table 3
D
a
f
k
m
b
c
h
_R
T
f
e
k
b
q
h
d
P
y
k
f
a
b
e
m
d
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R must react 9 times. Since at each decision he has to do something, to choose 
the letter again is just as much a decision as to change and if letters are repeated 
in a row he still has to choose. Suppose he chooses the strategy shown, with its 
outcome in transformation in Table 4
Table 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9
a fi Y B a 13 Y a Y
/ e a b c h d a h
However we interpret R's moves, they represent three unique alternatives. They 
have a variety of 3. Similarly, D's moves have a variety of 9. The outcomes in 
the example have a variety of 7. Our interest here is in how small the outcome 
variety can be and we can show that; for any table, constructed as Table 3, the 
outcome variety cannot be less than
D’s variety
R's variety
This can be readily demonstrated from Table 3. Suppose that at each move in 
response to a move by D, R chooses the column, which will minimise the 
increase in variety. Since this move will introduce a new letter he must change 
column, which may introduce another letter. At best he will have to return to 
the first column after three moves which must increase the variety and by the 
time D's repertoire is exhausted, at least two (in this case) changes will have 
been made. In the example of Table 5, below, it can be seen that R has an 
obvious strategy which will produce an output in which only a, d, and g  occur.
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Table 5
a
R
f i r
1 a b h
2 b a i
3 c b a
4 d c b
D 5 e d c
6 f e d
7 g f e
8 h g f
9 i h g
If the elements of Table 3 are interpreted as possible states of the world, which 
include possible states of an agent, then choices by D can be interpreted as 
actual states of the world and choices by R can be seen as possible responses by 
the agent. It must be remembered that the agent is in the world and is of the 
world. The interpretation of this result in this context is that unpredictability of 
outcome for an agent against a world which varies in ways that are 
unpredictable by the agent can only be reduced, for the agent, in so far as the 
responses available to the agent as regulator are of a variety which, at least, 
matches the variety of challenges in the environment for the agent. Only variety 
in R can force down the variety in D. In so far as the challenges posed by the 
environment are unpredictable, they can be seen as information for the agent 
and the same result can be derived in information theoretic terms4.
4 Rothstein, (1951), equates physical information with negative entropy. But the entropy need 
not be a matter o f thermodynamic states. Any occurrent contingent state can be informative and 
this information may be measured by the relative probabilities o f its alternatives.
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If D, R and E are three variable, such that each can be interpreted as an 
information source; that is, data regarding hitherto unknown states of the world, 
possibly causally independent. Then, if all lie within some stable probability 
distribution, the entropies (in Shannon's usage of the term), can be stated: 
H(D,R,E) is the entropy of the vector with the three as components, H(E|D) is 
the uncertainty in E when D is known, H(R|E,D) is the uncertainty in R when E 
and D are known and so on. The previous criterion, that no element shall occur 
twice in a column, is interpreted as the criterion that the entropy of the outcome 
'E' is not to be less than that of D, that is,
H(E|R) > H(D|R)
From this it can be readily shown, from the multiplication axiom for general 
events,
P(A,B) = p(A)p(B|A) = p(B)p(A|B),
that
H(E) > H(D) + H(R|D) - H(R).
The implication of this is that the entropy of the outcome has a certain 
minimum and that this is least when H(R|D) is zero, that is, when R is a 
determinate function of D and then, H(E) is H(D) - H(R). The minimum value 
of the outcome entropy can only be reduced below that of the disturbance by an 
equal increase in that of the regulator
These results can be interpreted in terms of communication.
T
R
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In the above diagram, D can be interpreted as a source of disturbance or events 
that are epistemically contingent, for the entity R. T can be interpreted as the 
state of the world common to D and R and E as the outcome of states of the 
entity. In terms of variety, if R does nothing then variety in D can pass straight 
through to E. It may not, since T may be such as to block change (an organism 
may not need to seek shelter if it is behind a natural barrier) but generally, 
suppression of variety transmission to E is blocked by variety in R.
Alternatively, R can be seen as a transmitter
D R Tw w
And an alternative formulation of the Law of Requisite Variety is that R's 
capability, as a regulator cannot exceed R's capacity as a channel of 
communication. This is equivalent to Shannon's theorem that the amount of 
noise that can be removed from a correction channel is limited to the amount of 
information that can be carried by that channel.
All organisms are in the business of regulation. This may be the homeostasis of 
the control of internal variables or heterotelic action in the environment fot the 
goals of agency. Each organism that survives by its regulation does so in virtue 
of a variety of types of representational state that at least matches the variety of 
states of the world that may threaten the organism
This theorem applies in time as well as space, organisms may evolve to utilise 
auto correlation and cross correlation in their predicting. Selection pressures 
may favour more rapid response to changing circumstance. They may favour 
integrated processing of several changing phenomena. One result of Ashby's 
gloss on Shannon's theorem is that rate of change and variety of what changes 
are two aspects of the same criterion. Variety in both in time and space offers
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an ecological niche and organisms in that niche will survive that possess the 
regulatory variety to match it.
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GLOSSARY
Accident: If for some given event no causal predecessor can be found by a 
theorist, then the incidence of such an event is effectively random for that 
theorist; It is an accident.
Action: The causal process by which representational states of agency 
intentionally change states of the world, including the agent, for the goals of the 
agent.
Agency: The capacity of an entity in virtue of which the entity acts to maintain 
or attempt to achieve its goals in a dynamic and unpredictable environment.
Allometry: The differential growth rate of parts of the body between members 
of a group.
Allopoietic Machine: A machine which has as its product something different 
from itself, as a car or a university.
Autonomy: Independent of others and having function for itself; surviving as an 
organism independently of other organisms or parts.
Autopoietic Machine: A machine that has as its product; its boundary, its 
structure and the components necessary for its own continuation.
Cause: Two successive, directly or ancestrally, physically contiguous states of 
affairs are apt for description as causally linked iff true descriptions of each are 
available that are within the same domain of physical description. And within 
this domain, they and their intermediate causal ancestors, are connected by 
physical laws such that the second is counterfactually dependent on the first.
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Closed system: A bounded entity is organisationally closed if its organisation 
does not causally depend on its environment. It is materially closed if there is 
no import or export of substance across the boundary
Cognition: Cognitive processes are those causal processes by which perception 
changes representation, representations change representations and 
representations cause actions so as to enable the agency of an entity
Concept: (i) Within the usage of the philosophy of language; possessing a 
concept is knowing what it is for something to be its semantic value. Concepts 
are abstracta, realised in the practices of language. Representations with 
conceptual content are realised within sentences of language spoken by people 
to people about things in the world.
(ii) Within the usage of ethology; concepts may be attributed to a 
organism if their attribution enables the explanation of complex abilities to 
generalise over variable stimuli, to rapidly produce appropriate responses to the 
common features underlying these stimuli and to modify behaviour when it is 
discovered that perceptual stimuli are unreliable guides to underlying features.
Content: The content of a representation is the state of affairs that it represents. 
Content can be conceptual, as in the representations of language or non- 
conceptual as in intrinsic representations within agency. The non-conceptual 
content of intrinsic representations may be described within the concepts of a 
theory.
Contiguity: Two states of affairs may be described as physically contiguous if 
they are in the same domain of physical description and spatiotemporally 
located such that one may imply the other within a physical law.
Cybernetics: The field of cybernetics is the field of control theory and those 
aspects of communication theory that are relevant to control.
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Directive Correlation: The correlation between events in the world and the 
actions of an intentional agent in a goal oriented response to such events. To be 
distinguished from the statistical correlation of events which may or may not 
have a causal explanation.
Entropy: (i) The tendency to disorder in closed physical systems, (ii) A 
statistical measure of the disorder in a closed system, given in terms of the 
disjunctive information latent within the system.
Function: To ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a capacity to it that is 
singled out by its role in an explanatory analysis of some system. When a 
capacity of an entity within a system is appropriately explained by analysing it 
into a number of other capacities, the analysing capacities also emerge as 
functions. A function is a relation in that it is of an item and for an item, 
although an item may have function for itself (see Autonomy)
Goal: The goals of agency are a cut in the set of possible worlds picked out by a 
system description of an agent in the world. In this system an agent may be 
described as pursuing its goals against events in the world that are epistemically 
contingent for it.
Heterotelis: Regulatory mechanisms between an entity and its environment by 
which the entity pursues its goals in the environment.
Homeostasis: Regulatory mechanisms within an organism by which it 
maintains its autopoiesis.
Information: (i) A disjunctive usage connected with the probabilities of 
alternative states of affairs that may be used as a measure of the variety of states 
of the world that are epistemically contingent for an agent,
(ii) A conjunctive usage connected with the combination of
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propositions by a linguistic agent as premises of inference.
Intentionality: A state of an entity is intentional if it is about aspects of the 
world that are relevant for the entity. A description of causal change is a 
description of intentional action if and only if the change can be explained as 
intended by an agent and caused by an intended change of that agent.
Machine: A bounded physical entity with capacities that are functionally 
enabled by mechanisms.
Meaning: A concept within a metalanguage that pertains to the relation between 
the conventional denotation of a term within the object language and the state 
of affairs denoted.
Mechanism, (i) Noun: a nexus of physical cause, seen as a holism in an 
explanatory context.
Mechanism, (ii) Principle: the view that every biological event is a combination 
of physical causation.
Metalanguage: A language in which terms denote items of an object language.
Observer: Anything that is described is described by an observer. The observer 
is an agent, in the world and of the world that contains the agency that the 
observer describes. Although, within language, the observer can recursively 
describe what it is to be an observer describing the agency of an observer, there 
is no transcendental view point from which such description can be made.
Open System: A bounded entity is organisationally open if its organisation 
causally depends on its environment. It is materially open if there is import or 
export of substance across the boundary. Organisms and artefacts of regulation 
may be organisationally closed and materially open. The dynamics of such
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systems may include plasticity in which material transactions lead to 
organisational change in the longer term. Entities in such systems may be 
organisationally closed with respect to short-term dynamics but open in the 
longer term.
Perception: The causal processes by which states of the world change
representational states of agency.
Representation. One item represents another when, in some context or by some 
convention and with some function, that item stands in for another. 
Representations may be classified into three types.
Type I. Symbols, in which the power of representation derives from 
conventions of definition and conventions of interpretation. The function of 
symbolic representation is for the members of the community whose 
conventions define its use and interpretation.
Type II. Icons and natural signs, in which the power of representation derives 
from their natural or artificial resemblance or correlation, but their 
interpretation is by convention. The function of such representation is for the 
interpreter.
Type III. Intrinsic representation in which the representational power derives 
from processes of the entity for which the representation has cognitive function. 
Such entities may be biological or artificial though if artificial, representations 
within the entity will have function for the entity and for its maker.
System: A mode of description, based on a theory, comprised of statements and 
conditionals, that is concerned with the possible outcomes implied by physical 
entities and contingent events in an actual world.
Teleology: A mode of explanation in which current actions of agency are for 
the current goals of agency.
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Text: Any token linguistic transaction that exists subsequent to its initial 
production and to which reference can be made. Text may be realised in the 
marks of textual media or the memories of speakers..
Theory: Causal relations cited between features of a system description of an 
actual physical world constitute a theory. This theory is true if the system is a 
true description of an actual world. System theories may be at the level of 
physical causal mechanisms or they may be at the level of system capacities 
and functional components that enable those capacities.
Truth: A concept within a metalanguage that pertains to the relation between 
the conventional use of an assertive sentence within the object language and the 
state of affairs asserted. The statement, P is T iff p, where ‘P’ is the sentence 
and p is the state of affairs, implies two relations: one between a true usage of a 
sentence and a state of affairs and the other between a state of affairs and a 
putative true usage of the sentence. To express these relations we require a 
meta-metalanguage.
Variety: the number of states in an environment required to be distinguished by 
a regulator.
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GLOSSARY
Accident: If for some given event no causal predecessor can 
be found by a theorist, then the incidence o f such an event is 
effectively random for that theorist; It is an accident.
Action: The causal process by which representational states 
of agency intentionally change states o f the world, including 
the agent, for the goals o f the agent.
Agency: The capacity o f an entity in virtue o f which the 
entity acts to maintain or attempt to achieve its goals in a 
dynamic and unpredictable environment.
Allometry: The differential growth rate o f parts o f the body 
between members o f a group.
Allopoietic Machine: A machine which has as its product 
something different from itself, as a car or a university.
Autonomy: Independent o f others and having function for 
itself; surviving as an organism independently o f  other 
organisms or parts.
Autopoietic Machine: A machine that has as its product; its 
boundary, its structure and the components necessary for its 
own continuation.
Cause: Two successive, directly or ancestrally, physically 
contiguous states o f  affairs are apt for description as causally 
linked iff true descriptions o f  each are available that are 
within the same domain o f physical description and they and 
their intermediate causal ancestors are connected by physical 
laws within that domain such that the second is 
counterfactually dependent on the first.
Closed system: A bounded entity is organisationally closed if  
its organisation does not causally depend on its environment. 
It is materially closed if there is no import or export o f  
substance across the boundary
Cognition: Cognitive processes are those causal processes by 
which perception changes representation, representations 
change representations and representations cause actions so 
as to enable the agency o f an entity
Concept: (i) Within the usage o f  the philosophy o f language; 
possessing a concept is knowing what it is for something to 
be its semantic value. Concepts are abstracta, realised in the 
practices o f language. Representations with conceptual 
content are realised within sentences o f language spoken by 
people to people about things in the world.
(ii) Within the usage o f ethology; concepts may be 
attributed to a organism if their attribution enables the 
explanation o f complex abilities to generalise over variable 
stimuli, to rapidly produce appropriate responses to the 
common features underlying these stimuli and to modify 
behaviour when it is discovered that perceptual stimuli are 
unreliable guides to underlying features.
Content: The content o f  a representation is the state o f affairs 
that it represents. Content can be conceptual, as in the 
representations o f language or non-conceptual as in intrinsic 
representations within agency. The non-conceptual content 
of intrinsic representations may be described within the 
concepts o f a theory.
Contiguity: Two states o f  affairs may be described as 
physically contiguous if they are in the same domain of 
physical description and spatiotemporally located such that 
one may imply the other within a physical law.
Cybernetics: The field o f cybernetics is the field o f control 
theory and those aspects o f communication theory that are 
relevant to control.
Directive Correlation: The correlation between events in the 
world and the actions o f an intentional agent in a goal 
oriented response to such events. To be distinguished from 
the statistical correlation o f events which may or may not 
have a causal explanation.
Entropy: (i) The tendency to disorder in closed physical 
systems, (ii) A statistical measure o f the disorder in a closed 
system in terms o f the disjunctive information latent within 
the system.
Function: To ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a 
capacity to it which is singled out by its role in an 
explanatory analysis o f  some system. When a capacity o f an 
entity within a system is appropriately explained by 
analysing it into a number o f other capacities, the analysing 
capacities also emerge as functions. A function is a relation 
in that it is o f an item and for an item, although an item may 
have function for itself (see Autonomous)
Goal: The goals o f agency are a cut in the set o f possible 
worlds picked out by a system description o f an agent in the 
world. In this system an agent may be described as pursuing 
its goals against events in the world that are epistemically 
contingent for it.
Heterotelis: Regulatory mechanisms between an entity and its 
environment by which the entity pursues its goals.
Homeostasis: Regulatory mechanisms within an organism by 
which it maintains its autopoiesis.
Information: (i) A disjunctive usage connected with the 
probabilities o f alternative states o f affairs that may be used 
as a measure o f the variety o f states o f  the world that are 
epistemically contingent for an agent,
(ii) A conjunctive usage connected with the 
combination o f propositions by a linguistic agent as premises 
o f inference.
Intentionality: A state o f an entity is intentional if  it is about 
aspects o f the world that are relevant for the entity. A 
description o f causal change is a description o f intentional 
action if  and only if  the change can be explained as intended 
by an agent and caused by an intended change o f that agent.
Machine: A bounded physical entity with capacities that are 
functionally enabled by mechanisms.
Meaning: A concept within a metalanguage that pertains to 
the relation between the conventional denotation o f a term 
within the object language and the state o f  affairs denoted.
Mechanism, (i) Noun: a nexus o f physical cause, seen as a 
holism in an explanatory context.
Mechanism, (ii) Principle: the view that every biological 
event is a combination o f physical causation.
Metalanguage: A language in which terms denote items o f an 
object language.
Observer: Anything that is described is described by an 
observer. The observer is an agent, in the world and o f the 
world that contains the agency that the observer describes. 
Although, within language, the observer can recursively 
describe what it is to be an observer describing the agency of  
an observer, there is no transcendental view point from which 
such description can be made.
Open System: A bounded entity is organisationally open if its 
organisation causally depends on its environment. It is 
materially open if there is import or export o f substance 
across the boundary. Organisms and artefacts o f regulation 
may be organisationally closed and materially open. The 
dynamics o f such systems may include plasticity in which 
material transactions lead to organisational change in the 
longer term. Entities in such systems may be organisationally 
closed with respect to short-term dynamics but open in the 
longer term.
Perception: The causal processes by which states o f the
world change representational states of agency.
Representation. One item represents another when, in some 
context or by some convention and with some function, that 
item stands in for another. Representations may be classified 
into three types.
Type I. Symbols, in which the power o f representation 
derives from conventions o f definition and conventions o f  
interpretation. The function o f symbolic representation is for 
the members o f the community whose conventions define its 
use and interpretation.
Type II. Icons and natural signs in which the power o f  
representation derives from their natural or artificial 
resemblance or correlation but their interpretation is by 
convention. The function o f such representation is for the 
interpreter.
Type III. Intrinsic representation in which the 
representational power derives from processes o f the entity 
for which the representation has cognitive function. Such 
entities may be biological or artificial though if artificial, 
representations within the entity will have function for the 
entity and for its maker.
System: A mode o f description, based on a theory, comprised 
o f statements and conditionals, that is concerned with the 
possible outcomes implied by physical entities and 
contingent events in an actual world.
Teleology: A mode o f explanation in which current actions of 
agency are for the current goals o f agency.
Text: Any token linguistic transaction that exists subsequent 
to its initial production and to which reference can be made. 
Text may be realised in the marks o f textual media or the 
memories o f speakers..
Theory: Causal relations cited between features o f a system 
description o f an actual physical world constitute a theory. 
This theory is true if the system is a true description o f an 
actual world. System theories may be at the level of physical 
causal mechanisms or they may be at the level o f system 
capacities and functional components that enable those 
capacities.
Truth: A concept within a metalanguage that pertains to the 
relation between the conventional use o f an assertive 
sentence within the object language and the state o f affairs 
asserted. The statement, P is T iff p, where ‘P’ is the sentence 
and p is the state o f affairs, implies two relations: one 
between a true usage o f a sentence and a state of affairs and 
the other between a state o f affairs and a putative true usage 
of the sentence. To express these relations we would require 
a meta-metalanguage.
Variety: the number o f states in an environment required to 
be distinguished by a regulator.
